


Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research

United States Army War College Student Publications

Regionally Aligned Forces: Concept Viability and Implementation



March

2015

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE MAR 2015		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2015 to 00-00-2015	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Regionally Aligned Forces: Concept Viability and Implementation				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 17013				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 160	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research

United States Army War College Student Publications

Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research, an electronic publication of student-faculty work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. Each compendium reports the findings of a major student-faculty research initiative on a topic of strategic importance to the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger community of strategic leaders.

Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research

Larry D. Miller, Editor

Student Publications

Root Hall, B-14


Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5010

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/carlislecompendia>

Design and production courtesy the Institute for Military Writing

Selection Process

Published occasionally, the *Carlisle Compendia* is limited to USAWC student-faculty collaborative research. Inclusion is by invitation only. Lead faculty request consideration of meticulously edited professional manuscripts positioned to address issues of particular import to the Army. After vetting, manuscripts are edited for clarity, economy, length, and style.



Cover

Graphic: *The World with Commanders' Areas of Responsibility*, based on Unified Command Plan, http://www.defense.gov/news/UCP_2011_Map4.pdf.

Disclaimer

The ideas and viewpoints advanced in *Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research* are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the institution, the Department of Defense, or any other department or agency of the United States Government.

Regionally Aligned Forces: Concept Viability and Implementation

Gregory L. Cantwell, Ph.D.

▪

Colonel Tam D. Warren

▪

Colonel Mark E. Orwat

Overview

[Executive Summary](#) 1

[Implications and Recommendations](#) 3

[Essential Resources](#) 15

Research Reports

[RAF and Mission Command](#) 17

Lieutenant Colonel Mark B. Parker and John A. Bonin, Ph.D.

[RAF Movement and Maneuver Warfighting Function](#) 31

Colonel Phillip A. Chambers and Colonel Tam D. Warren

[RAF and Intelligence Warfighting Function](#) 44

Colonel James B. Botters and Colonel Mark A. Haseman

[RAF and Fires Warfighting Function](#) 57

Colonel Gregory M. Smith and Colonel Tam D. Warren

[RAF and Sustainment Warfighting Function](#) 71

Colonel Matthew H. Ruedi and James D. Scudieri, Ph.D.

[RAF and Protection Warfighting Function](#) 82

Colonel Anthony J. Healey and John A. Bonin, Ph.D.

[RAF and SOF Integration](#) 97

Colonel Scott W. Kelly and Colonel Chad A. McGougan

[RAF and ARFORGEN](#) 110

Colonel Robert A. Dawson and Mr. Robert C. Coon

[RAF and JTF Capable HQs](#) 123

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy C. Davis and Colonel Robert M. Balcavage

[RAF and Authorities](#) 139

Colonel Robert J. DeSousa and Colonel Scott J. Bertinetti

Executive Summary

In the fall of 2012, a division commander requested the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) consider the challenges of turning a division headquarters into a joint task force (JTF) headquarters. The USAWC provided onsite assistance to help explore this challenge. One year later, a combatant commander requested that the USAWC consider the challenges of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept. The combatant commander's deployed headquarters faced many of the same challenges identified in 2012. A division headquarters of approximately 150 personnel, deployed under the RAF concept, is smaller than would be expected as an operational JTF. Although focused on division-level challenges, the commander forward asked the USAWC team to consider the broader implications of implementing RAF across the Army. In response, the USAWC established a student/faculty study group to address this strategic issue. The USAWC Study Group examined the RAF concept, explored capability and capacity shortages, and considered the compounded effect of related implications from the different Warfighting Functions. Organized across the Army Warfighting Functions (WfFs)¹ and through the lenses of Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF),² this compendium reports the results of that effort.

The Army defines Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) as: 1) those units assigned or allocated to combatant commands, and 2) those service-retained, combatant command-aligned forces prepared by the Army for regional missions. They are drawn from the total force, including the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve.³ RAF consist of organizations and capabilities that are forward stationed, operating in a combatant command area of responsibility, and supporting (or ready to support) combatant commands through reach-back capabilities from outside the area of responsibility. Furthermore, RAF conduct operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities.⁴ In theory, the RAF concept provides a scalable, tailorable capability to meet combatant commanders' steady-state and phase zero shaping requirements. Additionally, the RAF concept improves the Army's ability to provide culturally and regionally aware forces for specific missions. As U.S. bases overseas are reduced, the challenge will be to maintain robust regional engagement. The RAF concept is designed to meet this challenge.

Neither the Secretary of Defense nor any combatant commanders have directed the Army to implement RAF. Since 2001, the revised global defense posture and the pursuit of increased cost savings have shifted force basing back to the United States. Increased emphasis on U.S.-based forces could undermine our current global posture. The RAF concept, however, increases the operational tempo of the U.S.-based troops and correspondingly increases annual operating costs. When compared to traditional U.S.-based training activities, RAF is an Army-induced cost that must be addressed when explaining the concept.

The Army's mission, and the justification for force structure, remains to fight and win the nation's wars. The Army force generation (ARFORGEN) model directs Army units to prepare for likely military scenarios as prioritized in the defense strategy. ARFORGEN drives the prioritization of training resources. RAF is the supporting concept that drives force alignment for shaping operations within a theater or region. Shaping operations should be aligned with the prioritization of resources in ARFORGEN and the defense strategy. In a resource-constrained environment the supporting nature of the RAF concept should not be confused with the primary mission. In earlier times, combatant commands were assigned troops to perform

the supported mission. Assigned forces conducted shaping operations and performed across the spectrum of conflict, to include theater and regional security cooperation activities. The RAF concept provides forces to a combatant commander without the full expense of forward basing. Regionally Aligned Forces, however, cannot easily prepare for ARFORGEN and RAF missions simultaneously. Opportunity costs among conflicting activities, training opportunities, and missions will occur. The strategic narrative must clearly articulate that RAF support combatant commanders' missions to prepare to fight and win the nation's wars. Current confusion about why the Army is implementing the RAF concept makes it appear that the RAF concept is a self-generated mission designed to ensure relevancy of a U.S.-based Army. The RAF concept is not the supported mission of the Army, nor should it appear to be.

As with any new management concept, however, adopting RAF comes with both opportunities and challenges. RAF provide the Army with planning predictability, i.e., the ability to provide forces to the combatant commander if and when needed. Forecasting operational requirements more effectively will enable the Army to better anticipate costs and prioritize budgets. In order to mitigate the effects of reduced budgets, the Army will continue to reduce its overall end strength. Reduction initiatives will require the force to be efficiently manned, trained, and equipped to meet global security requirements. The RAF concept provides a fresh and responsive means for managing the force, while providing better support to the combatant commander.

USAWC Study Group Leads

Gregory L. Cantwell, Ph.D.

Colonel Tarn D. Warren

Colonel Mark E. Orwat

Notes

¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 16, 2012, p. 3-6. The six warfighting functions are: Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, and Protection. "Commanders use the warfighting functions to help them exercise command and to help them and their staffs exercise control. A *warfighting function* is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. All warfighting functions possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects. The Army's warfighting functions link directly to the joint functions."

² Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1, *The Army*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 14, 2005, p. 4-1.

³ Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh, *Army Total Force Policy*, Army Directive 2012-08, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, September 04, 2012, p. 2.

⁴ Kimberly Field, James Learmont and Jason Charland, "Regionally Aligned Forces; Business Not as Usual," *Parameters* Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2013, p. 56.

Implications & Recommendations

The USAWC Study Group considered the impact of the RAF concept within fiscal constraints, the changing future environment, the joint operating environment, and new strategic guidance as the Army transitions toward steady-state and shaping operations. While the Army has been doing steady-state and shaping operations for decades, adoption of the RAF concept will stimulate new concerns, opportunities, and challenges, many of which are addressed herein. Analysis was organized across ten areas: the six Army warfighting functions (WFFs), special operations forces (SOF), the army force generation (ARFORGEN) process, joint task force headquarters, and legal authorities. Implications and recommendations for each are included in this section and organized in accord with the more in-depth reports that comprise the remainder of the compendium.

Mission Command

Implications

1. The RAF concept requires leaders to embrace the mission command philosophy.
2. Additional materiel solutions to facilitate remote communications at all deployed levels will be required.
3. The distributed nature of RAF missions will necessitate additional mission command systems below battalion level in order to enable dispersed forces to create shared understanding before, during, and after missions.
4. The RAF concept will require “digitally enabled” Army forces below the battalion level.
5. The Army must accommodate enhanced requirements for testing and evaluating the communication systems necessary to support the RAF concept.
6. All Army corps and division headquarters lack a joint presence in cyber space and joint internet protocol addresses (IPs) necessary to enable joint mission command systems required for a JTF Headquarters.

Recommendations

1. Conduct further analysis of the RAF concept to provide a JTF capable headquarters based on the growing complexity of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment combined with the mandated 25 percent reduction in staff manpower.
2. All forces should continue to be assigned, allocated, or apportioned to the combatant commands. The service retained combatant command aligned (SRCA) relationship should be discontinued to the maximum extent possible. To fully gain the benefits of building relationships and understanding within a combatant command, more forces should be assigned to combatant commands.

3. At a minimum, each ASCC should have an assigned division headquarters. ASCCs with assigned division headquarters bring stability from the strategic level through the operational level to the tactical level for each theater. The division headquarters can then act as a stabilizing influence that will reduce turmoil and confusion as brigades rotate in and out of their available phases. Additionally, with a 25 percent staff reduction in both ASCC and division headquarters, efficiencies created by long term relationships are vital.
4. Establish a deliberate exercise program between the ASCC, the assigned division headquarters, and the allocated RAF brigades using scenarios from the specific theater. A well-executed exercise program builds cohesive teams, develops trust and relationships, and creates shared understanding. The combat training centers utilize the Leader Training Program (LTP) to achieve this result, which could also work for RAF units. Additionally, exercises enable each unit to test its communications systems prior to execution, reinforce reporting requirements, and develop battle rhythms that ensure better command and control.
5. ASCCs must develop training programs that ensure RAF units can execute the required network administration for joint communications when called upon to be JTF HQs. A program focusing on joint network certifications, policies, and procedures will greatly enhance a unit's ability to execute a JTF mission.
6. Each ASCC should create a theater specific mission essential equipment list (MEEL) along with requests for any unfulfilled requirements. These specific requirements and capability gaps should drive the combatant command's Integrated Priority List (IPL) and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) submissions. Validated requirements would enable the acquisition system to develop appropriate solutions.
7. As solutions for RAF capability gaps are developed, they should be fielded to each combatant commands' assigned division headquarters. The division can then train and employ the solutions as necessary to ensure each RAF brigade has an appropriate toolkit to handle the scale and scope of security cooperation activities. As BCTs rotate in and out of each combatant command, the permanently assigned division headquarters can maintain the required expertise to install, operate, and maintain systems.
8. Expand the scope of the network integration exercise (NIE) to include steady-state activities and all six phases of operations. With the potential for leveraging commercial solutions, the NIE should be modified to incorporate RAF communications requirements. Executed semianually, NIE provides a unique opportunity to rapidly inject commercial off-the-shelf solutions into the Defense Acquisition System.
9. A JTF headquarters' mission command system should occupy IP space at the DoD/Joint level to enable subordinate service networks to establish trusted network connections (e.g., Army HQs utilizing Army IP addresses will have difficulty connecting to a Navy HQs utilizing Navy IP addresses due to challenges associated with network trust).

Movement and Maneuver

Implications

1. The RAF concept increases demand for reconnaissance forces while amplifying the requirement for an enhanced approach to reconnaissance.
2. The RAF concept highlights existing capability and identifies the capacity gaps inherent in organic BCT reconnaissance forces.
3. The RAF concept enhances the need to expand the movement and maneuver warfighting function's strategic role in deterring conflict and shaping the operational environment.

4. The RAF concept increases the requirement for strategic movement and force projection agility.

Recommendations

1. The Army Chief of Staff should clarify the definition of RAF for shared understanding and normalization.
2. The Army should codify in doctrine the expanded role of movement and maneuver in preventing conflict and shaping the operational environment.
3. The Army should modify training manuals to capture the conditions in which movement and maneuver tasks are performed in support of the RAF concept.
4. The Army should designate reconnaissance as a warfighting function. Doing so will emphasize its critical importance and compel increased attention to the planning and execution of reconnaissance across the range of military operations.
5. The Army should increase a BCT's capability to conduct reconnaissance by standardizing reconnaissance squadrons and platoon formations in all BCTs in support of the range of military operations.
6. To prevent the possibility of creating a hollow force, the Army should adopt a new approach to the ARFORGEN process; one that creates a higher base level of readiness across the Army through improved manning, equipping and training strategies.¹
7. In order to meet rapid deployment requirements, DoD should plan for and improve the capacity of domestic and foreign installations which provide optimal locations for strategic movement by air or sea.

Intelligence

Implications

1. The RAF concept requires a versatile mix of intelligence capabilities and expertise across the total force (AC, ARNG, USAR, and DA Civilians). The intelligence warfighting function (IWfF) must execute numerous RAF tasks, including: providing support to a JTF-capable HQ, providing forward stationed forces and capabilities, executing reach-back support from outside the AOR, conducting language proficiency, and providing regional expertise and cultural knowledge (LREC) training across the total force.² The intelligence training and certifications needed to execute these tasks necessitates synchronized allocation of IWfF resources across the total force.
2. The RAF concept builds upon the material and personnel solutions used to prepare intelligence personnel and units for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, many of these practices are cost prohibitive given the current fiscally constrained environment. Capability gaps will be created.
3. The cumulative effects of costly IWfF training solutions, force modernization efforts, accelerated force drawdown and anticipated reductions in headquarters will significantly curtail the ability to execute RAF tasks.

Recommendations

1. Establishing an effective JTF Intelligence Directorate requires significant re-structuring and augmentation to corps or division intelligence staffs in a JTF HQ. Creating joint manning document (JMD) templates using corps and division MTO&Es against the different JTF mission parameters would enhance the transition to a JTF HQ. These templates could also identify to the CCDR the enabler support required to facilitate command and control between the CCDR and the JTF HQ.

2. Foreign disclosure officer (FDO) requirements, coalition and joint network integration, or simply organizing the IWfF staff effort for a JTF headquarters requirements quickly overwhelm the intelligence staffs in corps and division HQs. The Army and the IWfF should invest in the capabilities inherent within the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). The intelligence support functional teams concept within the Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE) within the JECC would help coordinate, manage, and synchronize intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination within the IWfF of the JTF.³
3. A comprehensive IWfF troop-to-task assessment for the personnel, equipment, and facilities is needed for reach-back or split-based operations in both corps and divisions. The requirements may drive certain intelligence capabilities to reside in the reach-back location with none of the discipline moving forward. The IWfF can only provide the appropriate level of confidence to the forward command if resourced and organized appropriately at both locations.
4. A comprehensive review of the IWfF Title 10 functions and responsibilities must occur to clearly define responsibilities and resources required to execute the RAF specified and implied tasks. While the MSE is a FORSCOM initiative, it does not cover the total force IWfF requirements. Failure to address this issue early in the RAF operational concept will lead to friction and gaps in the IWfF's ability to support RAF across the DOTMLPF.
5. DA G2, INSCOM, FORSCOM and TRADOC must create a working group to assess the ability of RAF units to perform Foundry training and IROC across the total force. While certain installations have improved IT infrastructure and capabilities within existing SCIFs, only a finite amount of space is available. INSCOM can provide valuable insights as the subject matter expert with its extensive experience in building SCIFs for both CONUS and OCONUS locations.
6. Consolidate the culture and language training for both Army linguists and general purpose forces (GPF) under one proponent. Doing so allows for a more prudent use of resources to train regionally aligned GPF and assigned Army linguists. The Army Civil Affairs (CA) branch could assume this mission and provide divisions and their assigned BCTs with culture and language training oversight. The increased emphasis the RAF concept places on culture and language should force the Army to align the CA companies, currently consolidated at the 85th CA Brigade, under the BCT and division structure. These CA Soldiers can provide valuable training to both GPF and the 35P Army cryptologic linguists authorized in each Army BCT.
7. Recommend the DA G2 staff provide analysis and subject matter experts to the DA G8 for facility and infrastructure enhancements to fully implement reach-back, Foundry training, IROC, and IWfF support to a JTF HQs. The DA G2 staff must capture the baseline of equipment and facilities needed to implement the RAF concept. Only by incorporating this information can the DA G8 accurately determine the costs associated with RAF implementation.
8. Staff DA PAM 600-3 and DA PAM 611-21 across the active component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves to determine the knowledge, skills and attributes (KSAs) needed for a regionally-aligned and globally-engaged Army. The IWfF should consider KSAs that include regional and cultural understanding, critical thinking skills, strategic agility, building strategic networks, and balancing assignments between tactical and operational level intelligence formations. Adjust officer and NCO career progression charts to incorporate longer time in grade and longer unit dwell times for a smaller and more stable force.
9. The Army Staff should complete a Total Army Analysis (TAA) that captures the grade plate reductions, FY15 draw down of forces, and the 25 percent reduction in two-star level and above headquarters initiatives

to identify the loss of capabilities associated with these changes. Due to the near simultaneity of the events, second and third order effects these reductions will have upon the RAF concept have yet to be determined.

10. Create consolidated BCT SCIFs on installations which allow BCT IWfF staffs to use their assigned tactical joint worldwide intelligence community system (JWICS) capable systems and distributed common ground system- Army (DCGS-A) in a garrison environment. This basic facility would have the same perimeter and interior security required for a SCIF. Each BCT would have space to conduct all source intelligence analysis within a JWICS enabled environment. Using assigned tactical JWICS and DCGS-A systems does not require the robust IT infrastructure that the larger SCIFs contain. BCT intelligence staffs would simply require an area that allows for securing the tactical vehicle systems within the sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) accredited security perimeter, attach the system to the prime power and run network cables inside the building to the tactical DCGS-A systems. When required to deploy, these BCT IWfF staffs simply unplug the tactical systems and depart.

Fires

Implications

1. The RAF concept will increase demand for deployable fires training systems and simulators.
2. The RAF concept will increase demand for capabilities to support inform and influence activities (IIA).
3. The RAF concept creates increased demand for ‘non-traditional’ military education if force personnel are to be proficient and regionally aligned.
4. The RAF concept must be incorporated into professional military education (PME) at the earliest appropriate time to ensure leaders are regionally aware, culturally sensitive, and better prepared to operate in a decentralized environment.

Recommendations

1. Adapt existing and create new fires training simulators and systems that are easily-deployable by small teams and by military and commercial air. These systems must be ruggedized and operable in environments with unreliable commercial power supplies (e.g., simulators that support training in fire support, fire direction, cannon operations, air defense, and numerous computer-assisted IIA modules).
2. Create an inform and influence activity (IIA) battalion aligned with each geographic combatant command to better leverage strategic messaging. The IIA functions would gain increased effectiveness if the Soldiers were more regionally aware and able to capitalize on that awareness.
3. The Army should increase non-traditional training and education available for leaders. Broadening opportunities (e.g., internships, interagency training, formal civilian education, and working with NGOs) provide a diversity of experiences and perspectives that serve the Army well in the long run. AR 600-3, *The Personnel Development System*, should be updated to reflect these new career opportunities.
4. The Army should consider a 4-year rotation cycle between ARFORGEN and RAF support missions. An extended rotation cycle would reduce personnel turbulence, mitigate drops in readiness, and save money. Additionally, the Army should develop training packages for RAF units that better deliver training in decentralized and austere environments.

5. Assign a foreign area officer (FAO) to the division and corps staffs. The FAO has unique training, skills, and experiences that would better enable the division and corps commander to navigate the interagency environment as well as provide a unique cultural perspective to the planning staff.
6. Revise and update current professional military education (PME) to reflect the emerging RAF doctrine and requirements. The RAF concept calls for agile and adaptive leaders who can operate in austere environments with minimal oversight. The PME process must develop and foster these skills as well as provide a framework for cultural understanding among Army leaders.

Sustainment

Implications

1. The RAF concept increases requirements for enhanced sustainment, coordination, and synchronization efforts between the Army service component commands (ASCC), RAF units, and sustainment enablers.
2. Deployed RAF units may have to be capable of independent self-support. RAF units will likely deploy in small decentralized teams without the support of an established logistics support area (LSA) and may have to independently support themselves.
3. ASCCs must continue to include RAF units in their sustainment plans.

Recommendations

1. Consider combining EUCOM and AFRICOM in the Unified Command Plan to improve efficiency. This change would consolidate all sustainment forces (21st TSC & 16th Sustainment BDE) under one CDR for planning and execution purposes.
2. Regionally align each active duty sustainment brigade with a division and CCMD. This would combine the sustainment assets and division C2 together as they support each region. This would also ensure expeditionary timeliness and give the supported CDR coordinated sustainment in his campaign plan.
3. Build an equipment activity set (EAS) for AFRICOM and PACOM, similar to the package recently completed to support EUCOM. These sets ensure RAF is expeditionary in response time and allows the CDRs enhanced employment flexibility. The density list should include a combined arms battalion, brigade C2 element, and enablers.

Protection

Implications

1. The RAF concept will increase demand for protection warfighting function (PWfF) tasks during steady state and shaping operations.
2. Anticipated theater and joint level headquarters staff reductions will hamper the ability to meet the protection requirements generated by RAF implementation.
3. The RAF concept will increase the demand for TSC activities, including many military police (MP) tasks.
4. Theater security cooperation and state partnership programs need to be integrated into protection doctrine.

5. Small units deployed to remote areas should have SOF-like communications packages to enhance protection.

Recommendations

1. The Joint Staff or a selected proponent must review Joint Publication 3-10 *Joint Security Operations* which focuses on combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and decisive action, but does not address TSC activities within the joint security area. DoD must develop a joint publication to address steady-state operations or security cooperation as future operations will increasingly emphasize those activities.
2. AFRICOM is an example of an austere environment, and the RAF BCT MTOEs do not provide robust secure communications to support numerous small teams that deploy separately while operating within large AORs. RAF units should have access to expeditionary-type communications capabilities. RAF missions should be augmented with portable satellite communications to provide reliable communications either organically to regionally aligned BCTs or resourced to the small teams by the ASCC HQs.⁴ Additionally, the Army should consider acquiring off-the-shelf commercial technologies to enhance accountability, reporting, and communications with country teams or higher HQs.
3. Align reserve component maneuver enhancement brigades (MEBs) to CCMDs or Army divisions. MEBs can augment ASCC and JTF HQs with MP, Engineer, Aviation, and Air Defense staff enablers for 6-month rotations.
4. The Army should reconsider elimination of MPs from the BCTs. MPs are a vital protection WfF asset and enabler for BCTs throughout all phases of operations, as well as during steady state and shaping operations.
5. Enhanced emphasis is required on PWfF tasks if we are to ensure commanders have the means to preserve combat power.

SOF Integration

Implications

1. The RAF concept increases requirements for theater coordination and synchronization between special operations forces and conventional forces.
2. The RAF concept creates opportunities for integration between conventional and special operations force personnel at both the operational and staff levels.
3. Increased participation in TSC activities by conventional forces will provide special operations forces with reduced requirements for non-SOF unique missions.

Recommendations

1. Increase Army and SOF interoperability and interdependence.
2. Assign the majority of SOF capabilities, to include Army SOF units and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) capabilities, to the geographic combatant commands (GCCs). Reorganization will require enhancing the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).

3. Assign active component forces to a CCDR. Most service-retained forces should be in the generating force. Capitalize on demand and requirements from CCDRs to drive force structure across the Total Army. Detailed analysis can provide force solutions by CCMD to include type of capabilities, components, and density.
4. Prioritize readiness and resources to the CCDRs' objectives. Deployable C1 units must be maintained as the response option to meet the requirements of major contingencies and OPLANs. RAF elements should specifically train to their directed RAF mission and readiness level (SOF L/E-1): Increase the interoperability between SOF and CF. Incorporate TSOC/ASCC staffs and functions, increase training, deploy joint teams for TSC efforts, and merge the PME of SOF and CF personnel to include a "SOF Familiarity Certification" for CF.

ARFORGEN

Implications

1. An unforeseen crisis could interrupt implementation and place the RAF concept in jeopardy.
2. The creation of service retained, combatant command aligned (SRCA) distribution provides a useful tool for managing readiness while simultaneously preparing units to meet CCDR requirements.
3. The Army force generation (ARFORGEN) process requires adjustment to support an Army-wide readiness management philosophy that prepares RAF units to support CCDRs and maintains a higher base level of readiness across the force.
4. A regionally aligned policy allows Army units to be globally engaged while remaining CONUS based.
5. ARFORGEN and RAF policy synchronization allows the Army to support current and future global mission requirements while being concentrated in the Continental United States.
6. A Regionally Aligned Force policy facilitates global engagement.

Recommendations

1. The Army should adjust RAF and ARFORGEN training, manning, and equipping policies to meet future combatant command requirements with available resources.
2. Identify and habitually align brigade combat teams with the 6 geographic combatant commands and determine the how best to align division headquarters or enabling units.
3. Service retained, combatant command aligned forces should be retained to support the CCDRs.
4. The Army should retain ARFORGEN and exploit extant flexibility to manage units and resources.
5. The Army must use ARFORGEN to set the operating force in a predictable cycle to generate balanced support for the combatant commands.
6. The Army should return to the original regional alignment vision with the BCT as the central core capability. In less than 2 years, the "Regionally-Aligned Brigade" concept became the "Regionally-Aligned Forces" policy.⁵ The Army must clearly define what the Regionally Aligned Force policy is and is not in order to establish a common understanding and terms of reference for the defense community.

7. The Army must accelerate institutionalizing regionally-aligned force policy. By refining and focusing on a core capability, producing 12 habitually aligned brigade combat teams for example, the Army could expedite implementation.⁶ Policy modifications, to include growth, can be adjusted in the future in response to combatant commander feedback and mission demand.
8. The Army should retain ARFORGEN in order to manage readiness. ARFORGEN allows the Army to synchronize manning, equipping and training polices. The Army must be careful not to create so many unit force pools cycling through ARFORGEN that a conflict erupts in resource prioritization. ARFORGEN revisions allow the Army to avoid the pre-2001 “tiered readiness” institutional stigma.⁷ One way to overcome tiered readiness is to separate and manage units by mission.
9. Commanders’ comments are an important component of unit status reporting. However, the Army should temporarily suspend a command’s ability to subjectively upgrade a unit’s overall readiness assessment. As the Army draws down, quantitative data should define unit readiness. Commands must resist pressure to routinely assert that a unit can accomplish mission tasks it is not trained/resourced to conduct, especially as budgets and resources reduce.
10. The Army should work with combatant commands to expand regional engagements to include regional allies while conducting regionally-aligned missions in order to establish long term multi-lateral partnerships. Strategic guidance specifies that the United States will partner to solve international problems; however, just as the United States is reducing defense budgets, so too are allies.⁸
11. The Army should commit to habitually aligning brigade combat teams to geographic combatant commands and extend the alignment to multiple ARFORGEN cycles. Habitually-aligned units remain available to support contingency operations if required. Repetitive missions in support of combatant commands allow Army units to establish relationships with host nation militaries.
12. The Army should retain units not assigned to combatant commands in order to centralize training and resources and to generate tailored forces to support combatant command mission requirements. Retaining units not assigned to combatant commands allows flexibility to generate a tailored force in support of combatant commands. Combatant commands can request force packages if mission required.
13. The Army should create “Cultural Centers of Excellence” at Fort Polk and Fort Irwin to support centralized regionally-aligned programs of instruction. Failure to habitually align units with combatant commands results in units and installations competing for customized training resources during each ARFORGEN cycle. FORSCOM should centralize training and readiness management for unassigned, service-retained units.
14. The Army should overhaul mid-grade and senior personnel assignment policies to encourage commitment to the regionally aligned force policy. It should also adapt manning policies to maximize assignments in regionally-aligned units in order to support the long term viability of the policy and achieve a return on investment. As the size of the Army falls, and 12 to 14 percent of Army manpower turns over annually, the fastest way to develop Soldiers culturally is by repetitive assignments to regionally aligned units.⁹
15. The Army should modify enlisted, officer, and command tours, and extend brigades to multiple ARFORGEN alignment cycles with the same combatant command. This allows the Army to realize returns on investments made on culture and language training. The synchronization of ARFORGEN and regionally-aligned force policy allows the Army to overhaul its personnel policy.

JTF Capable HQs

Implications

1. The RAF concept will require the Army to regionally align a JTF-capable division or corps headquarters to each CCDR; the service retained, CCDR- aligned designation provides the flexibility to react to emerging crises.
2. The RAF concept will provide dedicated and predictable units to a CCDR that may be leveraged to mitigate the 25 percent reduction in two star headquarters staff.
3. Conducting RAF associated missions will require the assistance and support of habitually aligned division headquarters.
4. Aligning division and corps headquarters capable of serving as a JTF HQs creates a requirement to manage readiness for each organization.

Recommendations

1. Joint and Army Staffs should: 1) adjust the current force generation systems; 2) establish longer-term alignment of headquarters; 3) change human capital policies for regional expertise; and, 4) enhance corps and division headquarters to function as core JTF elements.
2. Division and corps headquarters should remain service retained combatant commander aligned, except for forces in PACOM. Little depth exists in operational headquarters, even post-drawdown. ARFORGEN's phases only work if there are enough units to have one in reset, one in training, and one deployed. Lack of depth requires central control of the division and corps headquarters for readiness, availability, and resources. This prevents gaps in strategic flexibility to react or surge capability for crisis or operations.
3. The Army should consistently align division HQs to the GCCs. These division HQs can then assist subordinate units with RAF- specific requirements such as country clearances, regional logistical challenges, and interagency coordination.
4. Enable corps and division headquarters for success as the core elements in JTF operations. The DoD should establish policies to mitigate challenges division and corps headquarters face in becoming JTFs, especially in the tactical command post (TAC). The TAC is the core from which to build many JTFs and is currently fenced from the 25 percent reductions for two star headquarters. Those and other critical staff positions should be coded to require Joint Professional Military Education II certification, should be stabilized for more than two years, and should be incentivized to draw and reward talent. Habitual stabilization will create efficiencies in training, standardization in operations, and depth in relationships.
5. Develop manning policies that incentivize and manage regional alignment of human capital to maximize return on investment. At the company level, officers should develop functional expertise; at the field grade level and higher, officers should develop operational, strategic, and regional expertise. There would be talent management advantages in assigning an identifier at the field grade level for officers and E8 for enlisted to indicate regional experience. This identifier, like other skills, could function as descriptive criteria when making future assignments. It could be either an Army skill identifier or a secondary military occupational specialty code (similar to the foreign area officer letter designation after the '48' for their regional focus). The assignment process should also consider regional experience in command and key

billet slating guidance, fellowship applications, and broadening assignments. Talent and experience management enhances future assignments and generates enhanced regional expertise.

6. Ensure or develop the capability of home-station joint operations centers (JOCs) for divisions and corps. Such home station posts need to build two JTF-capable headquarters JOCs for joint connectivity with theater, one to track ongoing operations, and a second to train JTFs prior to employment. Recapitalize JOC hardware resources available from the Army drawdown and redeployment of equipment from theater. These facilities provide reach-back capacity for the division HQ, subordinate unit teams, or other JTFs when deployed.

Authorities

Implications

1. The RAF concept designation comes with no new authorities or funding during a period of increasing budget constraints.
2. As the RAF concept is expanded throughout the total force, the diversity of missions, including security cooperation and security force assistance, may require a more tailored and durable set of authorities than currently exists.
3. If the Army does not secure funds to train, equip, and employ aligned forces for exercises and operations, concept implementation will be at risk.
4. RAF units require mission specific limits for employment in theater.
5. Despite rapid changes in the theater, deployed RAF units are not immediately capable of performing all missions across the range of military operations.

Recommendations

1. The Judge Advocate General's School should add a discussion of authorities and funding for RAF missions to training programs oriented on BCT and other command judge advocates.
2. Prioritize readiness and resources to the CCDRs' objectives. Deployable C1 units must be maintained as the response option to meet the requirements of major contingencies and OPLANs. RAF elements should specifically train to their directed RAF mission and readiness level.
3. The RAF concept requires a comprehensive review of authorities to maximize the concept's effectiveness and increase employment options. No authorities are required for RAF units to take advantage of low-cost methods of integrating culture, language and regional skills training into their objectives/plans.

Summary

None of the challenges identified by the study group are insurmountable. Many reflect Army wide issues that would benefit from an integrated DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, material, leader development, personnel, and facilities) solution. Furthermore, none exist in isolation. Solutions in one area may present challenges to another area and scarce resources may be required to mitigate risk. Building upon the best practices of 12 years of sustained operations, the RAF concept creates numerous opportunities and challenges for the Army to shape the force while supporting the needs of the geographic combatant commands.

Consequentially, implementation presents a genuine opportunity to consider the increasingly important role that shaping operations will play in meeting regional objectives and advancing U.S. security interests in accord with a philosophy of “prevent, shape, and win.”

Notes

¹John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, “A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2013, Fiscal year 2013,” Posture Statement presented to the 113th Congress, 1st Sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 5.

²U.S. Department of the Army, *Intelligence*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 31, 2012, p. 2-6.

³Ibid., 8.

⁴Gus Benton, “2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Learned Report,” memorandum for record, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 31, 2013.

⁵Andrew Feickert, *Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress* Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 25, 2013, p. 3; LTG James L. Huggins, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, HQDA G3/5/7, “FRAGO 1 to the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) EXORD,” Washington, DC, HQDA, October 17, 2013, p. O-3.

⁶Author calculations. If the Army aligned two brigade combat teams per geographic combatant command, then one BCT would be available to conduct missions, while the other BCT trained for the following year’s mission. This would require 12 BCTs to support regionally alignment. Future modifications can add enablers, divisions, or corps as required by demand.

⁷General Robert Cone, “TRADOC Commander: No plans to return to ‘tiered readiness’ in building future Army,” available from www.ausa.org/meetings/2012/annualmeeting/pages/chapterpresidentsdinner.aspx, accessed on February 1, 2014.

⁸Richard Norton-Taylor, “Armed forces budget to be cut by 500M British pounds,” available from www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/mar/20/armed-forces-budget-cut-500m, accessed on February 9, 2014; Malcolm Chalmers, “The Squeeze Continues-UK Defence Spending and the 2013 Budget,” available from www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=commentary&ref=C51506B24A254C, accessed on February 9, 2014.

⁹Author calculations determined that approximately 12 to 14 percent of Army manpower turns over annually after reviewing manpower data in the Fiscal Year 2014 Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report; U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report, Fiscal Year 2014* Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, August 2013, pp. 7, 20, 44.

Essential Resources

- Benton, Gus, U.S. Army Irregular Warfare Center, "2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Learned Report," memorandum for record, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 31, 2013.
- Brooks, Rosa. "Portrait of the Army as a Work in Progress." *Foreign Policy* 206 (May/June 2014): 42-51.
- Brooks, Vincent K., "U.S. Army Pacific and the Pacific Rebalance," *Army Magazine*, Greenbook, October 2013, available from www.ansa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2013/10/Documents/Brooks_Greenbook2013.pdf, accessed February 20, 2014.
- Cleveland, Charles T. and Farris, Stuart L., "Toward Strategic Landpower." *Army*, Vol. 63, No. 7, July 2013.
- Cone Robert W. and Mohundro, Jon D., "Capstone, Strategic Landpower for the Company Commander: Leading the U.S. Army into the 21st Century," *Army* January 2014.
- Dempsey, Martin E., "Joint Vision 2020 Capstone," 10 September 2012.
- Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," Washington DC, January 2012, available from http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf, accessed on February 17, 2013.
- Feickert, Andrew, *Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 25, 2013.
- Field, Kimberly, Learmont, James and Charland, Jason, "Regionally Aligned Forces; Business Not as Usual," *Parameters* Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2013.
- Flynn, George J., *Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations*, Suffolk, VA: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, Joint Staff J7, June 15, 2012.
- Gatlin, Timothy; Meekins, Christopher; Padilla, Daniel. "Targeting in Support of a Regionally Aligned Force." *Fires* (Jul/Aug 2014): 50-52.
- Grigsby, Wayne W. Jr.; Matlock, Patrick; Norrie, Christopher R.; Radka, Karen, "Mission Command in the Regionally Aligned Division Headquarters," *Military Review*, November-December 2013, available from www.usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20131231_art004.pdf, accessed on January 20, 2014.
- Hagel, Chuck, 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 4, 2014, available from www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf, accessed on March 10, 2014.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 14, 2001.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The United States Army Capstone Concept*, Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 19, 2012.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Theater Security Cooperation*, Field Manual 3-22, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, January 22, 2013.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2012.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2012.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC, 2011.

McHugh, John M. and Odierno, Raymond T., *Army Posture Statement 2013, Fiscal Year 2013*, Posture Statement presented to the 113rd Cong., 1st sess. available from www.army.mil/info/institution/posturestatement, accessed on January 10, 2014.

McHugh, John M. and Odierno, Raymond T., *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1992.

Odierno, Raymond T., "Regionally Aligned Forces: A New Model for Building Partnerships," *Army Live: The Official Blog of the United States Army*, available from <http://armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/aligned-forces/> accessed on December 16, 2013.

Pickup, Sharon, *Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, May 2012). <http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590768.pdf>.

Smith, Adam and Boutellis, Arthur, "Rethinking Force Generation: Filling the Capability Gaps in UN Peacekeeping," *Providing for Peacekeeping* May 2013, No. 2, New York: International Peace Institute.

Smith, Rupert, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, New York: Random House, 2005.

U. S. Government Accountability Office, *Language and Culture Training: Opportunities Exist to Improve Visibility and Sustainment of Knowledge and Skills in Army and Marine Corps General Purpose Forces*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2011.

RAF and Mission Command

Lieutenant Colonel Mark B. Parker and John A. Bonin, Ph.D.

Use Command and Control to deal with the known and Mission Command to deal with the unknown.

—Lieutenant General David Perkins¹

A vast number of unknowns characterize the global environment. Mission command, however, provides a framework for handling unknowns. Mission command is concerned with how commanders, with staff, combine the art of command and the science of control to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and accomplish missions.² Although counter intuitive, RAF missions are more complex than conventional operations and tactics. RAF is harder, not because of the volume or rapidity of data or decisions, but because of the complexity of relationships and the need to understand the operating environment.

Initially, this report examines changes in national policy, strategy and the global environment that drove the creation of RAF. The second section examines RAF through the lens of the art of command, i.e., the mission command philosophy, by examining six guiding principles. The third section analyzes RAF through the application of the science of control, the Army Warfighting functions (WfF), and the systems that enable command and control. Finally, a DOTMLPF analysis serves to articulate challenges and opportunities for RAF in the areas of doctrine, organization, training, and material.

The United States has always counted on its Armed Forces to win the nation's wars with the Army playing a key role. After a decade of conflict, however, the national strategy has begun to shift to war and conflict prevention. Driven by the desire to defeat violent extremism, the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) began to stress the importance of building partner capacity to enable regional allies to defeat terrorism:

The struggle against violent extremists will not end with a single battle or campaign. Rather, we will defeat them through the patient accumulation of quiet successes and the orchestration of all elements of national and international power. We will succeed by eliminating the ability of extremists to strike globally and catastrophically while also building the capacity and resolve of local governments to defeat them regionally.³

After the 2008 Presidential elections, the new administration continued this policy shift with the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS). Which directed the military to further “strengthen its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.”⁴ The following year the 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS) reinforced and expanded the theme:

We will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security. This will help reduce potential safe-havens before violent extremism can take root. We will nest our efforts to build partner capacity with broader national security priorities, consolidate our institutional processes, and improve coordination across agencies. Military-to military relationships must be reliable to be effective, and persevere through political upheavals or even disruption.⁵

In 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) strengthened the theme, stating “support” for:

political and economic reform and deepening partnerships to ensure regional security. In contrast to the murderous vision of violent extremists, we are joining with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity.⁶

This shift impacts Department of Defense (DoD) and Army foci for both efforts and missions.

At the DoD level, the activities identified in the published guidance, such as building partner capacity, military-to-military engagements, and enhanced security cooperation are described as steady-state activities.⁷ Prevention and shaping activities include deterrence and are critical components of this policy shift. These activities are linked to strategic DoD end states through both global and theater campaign plans.⁸ For certain events, the DoD develops specific campaign or contingency plans. For such plans, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, defines six phases.⁹ The phases are: Phase 0 – Shape, Phase I – Deter, Phase II – Seize the Initiative, Phase III – Dominate, Phase IV – Stabilize, and Phase V – Enable Civil Authority.¹⁰ The preponderance of military effort occurs in the middle phases of Seize Initiative, Dominate, and Stabilize. Emphasis on building partner capacity to enhance security shifts importance to shaping and deterring, so that II, III, and IV may not become necessary. The goal of steady-state activities and Phase 0 (Shape) is to dissuade and deter potential adversaries while strengthening relationships with friends and allies.¹¹

To achieve desired theater end states, combatant commands conduct security cooperation activities aligned with national and strategic military objectives. Security cooperation formally refers to:

All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.¹²

If security cooperation and shaping activities are not successful and a crisis looms, Phase I (Deter) activities seek to dissuade undesirable adversary actions.¹³ Dissuading activities can include demonstrating the resolve and capabilities of the joint force to act. If deterrence fails, Phase II (Seize Initiative) activities occur with the application of force. Increasing steady state or Phase 0 (Shape) activities has the greatest likelihood of preventing conflict. As the nation’s premier land force, the Army’s ability to operate within the land domain makes it the most appropriate service branch to shape and deter potential conflict.

The world’s population lives on land and the land domain provides abundant opportunities for building partner capacity designated to enhance security. People utilize the air, sea, space and cyber domains but their time within each is transitory. Humanity lives on land and there lies the greatest opportunities for interaction, relationship building, and mature understanding. Understanding occurs when all human needs, values, and differences, including culture, language, ideology, and religion are aptly recognized and appropriately accommodated. The Army Chief of Staff, General Raymond Odierno, recently stated, “Preventing conflict is better than reacting to it, and to prevent it we must understand its causes. That understanding is only gained through human contact.”¹⁴

Conflict inherently involves people, whether over territory, resources, or ideology. As military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted, people and government represent two thirds of the trinity of war.¹⁵ To gain understanding and prevent conflict, the Army must successfully operate within the human domain, i.e., where the people reside. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) defines the human domain as:

The totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that success of any military strategy, operation, or tactical action depends on the application of unique capabilities . . . designed to fight and win population-centric conflicts.¹⁶

As recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, building partner capacity requires understanding. With experience in building partner capacity, the Army is uniquely positioned to conduct capacity building initiatives during steady-state and Phase 0 activities. The Army's ability to operate in close proximity to the people is key to the potential effectiveness of Regionally Aligned Forces.

The CSA's vision for the Army is to "Prevent, Shape, and Win."¹⁷ Due to the scale of the land domain and its intimate ties to the human activity, the Army provides the most direct and persistent opportunities to shape and deter conflict. People-to-people relationships within the human domain "operationalize" the Prevent, Shape, Win strategy.¹⁸ The RAF concept helps accomplish this strategy by providing trained, ready, and responsive forces to the combatant commands.

Regionally Aligned Forces "provide the combatant commander with up to a joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment."¹⁹ These forces include Army units assigned and allocated to combatant commands and those capabilities distributed and prepared for regional missions. The scope of RAF includes Army Reserve and National Guard forces. Forces can be stationed or operating within the combatant command or providing support from outside the command.²⁰

The RAF concept entails increasing the quantity and quality of Army forces available to the combatant commands so they can shape the environment and prevent conflict.²¹ The Army seeks to become more proactive in preventing conflict, rather than simply reacting once it occurs. Sun Tzu notes: "the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting."²² Instead of a significant portion of the Army remaining forward deployed or garrisoned at home station, the RAF concept seeks to prevent conflict while remaining prepared to fight and win if needed. Army forces can provide stabilizing influences by building partner capacity and strengthening allies around the world. The Army's ability to provide sustained engagement makes it the appropriate force for executing security cooperation initiatives. When preparing for or executing missions, Regionally Aligned Forces can fall under several different authorities.

The command relationships for Regionally Aligned Forces begin with the Unified Campaign Plan (UCP), wherein forces are assigned to the combatant commands.²³ Guidance for the use of those forces comes from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), through the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). Developed from several strategic documents, the GEF identifies the combatant commands strategic priorities for operational activities.²⁴ To meet the requirements in the GEF, the Joint Staff uses the Global Force Management (GFM) framework to resource the combatant commands in accord with requirements. Joint Publication 5-0 explains three related GFM processes: assignment, allocation, and apportionment.²⁵

The Secretaries of the Military Departments *assign* forces to combatant commands. When forces are assigned, the command relationship is referred to as combatant command (COCOM). The Secretary of Defense directs and approves the assignments through the GEF process.²⁶ When forces are not assigned to combatant commanders, they are referred to as "service retained" or "unassigned" by the Secretary of the Military Department.²⁷ Forces are *allocated* when transfer of forces between combatant commands or employment of unassigned forces is necessary. The Secretary of Defense allocates the forces and specifies the new command relationships.²⁸ These relationships will likely be operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON). After force assignment and allocation, combatant commands will still have more requirements than forces available. Many requirements are planning initiatives directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Through the JSCP, the CJCS directs the preparation

of various joint plans to include operational plans and contingency plans. As a planning starting point, the CJCS *apportions* combat and related support forces to the combatant commands based on guidance in the GEF.²⁹ Forces apportioned for planning may not be the same forces allocated for execution.

Within command relationships, the Army created a unique definition called Service Retained, Combatant Command Aligned (SRCA). The working concept for SRCA is “those Army forces and capabilities in the available period that are under the administrative control of the Secretary of the Army and not assigned to combatant commanders but provide support to combatant commanders.”³⁰ The Army Service Component Command (ASCC) assigned to each combatant command provides theater specific training requirements that aligned forces used to drive training and readiness reporting. Combatant commands are informed of the force capabilities aligned to their theater, but lack authority over these forces. If a combatant command wishes to employ these capabilities, it does so through the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) process. Even though the combatant command knows the forces and capabilities aligned, no guarantee exists that those forces are actually available upon request. Additionally, forces currently aligned to one combatant command may be aligned differently on the next rotation. Such alignment changes ostensibly decrease the value of training, minimize understanding, and complicate relationship development for that combatant command. Such turmoil is inconsistent with the CSA’s intent.

Based on and derived from several documents including the JSCP and GEF, the GFMIG is the critical document for force planning and execution.³¹ Published every two years, the GFMIG includes the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum, referenced as the “Forces For” memorandum. This “provides SecDef’s direction to the Secretaries of the Military Departments for assigning forces to CCMDs and serves as the record of force assignments.”³² The GFMIG describes the forces a combatant command has to accomplish missions including security cooperation. When requirements exceed the available forces, combatant commands request additional forces through the Joint Staff using the Request for Forces (RFF) or a Request for Capabilities process.

For several years, CENTCOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) requirements resulted in few Army forces being available to other combatant commands.³³ The CSA’s vision anticipates increased Army force availability as CENTCOM’s requirements decrease. In a time of declining resources, available forces must be appropriately managed to help offset reductions. RAF provides essential and needed forces by better supporting combatant commands. With the allocation of 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division to AFRICOM, the RAF concept was initially tested.³⁴

Mission Command

ADP 6-0 describes mission command as a “philosophy and a warfighting function;” it is also the framework for the Army’s execution of military operations in support of Unified Land Operations (ULO).³⁵ The mission command philosophy is described as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”³⁶ The mission command philosophy incorporates six guiding principles that commanders must balance while executing “related tasks and mission command systems that support the exercise of authority and direction.”³⁷ Working together, the philosophy and warfighting function guide, integrate, and synchronize Army forces throughout the conduct of Unified Land Operations (ULO).³⁸

Mission command may be new in doctrine, but it remains old in practice. In 1864, General Ulysses S. Grant ordered LTG William T. Sherman to initiate the Atlanta campaign. In but a few sentences, Grant clearly laid out his intent and demonstrated trust in Sherman.³⁹ In April 2012, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

General Martin Dempsey, published an eight-page white paper to pursue, instill, and foster the philosophy of mission command within the Joint Force of 2020.⁴⁰ A month later, the Army published ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command*.⁴¹ Although envisioned primarily for the Army's execution of its core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security, mission command is especially apt for Regionally Aligned Forces. The timing of these publications coincides with the RAF taskings to execute global security cooperation activities. A globally engaged Army requires greater application of a mission command philosophy that will challenge many leaders.

The Art of Command

Unified Land Operations (ULO) refers to “to seiz[ing], retain[ing], and exploit[ing] the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations” in order to “create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.”⁴² ULO is executed through decisive actions of offense, defense, stability and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA).⁴³ The Army core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security constitute the means of execution in accord with mission command.⁴⁴

Principles of Mission Command

The six mission command principles are: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander's intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk.⁴⁵ These principles assist commanders as well as staff in balancing the art of command with the science of control.

Building Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust

With all but two of the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Headquarters forward stationed within each combatant command theater, distance and time can hinder team building, establishing and maintaining trust with RAF. According to ADP 6-0:

Commanders build cohesive teams in an environment of mutual trust. There are few shortcuts to gaining the trust of others. Trust takes time and must be earned... Trust is gained or lost through everyday actions more than grand or occasional gestures. It comes from successful shared experiences and training, usually gained incidental to operations but also deliberately developed by the commander.⁴⁶

Most RAF units can expect a separation of several thousand miles and several time zones. For example, the headquarters for United States Army Africa (USARAF) in Vicenza, Italy is 5,100 miles and seven time zones from the headquarters of its allocated RAF unit, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.⁴⁷ The brigade has Soldiers located at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, approximately 8,100 miles and nine time zones away.⁴⁸

The envisioned rules to request and employ RAF forces project short-duration missions of less than 90 days with an available waiver of up to 179 days.⁴⁹ The element executing the security cooperation activity receives notification of the mission 90 days prior to execution and a deployment order 60 days out.⁵⁰ This short timeline provides little opportunity to build a cohesive team among the major players: the ASCC, the country team, and the RAF unit.

Time and distance challenges are not new, however. The Forces Command (FORSCOM) system of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) in support of Central Command (CENTCOM) operations generated the same challenges to units deploying into and out of theater. The difference with RAF is that units are not typically deploying *en masse*, but instead are moving as small teams where needed while headquarters usually

remain at home station. The expectation is for unit alignment 15 months prior to its available phase. FORSCOM would issue a Mission Alignment Order (MAO), which formally aligns a brigade to a combatant command for security cooperation activities during the final quarter of the unit's current available phase. If maintained, 15 months is sufficient time to begin building trust, but the nature of RAF requires a tremendous level of trust. Isolated, small teams separated by great distance and time from higher headquarters require unusually high levels of trust. Commanders who do not trust their subordinates will be tempted to create a second command channel back to them. Commanders and staff must trust their subordinates to execute with little supervision. Subordinates must trust that their commanders and staff will properly train and prepare them for RAF missions.

Creating shared understanding for RAF missions is perhaps the greatest challenge. The global environment is increasingly complex and the Army lacks mission command systems below the battalion level to enable the creation of shared understanding before, during, and after missions. Yet, creating this shared understanding has the potential to be one of RAF's greatest benefits.

The further away a person is from a problem in time and distance, the greater the difficulty in understanding the problem. The second challenge that ADRP 6-0 identifies as critical is creating a shared understanding both prior to and during operations. "Shared understanding and purpose form the basis for unity of effort and trust."⁵¹ Common understanding enables commanders to use intent to accomplish objectives. Since everyone understands the environment and the problem, presumably everyone can understand the commander's intent. The commander does not have to issue directive orders, but instead can enable subordinates to execute disciplined initiative. The sheer complexity and size of some areas of operations, however, constitute significant challenges to shared understanding.

Allocated to AFRICOM, the size and complexity of the African continent presents significant challenges for 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. With one seventh of the world population, Africa is second only to Asia in population.⁵² Ethiopia alone is the size of Iraq and Afghanistan combined.⁵³ Yet, Ethiopia is only the tenth largest of 54 African countries.⁵⁴ Over the course of one year, the brigade is projected to execute close to 100 security cooperation events in 34 African countries.⁵⁵

The RAF concept calls for the Army to be regionally aligned and globally engaged. The challenge is for the Army to "globally enable" below the battalion level. The mission command systems utilized to execute mission command are issued to battalion-level headquarters and above. Under RAF, most missions are to be executed below the battalion level by small teams. The task of creating shared understanding, while daunting, is vital because it has potential to yield the greatest benefit of RAF.

With RAF units executing missions globally, the Army's need for understanding will increase significantly. The human-to-human interactions RAF forces generate while conducting security cooperation activities will create relationships as they learn the complex environment of their areas. Ideally, host nations want to help create understanding of their countries, people, and values. If called upon to operate within a particular area, an enhanced understanding should prevent a delay or "cold start" associated with a lack of familiarity with the culture, language, ideology, or religious considerations. RAF units should be able start with "momentum," utilizing existing relationships and a fundamental understanding of the environment. As RAF units gain local/cultural knowledge, that understanding should aid their superiors by helping to develop better informed and better designed plans consistent with the commander's intent.

Provide Clear Commander's Intent

Bound by higher authority's guidance, a commander's intent conveys a clear image of the mission's purpose, key task, and desired outcome.⁵⁶ The "why" articulated in the intent is what ensures unity of effort among subordinates. Commander's intent is defined as:

A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.⁵⁷

When 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division Soldiers deploy to execute RAF missions, they are under the operational control (OPCON) of AFRICOM.⁵⁸ AFRICOM has delegated OPCON of Army forces in Africa to United States Army Africa (USARAF).⁵⁹ These RAF forces operate at the end of very-austere and long communication lines. For example, the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division Soldiers supporting operations in Mali are 2,000 miles from USARAF headquarters. The dispersed nature of RAF missions and relatively few communications enablers necessitate an exceedingly clear understanding of commander's intent. When facing unforeseen circumstances far from authority with little supervision, Soldiers must successfully exercise initiative to complete the mission in accord with the commander's intent.

The Army thrives on initiative and RAF forces will need it. Based on today's volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment, exercising disciplined initiative is vital if RAF forces are to be successful. The Army executes Unified Land Operations (ULO) to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.⁶⁰ In joint operational planning, "Seize the Initiative" is the third phase. The Army does not expect leaders and Soldiers to act thoughtlessly. Rather, the Army expects action in the absence of orders, especially when orders no longer apply or when unforeseen opportunities arise.⁶¹ Security cooperation missions are opportunities for small-unit leaders to exercise disciplined initiative and help improve the security environment. Guided by the commander's intent, informed by shared understanding, and functioning as part of a cohesive team, subordinates negotiate the situation and accomplish the mission.

Commanders set priorities, allocate resources, and influence the situation through mission orders. Mission orders "are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them."⁶² The intent of mission orders is to maximize initiative by providing subordinates maximum freedom of action. Mission orders ensure vertical and lateral coordination while focusing on the main objective. Doctrine urges commanders to not micromanage subordinates, but supervise and direct changes when necessary. The nature of most RAF missions, however, limits the commander's ability to closely supervise.

Accept Prudent Risk

No mission comes without risk. RAF missions by their very nature expose Soldiers to a host of risks where some are both unfamiliar and difficult to mitigate. In fact, "making reasonable estimates and intentionally accepting prudent risk are fundamental to mission command."⁶³ Prudent risk is "a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost."⁶⁴ When making decisions, commanders accept this risk because of uncertainty. When assembling the team to conduct security cooperation activities, the commander must account for risk inherent in the activities. Mistakes will occur with or without a senior supervisor's availability. Soldiers must respect the host nation's laws and customs if they are to minimize incidents with the potential to damage partner relationships.

The Science of Control

The current Army command-and-control systems were designed to win wars on battlefields and now must adapt and transition to preventing conflict and maintaining the peace. Yet, the Army has not modified its process for testing and evaluating communication systems nor adjusted requirements and documents to adapt to RAF. Commanders and staffs utilize mission command systems to understand the capabilities and limitations of not only enemy forces, but also friendly forces. The right staff with the right understanding enables a commander to exercise control. To meet the CSA's intent to be regionally-aligned and globally-engaged, the Army must devise and exert authority that goes well beyond a conventional battlefield mentality.

The Globally Enabled Challenge

The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have created an expectation of communications infrastructure that is not feasible for supporting RAF. Leaders and Soldiers with recent combat experience have grown accustomed to high-bandwidth, low-latency internet connections down to the lowest levels and developed over years of occupying the same battlefield. In 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, 542,000 service members required millions of bits of data per second.⁶⁵ Twelve years later during beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the data requirements had increased by over a factor of 30, even though the number of service members decreased by a factor of four. By 2004 in OIF, approximately 123,000 service members required billion bits of data per second.⁶⁶ Seven years later during the conclusion of Operation New Dawn, a much smaller force was using the same amount of data.⁶⁷ With the increase in cloud services and computing, the Army's requirements for bandwidth are continuing to increase. The RAF concept of numerous, short-term global missions has exposed a requirements gap in the Army's command and control systems.

This gap exists because Army fielded communications equipment only enables battalion-level headquarters and higher to be digitally enabled. The preponderance of RAF missions are of relatively short duration executed by small teams. The Army lacks a standardized, fielded, and trained system to meet the requirements of most RAF missions. Recently, the CSA highlighted this challenge when he compared his smart phone to battlefield communications gear. He said, "I can sit here in my chair and pull out my smart phone and talk to every continent in the world with one little smart phone."⁶⁸ When referring to battlefield communications gear, however, he stated: "I have to bring 50 trucks and 300 Soldiers. Why is that? We cannot do that anymore. Our command and control systems are too heavy today."⁶⁹ The CSA wants the Army to invest in leap-ahead technology, but to do so wisely. The challenge is "to determine how we leverage the technologies that are out there. How do we leverage our ability to reduce our footprint to have better communications to secure data?"⁷⁰ The CSA wants to "be able to deploy very quickly, get there in small packages and then potentially build on them, and we have to get there with the least amount of support necessary."⁷¹

When advantageous and safe to do so, the Army can and does use commercial infrastructure to support operations but cannot completely rely on commercial networks. Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/D2) also applies to the cyber domain. As recent events demonstrate, adversaries can disable both fixed and wireless commercial networks. When called upon to execute Phase II or Phase III operations, RAF units' organic tactical communication systems meet their requirements. Regionally Aligned Forces, however, primarily execute security cooperation activities during steady state and Phase 0 when their access to tactical systems is limited.

The Commercial Challenge

Mission command system development and testing continues to focus on Phases II, III and IV of operations. The Army's Nett Warrior program is designed to provide situational awareness and mission command to the individual, dismounted Soldier. The program utilizes a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) mobile phone that links to the AN/PRC 154A Rifleman Radio to communicate with other Rifleman Radios.⁷² The Army modified the mobile phone to work exclusively with the Rifleman Radio. Future Army systems must function in all operational phases, almost exclusively in Phases II, III and Phase IV.

The Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) program at Fort Bliss conducts a semiannual field exercise to assess network and non-network capabilities in order to integrate Army tactical networks. The intent is to help mature Army networks by determining which capabilities require rapid acquisition. NIE has three goals: "(1) reduce/eliminate integration burden on operational formations, (2) develop/integrate mission command capability sets, and (3) provide a forum for leveraging promising industrial capabilities that solve operational gaps."⁷³ If modified, the third goal provides an opportunity to leverage commercial capabilities for Phase 0 and Phase I operations in support of RAF.

The NIE has successfully produced some capabilities that can be utilized to support RAF missions, but those capabilities were not fielded to RAF units. In late 2012 as part of NIE 13.1, the Signal Center of Excellence worked with a commercial vendor to develop, test, and field a small, command-post node package. The package specifically addresses an Army identified capability gap to provide three networks for 10 to 40 users. The required networks are unclassified, secret, and a combination network option of interagency, coalition, or Top Secret.⁷⁴ The resulting package was 50 percent smaller, significantly lighter, and capable of transport on commercial aircraft as checked baggage.⁷⁵ According to the G6 of the 1st Infantry Division, this type of package would greatly benefit the brigade currently performing RAF missions in Africa.⁷⁶ The packages, somewhat surprisingly, were fielded to a unit that supports echelons above corps rather than to a regionally-aligned division headquarters.

JTF Enabled Challenge

The Regionally Aligned Forces concept promises the combatant commanders that RAF can provide "up to joint task force capable headquarters."⁷⁷ Yet, all Army corps and division headquarters lack a key capability to become a JTF Headquarters. They lack a joint presence in cyber space and joint internet protocol addresses (IPs) to enable joint mission command systems. A JTF HQs mission command system should occupy IP space at the DoD/joint level to enable subordinate service networks to establish trusted network connections. DoD networks utilize a trust architecture that makes it difficult for service networks to function as JTF networks. For example, any Army HQs utilizing Army IP addresses will have great difficulty "trusting" a Navy HQs utilizing Navy IP addresses due to network trust problems.

From a network administration perspective, joint networks also require joint network certified technicians. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) controls the certification procedures and testing for joint networks. Each service has its own procedures and policies for certifying network technicians. Unless a technician previously worked on joint networks, that technician is not certified on joint networks. Once certified by the Army, a warrant officer working on a division G6 staff, is granted permissions to administer that division's .army.mil networks but no others. If a Navy-certified network technician joined the division headquarters as part of a JTF staff, he or she would require certification and permissions with that division's network. Certification and testing procedures can take weeks or months depending on the skill level of the technician. Additionally, all network certifications expire over time and require renewal. Ensuring that the right

technicians with the right skills and certifications are at the right place at the right time to enable joint networks remains a significant challenge.

DOTMLPF for Mission Command

Regarding the RAF concept, two areas of Army doctrine require refinement. The first is additional analysis of the primary RAF mission (security cooperation) to ensure appropriate alignment with the CSA's vision: "prevent, shape, win." The second is further analysis of the RAF capability to provide a JTF headquarters in light of the growing complexity of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment (JIIM) complicated by a 25 percent reduction in staff manpower.

The SRCA relationship should be discontinued to the extent possible. All forces should continue to be assigned, allocated, or apportioned to combatant commands. To fully gain the benefits of building relationships and understanding within a combatant command, more forces should be assigned to combatant commands. By retaining a majority of forces at the Department level, the Army is not fully committing to RAF. Actions are not yet aligned with words.

Consequently, the Army would lose flexibility in reacting to emerging or unforeseen requirements and risk some degree of control over the training, readiness, and oversight (TRO) of its forces. Additionally, if all forces are assigned to combatant commands, the challenge of setting and managing force priorities becomes difficult. New procedures and policies would have to be created to handle competing combatant command priorities for resource allocation. Concerns about flexibility and TRO of Army forces can be worked out through the use of Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) between the Army, FORSCOM, and the combatant commands. Procedures already exist for allocating forces as necessary among combatant commands. Assigning all but institutional forces to combatant commands sends a very strong signal to the combatant commands and Congress that the Army intends to Prevent, Shape, and when necessary, Win.

At a minimum, each ASCC should have an assigned division headquarters. The ASCC commander and staff can build trust between their headquarters through daily activities and interactions. Daily interactions will foster team building and result in greater cohesion. ASCCs with assigned division headquarters bring stability from the strategic level through the operational level to the tactical level for each theater. The division headquarters can then act as a stabilizing influence that will reduce turmoil and confusion as brigades rotate in and out of their available phase. The assigned division can act as a permanent entry point for all RAF and Army forces working in that theater. Additionally, with a 25 percent manpower reduction in both ASCC and division headquarters staffs, efficiencies created by long term relationships will become increasingly vital. A consistent team working security cooperation activities yields better understanding, likely to result in more effective planning and mission execution.

If division headquarters were assigned to combatant commands, the Army would lose flexibility to respond to emerging requirements. The Army would also lose the ability to mitigate the impact of the same brigades of a division responding to differing combatant command requirements. Furthermore, the Army would lose the ability to reset and train a division headquarters. However, the benefits to team building and creating shared understanding, combined with stability from the strategic to tactical levels, far outweigh the risk of assigning division headquarters to combatant commands. Additionally, assignment consistency better enables relationship building. Each assigned division can act as the focal point of tactical knowledge for each combatant commander's AOR.

A deliberate exercise program between the ASCC, the assigned division headquarters, and the allocated RAF brigades using scenarios from the specific theater is necessary. A well-executed exercise program builds cohesive teams, develops trust and relationships, and creates shared understanding. The combat training centers

utilize the Leader Training Program (LTP) to achieve this result, which could also work for RAF. Additionally, exercises enable each unit to test its communications systems prior to execution, reinforce reporting requirements and develop battle rhythms, ensuring better command and control.

Although the allocated brigade is in the training phase, both the ASCC and the division headquarters are conducting operations. Participating in an exercise would place an additional burden on their respective staffs. Additionally, any exercise program costs money. Since this exercise is between Army elements, the Army can be expected to fund it. Although it would cost resources, the potential benefits of an integrated Army team outweigh the cost. During the exercise program, team building will occur and environmental understanding will be improved. The team can learn the nuances of culture and language while building relationships and promoting trust. Better understanding leads to better unity of effort and unity of action.

ASCCs must develop a training program that ensures RAF units can execute the required network administration for joint communications when called upon to function as a JTF HQ. A program focusing on joint network certifications, policies, and procedures will greatly enhance a unit's ability to execute a JTF mission. Army units currently struggle to maintain technician certifications on Army networks. An additional level of network certifications is likely to overly tax some units, while diminishing focus on maintaining Army required certifications. In a time of constrained resources, appropriate funding presents a challenge. Again, the benefits far outweigh the cost. Joint communications are extremely difficult due to the complex nature of joint networks. The operation of joint networks requires training and certifications that cannot be acquired quickly. This training must be funded and become a dedicated training objective.

A theater specific Mission Essential Equipment List (MEEL) and any unfulfilled requirements should be created by each ASCC. These specific requirements and capability gaps should drive combatant command's Integrated Priority List (IPL) and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) submissions. Validated requirements would enable the acquisition system to develop solutions to satisfy RAF requirements.

The unique requirements of each combatant command could drag requirements vetting in various directions, preventing any comprehensive solutions from being developed. The acquisition system also needs to prevent non-standard equipment purchases for each theater. Equipment incompatibility must be avoided. As the Army embraces RAF, capability gaps will be identified at all levels. ASCCs should serve as the Army's injection point to each combatant command for these requirements from each RAF brigade. As each brigade analyzes its RAF requirements, the ASCC should be able to provide a toolkit of solutions in the form of a MEEL.

When solutions for RAF capability gaps are developed, they should be fielded to each combatant command's assigned division headquarters. The division is then enabled to train and employ them as necessary to ensure each RAF Brigade has an appropriate toolkit to handle the scale and scope of security cooperation activities. As brigades rotate into and out of each combatant command, the permanently assigned division headquarters can maintain the required expertise to install, operate, and maintain these systems.

Division headquarters are not designed as supply depots for brigades. Placing RAF unique equipment within division headquarters places additional burdens on logistics personnel. Division headquarters, however, are the most logical unit for central management of theater-specific equipment. With brigades rotating between combatant commands, only an assigned division headquarters can provide the stability necessary for building the needed training and maintenance base.

The Army should expand the scope of the NIE to include steady-state activities and all phases of operations. With the potential for leveraging commercial solutions, the NIE should be modified to specifically incorporate RAF communications requirements. The NIE is executed semi-annually and provides a unique opportunity to rapidly inject COTS solutions into the Defense Acquisition System (DAS).

Including communication requirements from other than major combat operations has the potential to dilute the Army's focus on battlefield communication challenges. This shift in focus to commercial systems can have an adverse impact on the next generation of tactical communications systems. Yet, the Army's emphasis on communications in support of major combat operations should continue so long as a concerted effort to leverage commercial communications is initiated. Most Army activities occur outside of major combat operations and the Army's communications systems should support these activities. To ensure that the Army stays current and leverages new technologies quickly, NIE must be modified.

Conclusion

The best wars, of course, are the ones not fought. Due to the effects of globalism, even low-level conflicts in remote regions have the ability to escalate into global crises. The Army can and should have the preeminent role in preventing conflict and building partner capacity through security cooperation activities that deter aggression. The Army's ability to provide sustained presence enables enhanced understanding of the people, issues, and options. The creation of shared understanding under mission command may be the most powerful and useful consequent of RAF. Furthermore, the Army's ability to operate within the land domain and to influence the human domain will require tailored mission command systems, specifically below the brigade level.

Notes

¹ David Perkins, "Mission Command," lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 19, 2013, cited with permission of LTG Perkins.

² Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, Army Doctrinal Publication 6-0 w/Change 1, Washington, DC; U.S. Department of the Army, May 17, 2012, p. ii.

³ Department of Defense, "National Defense Strategy," Washington, DC, June 2008, p. 9.

⁴ Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010, 11, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, accessed on October 23, 2013.

⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC, 2011, p. 5.

⁶ Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," Washington, DC, January 2012, available from www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf, accessed on February 17, 2013.

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011, p. II-4.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., p. III-39.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. III-39.

¹¹ Ibid., p. III-42.

¹² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010 as amended December 15, 2013, p. 235.

¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, p. III-42.

¹⁴ Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, *CSA's Strategic Intent: Delivering Strategic Landpower in an Uncertain World*, Lanham, Federal Information & News Dispatch, 2013.

¹⁵ Christopher Bassford, "Tip-Toe through the Trinity," available from www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/Trinity8.htm, accessed on February 2, 2014, p. 6.

¹⁶ Charles T Cleveland and Stuart L. Farris, "Toward Strategic Landpower." *Army*, Vol. 63, No. 7, July 2013, pp. 20-23.

¹⁷ Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, *CSA Editorial: Prevent, shape, win*. Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, December 16, 2011, available from <http://www.army.mil/article/71030/>.

¹⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army G3/5/7, "Regional Alignment of Forces," briefing slides, Washington, DC, Department of the Army, November 04, 2013.

¹⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army G3/5/7, "Regional Alignment of Forces," briefing slides, Washington, DC, Department of the Army, June 27, 2013, p. 1.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ James E. Rexford, FORSCOM G-3/5/7 Plans, "Preparing Regionally Aligned Forces to Meet CCMD Requirements," briefing slides, Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, November 18, 2013, p. 2.

²² Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, available from www.suntzusaid.com/book/3/3, accessed on January 7, 2014.

²³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, p. II-3.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., p. H-1.

²⁶ Ibid., p. H-1.

²⁷ Ibid., p. H-1.

²⁸ Ibid., p. H-2.

²⁹ Ibid., p. H-4.

³⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army G3/5/7, "Regional Alignment of Forces," June 27, 2013, p. 12.

³¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, p. II-6.

³² Ibid.

³³ Kristian Matthew Marks, *Enabling Theater Security Cooperation Through Regionally Aligned Forces*, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2013, p. 4.

³⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army G3/5/7, "Regional Alignment of Forces," June 27, 2013.

³⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, ADP 6.0, p. 1.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

³⁸ Ibid., p. iv.

³⁹ Ulysses S. Grant, *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 10: January 1 – May 31, 1864*, edited by John Y. Simon, Ulysses S. Grant Association, 1982.

⁴⁰ Martin E. Dempsey, Mission Command White Paper, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 April 2012, available from www.ndu.edu/pinnacle/docUploaded/MissionCommandPaper.pdf, accessed on January 11, 2014.

⁴¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, ADP 6.0; U.S. Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 17, 2012.

⁴² Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0 w/ Change 2, Washington, DC; U.S. Department of the Army, October 10, 2011, p. 1.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, ADP 6.0, p. 2.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

⁴⁷ *Free Map Tools*, available from www.freemaptools.com/measure-distance.htm, accessed on January 21, 2014.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army G3/5/7, "Regional Alignment of Forces," June 27, 2013, p. 11.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, ADP 6-0, p. 2-2.

⁵² *List of continents by population*, available from www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_continents_by_population, accessed on February 11, 2014.

⁵³ Kris Ellis, U.S. Army, G6, United States Army Africa, telephone interview by author, February 11, 2014.

⁵⁴ *Area of African Countries*, available from www.joinafrica.com/Country_Rankings/area_africa.htm, accessed on February 11, 2014.

⁵⁵ Daniel B. Allyn, "Building Readiness and Providing Responsive Landpower." *Army*, Vol. 63, No. 10, October 2013, p 70.

⁵⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, p. 4.

⁵⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation*, Joint Publication 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011, p. GL-7.

⁵⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army G3/5/7, "Regional Alignment of Forces," briefing slides, Washington, DC, Department of the Army, January 23, 2014, p. 7.

⁵⁹ Marcus F. De Oliveira, United States Army Africa G3/5/7, United States Army Africa, telephone interview by author, February 19, 2014.

⁶⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, ADP 3-0 w/ Change 2, p. 1.

⁶¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, ADP 6.0, p. 4.

⁶² Ibid., pp. 2-4.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 5.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ LaWarren V. Paterson, "Army Use of Commercial Networks," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Washington, DC, Department of the Army, January 24, 2014.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Robert Rhodes, U.S. Army, Network Engineer, 25th Infantry Division, telephone interview by author, February 15, 2014.

⁶⁸ Bob Brewin, "The Army Wants More Smartphones on the Battlefield," Defense One, January 28, 2014, available from www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/01/army-wants-more-smartphones-battlefield/77657, accessed on February 1, 2014.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Scott R. Gourley, "Nett Warrior: Mission Command at the Tactical Edge." *Army* Vol. 63, No. 6, June 2013, pp. 24-27.

⁷³ *Network Integration Evaluation*, available from www.arcic.army.mil/Initiatives/network-integration-evaluation.aspx, accessed on January 22, 2014.

⁷⁴ James Snyder, "13.1 Candidate SUE Evaluation SNAP Lite VSAT Solution," briefing slides, Fort Bliss, TX, Directorate of Systems Integration, February 3, 2012.

⁷⁵ Dwayne Williams, D.A. Civilian, Deputy, Requirements Integration Division, Signal Center of Excellence, telephone interview by author, February 13, 2014.

⁷⁶ Patricia Sayles, U.S. Army, G6, 1st Infantry Division, telephone interview by author, February 12, 2014.

⁷⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army G3/5/7, "Regional Alignment of Forces," June 27, 2013, p. 1.

RAF Movement and Maneuver Warfighting Function

Colonel Phillip A. Chambers and Colonel Tarn D. Warren

By aligning unit headquarters and rotational units to combatant commands, and tailoring our combatant [sic] training centers and exercises to plan for their greatest contingencies, units will gain invaluable expertise and cultural awareness, and be prepared to meet the regional requirements more rapidly and effectively than ever before.

—General Raymond Odierno¹

The Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept is a viable approach for providing trained and ready forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs) to operationalize prevent, shape, and win. When viewed through the lens of the movement and maneuver warfighting function, however, some aspects of the RAF concept require refinement. The brigade combat team (BCT) is the principle maneuver force and represents the primary focus from which to analyze the impact of RAF on the movement and maneuver warfighting function as well as on the existing capability of a BCT to fulfill core maneuver tasks.

The evidence indicates that in addition to existing capability gaps in a BCT's organic reconnaissance force structure, RAF increases the demand for reconnaissance operations to meet information requirements. Therefore, the Army should increase a brigade combat team's capability to conduct reconnaissance. Further examination of the RAF concept and the current Army force generation (ARFORGEN) process confirms that the current system requires adjustment. Modification of the ARFORGEN process is required to support an Army-wide readiness management philosophy that prepares RAF-designated forces while maintaining a higher level of base readiness across the force.

RAF implementation also expands the movement and maneuver warfighting function's role in deterring conflict and shaping the operational environment. Increased exposure to a region will amplify expertise and enhance the ability of maneuver forces to conduct unified land operations. With additional refinement, BCTs will have the capability and capacity to fully support the RAF concept to provide modernized and ready, tailored land force capabilities to meet the combatant commander's requirements across the range of military operations.

The role of conventional forces (CF) evolved over the last decade, expanding its capability and capacity in the current operating environment. After more than 10 years of war, the lines between the traditional roles for conventional and special operating forces (SOF) have blurred. Prior to 2002, foreign internal defense (FID) and relationship-building with indigenous people was solely a SOF function. Many of the tasks traditionally associated with special operations forces can also be performed by conventional forces, however. Recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan identified the necessity for land forces to work in and amongst the people of a host nation. Land forces, both Marines and Soldiers, demonstrated exceptional proficiency in executing traditional SOF missions using SOF techniques.²

The new reality is that land forces in general, (Army, Marines and SOF), have expanded their traditional roles and demonstrated enhanced capability and capacity to perform a wider array of tasks across the range of military operations. Considering the range of operations is an effective way to describe the type, complexity, and intensity of conflict from security cooperation activities, to limited contingencies, to full scale war.³ The

increased demand for conventional forces by combatant commanders (CCDR) to support theater security cooperation activities acknowledges the expanded role of CF. This new reality requires shedding the old labels and outdated roles. The RAF concept provides a starting point for examining the role of land forces in support of CCDRs across the spectrum of conflict.

The RAF concept, however, is not yet well understood. Contributing to the problem is how the acronym “RAF” is used. The military profession uses the acronym in three ways. First, it is used appropriately to describe a regional alignment of forces as a new sourcing strategy to meet CCDR theater security cooperation (TSC) requirements. Second, RAF can be used as a term that identifies specific units considered as service retained, CCMD aligned (SRCA) by the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) to provide RAF capability for the CCDR. Third, the acronym is also used to describe an innovative concept for supporting CCDRs requirements. Moreover, the public evolution of assorted RAF definitions adds to the confusion which contributes to headquarters’ disagreements over authorities and responsibilities. For the purpose of this inquiry, the Department of the Army (DA) G-3/5/7 definition is adopted:

Regionally Aligned Forces provide the Combatant Commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. [RAF] includes Army total force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.⁴

This definition, unfortunately, is still too broad to be helpful and actually promotes additional confusion because it fails to differentiate RAF as either a sourcing solution, i.e., a new concept for addressing the future role of the Army, or as a capability for the joint team. This definition does provide some helpful insights, but it is not sufficiently specific to support fully meaningful discussion.

A RAF-designated unit is provided under a precise set of authorities to deliver specific capabilities to meet CCDR requirements. According to Forces Command (FORSCOM) planners, most active and some reserve component Army units are currently regionally aligned with one of the geographic combatant commands (GCC). These designations consist of assigned, allocated, or service retained, CCMD aligned (SRCA). Units designated as a global response force (GRF) or contingency headquarters, however, will not be regionally aligned.⁵

A more concise definition specifies RAF as “the U.S. Army’s vision for providing Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) with tailored, responsive and consistently available Army forces, to include JTF capable headquarters.”⁶ This definition is useful for addressing RAF as a resourcing strategy concerned with how the Army provides trained and ready forces. If the Army seeks to improve understanding of RAF, then both terminology and corresponding definitions must be simplified and clarified.

Prior to examining the impact that RAF has on the movement and maneuver warfighting function, a review of additional definitions will aid in creating a common understanding. A warfighting function (WfF) provides a method to categorize a group of critical tasks into a format that is used to analyze, synchronize and describe capabilities.⁷ In its simplest form, the movement and maneuver WfF encompasses the tasks and systems that place forces in a position of relative advantage over an enemy. Maneuver forces’ ability to close

with an enemy is aided through the employment of direct and joint fires. The Army's movement and maneuver framework states that Army forces are maneuver-focused with specific units capable of gaining a positional advantage.⁸ This WfF also encompasses force projection as a means for gaining positional advantage over the enemy.⁹ As a joint function, the joint doctrine's definition of movement and maneuver further expands our understanding of the WfF. It describes the joint function's role at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and states that maneuver is conducted in relation to an enemy's center of gravity (COG).¹⁰ Through a synthesis of these definitions, this analysis explores the impact of RAF on the movement and maneuver warfighting function.

RAF and Movement and Maneuver WfF

RAF—and the associated capability it promises to deliver—promises both opportunities and increased challenges for the movement and maneuver warfighting function (WfF). The concept provides an approach to expand movement and maneuver's role in preventing conflict and shaping the operational environment. Additionally, RAF will increase regional expertise that will better enable maneuver forces to effectively conduct decisive operations if warranted.

One misperception about RAF is that it is strictly a method for providing a dedicated force to a GCC to conduct theater security cooperation activities. Contributing to the misperception are the rules for employing a RAF-designated force in security cooperation activities, such as requiring a CCDR to gain permission from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to employ the SRCA forces in activities other than TSC activities. The RAF concept does, however, allow for the possibility that a RAF-designated force may conduct combat operations. A challenge for the movement and maneuver WfF will be how to provide the promised capability in terms of training, structure, and readiness.

The requirements of the RAF concept on the movement and maneuver warfighting function's expanded role is best captured by the phrase "prevent, shape and win." The CSA uses the phrase to describe his vision of the three roles for the Army.¹¹ Furthermore, both of the CSA's prevent and shape role descriptions nest with the tasks in joint operations phase 0 (shape) and phase I (deter) definitions in joint doctrine.¹² The RAF concept operationalizes the capability and capacity to fulfill these roles in support of a joint commander.

Implied in the CSA's vision is the maneuver force's role in preventing conflict by serving as a visible forward-deployed deterrent to potential adversaries. In order to provide a credible deterrence, the Army must maintain a modern, trained, and ready Regionally Aligned Force that provides decisive land power to a CCDR as part of the joint force. Effective deterrence provides the strength to support diplomacy with potential rivals or enemies. Therefore, maneuver forces must ensure a high level of proficiency in their WfF's core tasks in order to maintain the capability and readiness to be a credible element of national power.¹³

A Regionally Aligned Force will help shape the global security environment by setting conditions prior to any potential crisis. The CCDRs accomplish this by building relationships that increase partners' or allies' capacity while providing access ahead of crises. This role increases the training requirements of maneuver forces because they must develop regional familiarity, cultural understanding, and basic language skills. An additional requirement is to develop leaders who are capable of teaching military skills to partner nations in support of security cooperation activities. Maneuver forces will be required to conduct key enabling activities including reconnaissance tasks designed to promote better understanding of the infrastructure, terrain and attitudes of the population. Using a maneuver force in an expanded role to get ahead of a possible crisis is a lesson learned over the past 10 years of war. The military must move beyond the old "break glass in case of war" mentality for the employment of conventional maneuver forces. RAF enables CCDRs' TSC plans that are designed to shape the security environment.

The third role in the CSA's vision is "win." Winning is the core Army role: to provide land power in combination with the joint force to fight and win. Maneuver forces derive their core WfF tasks from their ultimate requirement to "win" in combat. An additional expectation is that maneuver forces will contribute to a manner that both mitigates risk and, to the extent possible, precludes long-term conflict.¹⁴

Movement and Maneuver WfF forces executing the RAF concept in prevent, shape and win roles will face environmental challenges. The Army's Capstone Concept (ACC) provides a description of the anticipated future environment, characterized as volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA).¹⁵ In addition, an increased likelihood exists that operations will be conducted among civilian populations. Any new situation or environment has the potential to be complex due to unforeseen friction, chance, perceptions, lack of information and lack of familiarity with the physical and human terrain. Complexity and ambiguity places additional emphasis on developing the capability and capacity of the movement and maneuver WfF.

Additional requirements placed on the movement and maneuver WfF by the RAF concept fall in the areas of training, building increased capacity in force structure, and managing readiness in a fiscally-constrained environment. A comparison between the capabilities of a known maneuver force, a BCT, to what is expected of a RAF-designated unit operating in a VUCA environment may help identify any gaps.

The BCT: A Primary Movement and Maneuver WfF Organization

The RAF concept relies heavily on the movement and maneuver WfF to provide CCDRs credible deterrent options, support to theater security cooperation plans, and a land force capable of delivering decisive victory in conflict. The BCT is the Army's primary ground maneuver force and the combat aviation brigade (CAB) is the parallel air movement and maneuver force. General Odierno's strategic vision provides the best description of a RAF-designated unit and a sound entry point to broadly understand force requirements:

It is uniquely organized with the capability and capacity to provide expeditionary, decisive land power to the Joint Force and ready to perform across the range of military operations to Prevent, Shape and Win in support of Combatant Commanders to defend the Nation and its interests at home and abroad, both today and against emerging threats.¹⁶

This vision creates the expectation that the Army will provide a multi-functional capability in a single unit to a CCDR. As examined through the movement and maneuver warfighting function (WfF), the CSA's vision of a RAF-designated force effectively describes its principal combined-arms maneuver force, the BCT.

The doctrinal role of the BCT aligns with elements of the CSA's vision for the Army. The BCT's capabilities and its role in the movement and maneuver warfighting function is described as follows:

Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker brigade combat teams are the Army's combat power building blocks for maneuver, and the smallest combined arms units that can be committed independently. BCTs conduct offensive, defensive, stability and civil support operations. Their core mission is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy or capture enemy forces, or to repel enemy attacks by fire, close combat, and counterattack. The BCT can fight without augmentation, but it also can be tailored to meet the precise needs of its missions. BCTs conduct expeditionary deployment and integrate the efforts of the Army with military and civilian, joint and multinational partners.¹⁷

Essentially, the BCT is the maneuver force that has the capability required by the RAF concept. Furthermore, doctrine asserts that a BCT is the Army's primary maneuver force for core movement and maneuver warfighting function tasks as well as a range of military operations in a joint environment. A BCT is capable of expeditionary operations and can be scaled to the exact mission requirements. The doctrinal description of a

BCT, however, not only specifies the unit's role in "win" operations, it implies that a BCT can conduct prevent and shape activities.

Designating the BCT as RAF

Three types of BCTs exist: armor (ABCT), infantry (IBCT) and Stryker (SBCT).¹⁸ Each type has a unique modified table of organization and equipment (MTO&E). The acronym "BCT" is used henceforth to describe all three unit types collectively.

The organic capabilities in a BCT make it the RAF sourcing unit of choice for combatant commanders. A BCT is the primary land domain maneuver force and it is organized as a combined arms team. The MTO&E provides commanders the flexibility to internally task-organize for squad through brigade-level missions. A BCT is organized with the level of leadership needed to provide mission command for independent operations of the organic, combat-arms maneuver forces, enabling forces, fires, and functional support units. Furthermore, a BCT proficient on decisive action core competencies is also capable, with limited additional training, to conduct, prevent and shape activities. "Decisive action" describes how land forces conduct decisive and sustainable operations while simultaneously conducting offense, defense and stability tasks, and possibly even defense support of civilian authorities (DSCA).¹⁹

Brigade combat teams are capable of self-sustainment for up to 96 hours and doctrinally require only limited external augmentation to be able to conduct the full range of military operations.²⁰ The recent MTO&E change to the BCT force structure eliminated the organic capability of military police and air defense, and reduced the intelligence and communications personnel.²¹ This capability loss increases the need for augmentation if the BCT is to provide full warfighting function capability in accord with the RAF concept.

Another BCT capacity gap is the organization's ability to conduct reconnaissance and security operations. This gap is due to an insufficient number of organic reconnaissance forces. The recently published fiscal year (FY) 2014 MTO&E provided a third organic maneuver battalion to IBCTs and ABCTs without an increase in reconnaissance forces. The disparate ratio of reconnaissance to maneuver units in a BCT will undercut reconnaissance operations required by the RAF concept. The challenge for planners and force developers is to translate the requirements of the RAF concept into capabilities that support the CCDR's requirements. The Army must execute due diligence to ensure we have the optimal BCT structure for addressing all contingencies in a RAF-designated BCT environment.

Capability Analysis

DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities) is a framework force developers use to analyze capability. A DOTMLPF analysis can assist in exploring the maneuver BCT as the Army organization that will implement the RAF concept. The substance of the analysis in this report focuses on doctrine, organization and training. Additionally, the evaluation discusses the movement and maneuver WfF's expanded role in doctrine and recommends that reconnaissance be classified as a warfighting function. Furthermore, the capacity gap created by an insufficient ratio of reconnaissance to maneuver forces necessitates standardizing reconnaissance formations across all BCTs. The training analysis centers on adjusting the conditions in which movement and maneuver tasks are performed. The analysis examines and then provides a recommendation to modify the ARFORGEN training model from 24 to 36-months while extending the manning policy from 36 to 48-month tours. Overall, implementing the RAF concept does not impact every movement and maneuver aspect of DOTMLPF.

In general, the movement and maneuver warfighting function's tasks in doctrine adequately address a RAF-designated BCT and supporting RAF concept. Two areas require additional doctrinal attention, however.

First, the need for increased information for RAF when operating regionally warrants a reexamination of reconnaissance. Second, training manuals must be modified.

Army doctrine already provides significant depth to the movement and maneuver WfFs “win” role. The recently published Army Doctrinal Publication 1, *The Army*, specifies the critical nature of the role that landpower performs in deterring potential adversaries, and effectively supporting the prevent role of the RAF concept.²² Additionally, ADP 1 portrays the critical nature of shaping activities by designating support to security cooperation as a core enabling competency.²³ The Army devoted an entire manual (*Army Support to Security Cooperation*) to assist in executing TSC activities in support of a CDR.²⁴ With an eye to the future, *The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver 2016-2028* clarifies linkages to the RAF concept and the capabilities that the movement and maneuver WfF should provide to a CDR. As a result, the future missions and associated tasks required of a BCT nest closely with the current requirements of a RAF BCT.

What is missing from doctrine is recognition of the need to increase reconnaissance operations. The specific requirement provided by the Army Capstone Concept (ACC) is:

Future Army forces require the capability to fight for, collect, and exploit information in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations through continuous physical reconnaissance, persistent surveillance, and human intelligence, enabled by responsive process, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities to develop the contextual understanding to defeat enemy countermeasures, compensate for technological limitations, and adapt continuously to changing situations within the operational environment in support of unified action.²⁵

In order to meet the ACC-generated requirements, the Army must designate reconnaissance as a warfighting function rather than as a tactical enabling task.

Doctrine does not adequately address the critical role that reconnaissance plays in shaping tactical through strategic environments for movement and maneuver and other warfighting functions. Implementing RAF increases reconnaissance requirements. The Army's Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-90 classifies reconnaissance as a tactical enabling task primarily performed in support of intelligence and the movement and maneuver WfFs.²⁶ The purpose of reconnaissance is to provide information that builds situational awareness and increases the commander's understanding. This understanding provides the RAF unit commander with a clearer visualization of the operating environment, and that which facilitates rapid and informed operational decisions.²⁷

Reconnaissance information in support of maneuver is as critical as the fires provided by artillery. Reconnaissance provides the information that enables a commander to understand where he can gain a decisive advantage while limiting the enemy's ability to disrupt maneuver. Establishing reconnaissance as a warfighting function would recognize the importance of reconnaissance activities in RAF operations. Furthermore, and as a warfighting function, increased reconnaissance would help with operations planning and execution in support of prevent, shape, and win.

The current RAF-designated BCT's organic reconnaissance forces are insufficient to meet RAF requirements on the movement and maneuver WfF. Future operating environments will drastically increase the necessity for information/intelligence collection and security operations designed to reduce uncertainty inherent in new or rapidly-evolving situations. A Regionally Aligned Force must be prepared to be expeditionary and ready for deployment to a foreign land. An unfamiliar environment increases the requirement for BCT commanders to have the organic capability to conduct reconnaissance to gather information about the new environment and to conduct appropriate security operations. Higher-level commanders at division, corps or a joint task force (JTF) headquarters also require information to enhance their understanding of the ground situation.

The organic reconnaissance squadron's ultimate role in any type of RAF-designated BCT is to aid movement and maneuver tasks through reconnaissance and security (R&S) operations.²⁸ During RAF shaping operations that are designed to gain access to and develop relationships with a partner country, reconnaissance forces can assist in setting favorable conditions. They are trained to gather information about the physical environment, infrastructure, people, and culture and could assist theater planners' efforts to gauge capabilities and access limitations in the face of unknown contingencies.²⁹

Even with the seven standard Army R&S missions, there is no standard reconnaissance squadron organization between the IBCT, SBCT and ABCT organizations. This incongruent approach extends to the platoon level, where there are different capabilities and limitations. The approved FY14 MTO&E, dated October 1, 2013, adds another maneuver battalion to BCTs with the exception of those BCTs currently stationed in Europe.³⁰ An additional maneuver battalion further exacerbates the imbalanced ratio of reconnaissance forces to maneuver forces in a BCT. As a result, this imbalanced ratio may require a BCT commander to divert maneuver forces to reconnaissance or security missions in order to acquire situational awareness or protect a flank. Diverting maneuver battalions to R&S operations negates the purpose of returning the third maneuver battalion to a maneuver brigade formation.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the mission sets assigned to most BCTs required three or more battalions to serve as land owning commands. BCT commanders were obliged to employ their reconnaissance squadrons in a maneuver battalion role, which severely degraded their BCT's organic ability to answer priority information requirements (PIR). The addition of a third maneuver battalion allows BCT commanders to employ their organic reconnaissance squadron to conduct reconnaissance and security missions. In sum, the Army should not increase the number of maneuver battalions without a corresponding increase in reconnaissance forces. Furthermore, the Army does not appear to employ a standard logic for how reconnaissance forces are structured to support each type of BCT. The ratio of mounted reconnaissance troop headquarters to infantry or armor company headquarters provides the differences between BCT types. The ratios of mounted recon troops to maneuver companies are: 1:6 in an IBCT, 1:3 in an SBCT, and 1:4 in an ABCT. Although the MTO&E for each reconnaissance squadron associated with its respective IBCT/ABCT/SBCT is significantly different, the seven core missions remain the same.³¹

The Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) at Fort Benning recognizes the capability gaps in the current structure of reconnaissance squadrons and is actively working to enhance capability through increased structure.³² The MCoE has also been developing concepts to address the future operating environment and guidance contained in the ACC. Its ongoing efforts will develop solutions to meet the joint and Army reconnaissance and security requirements as defined by the Army Operating Concept (AOC), the ACC,³³ and the Army Movement and Maneuver Concept (MMC).³⁴ The reconnaissance and intelligence communities need to identify a path forward that will better enable maneuver forces while supporting the reconnaissance demands of the RAF.

The Army should institute a standard ratio of one mounted reconnaissance troop, with three platoons, to each maneuver battalion. This would allow BCT commanders to task organize reconnaissance capabilities to each maneuver unit as the mission requires. A single mounted reconnaissance troop should be capable of conducting R&S missions in support of a maneuver battalion's doctrinal frontal coverage. Additionally, each BCT should be organized with a two-platoon dismounted reconnaissance troop (DRT) to perform specialized surveillance and reconnaissance tasks needed to answer a BCT commander's PIR.

To effectively address the reconnaissance force capability gaps, decision-makers must standardize the recon platoon's manning, equipment and training in order to meet the requirements placed on the movement and maneuver WfF by the RAF concept. In addition to differing reconnaissance troop quantities, each type of

BCT has a significantly different reconnaissance platoon in terms of manning, equipping and associated training requirements.³⁵ Retaining multiple platoon configurations is not efficient for the training base, nor is it cost-effective. Each of the three types of mounted recon platoon configurations has a dissimilar set of capabilities and limitations due to the equipment and manning. Incongruent capacity between RAF-designated BCTs makes it difficult for the joint force to understand the reconnaissance capabilities and limitations within each type of regionally aligned BCT.

Joint Readiness Training Center observers/coaches/trainers, some of the Army's most qualified experts on reconnaissance and security operations, developed several recommendations to address reconnaissance and security capability gaps.³⁶ Their principal recommendation urges the Army to standardize BCT reconnaissance squadrons with three mounted reconnaissance troops, each consisting of three mounted platoons. Additionally, they suggest that the Army increase reconnaissance platoon size and consider a standard platoon configuration that is manned with 42 Soldiers and equipped with four Stryker vehicles, four light weight, wheeled reconnaissance vehicles, (such as the Medium Assault Vehicle-Light or Flyer Advanced Light Strike Vehicle) and two side-by-side all-terrain vehicles.³⁷

A standard platoon configuration would reduce institutional training costs and associated local training costs associated when scouts join a different platoon configuration on permanent change of station (PCS). The increased manning level allows a platoon to be able to execute core tasks for long durations, while limiting the requirement for maneuver force augmentation. Another strength is that this recommendation provides a more flexible organization focused on gathering information rather than fighting for it. Future RAF-designated BCTs of any type must be equally capable of providing reconnaissance capability in support of RAF. Widening the aperture, the RAF concept also requires changes to force generation.

The current ARFORGEN process manages all Army units in a predictive cycle that synchronizes manning, equipping and training. Units progress through reset, train/ready or available force pools in a 24-month cycle while personnel rotate on a 36-month tour.³⁸ For the most part, the current approach is adequate to train and manage readiness for RAF-designated maneuver units in accord with the RAF concept. The current ARFORGEN system, however, does not provide a holistic methodology to mitigate risk to the baseline readiness of the entire force. The high level training proficiency required of maneuver units by the RAF concept necessitates a refined ARFORGEN model capable of achieving a sustainable level of readiness.³⁹

The RAF concept requires that Regionally Aligned Forces achieve training readiness level one (T-1) proficiency in their core decisive action mission essential task list (C-METL). These forces are then validated in a mandated culminating training event (CTE) at either home station or a combat training center (CTC).⁴⁰ The CCDR may dictate additional training requirements, including specific regional training and ideally some level of language familiarization.⁴¹ Specific to the movement and maneuver warfighting function, the RAF concept demands acquiring a high level of proficiency in less than a year and maintaining it for an additional year while the RAF unit remains available to the CCDR.

The range of missions appropriate to a RAF-designated BCT continues to grow. BCTs may be expected to conduct combat operations, perform strategic response force duties, and conduct security cooperation activities. A BCT might also be tasked to serve as a visible and capable formation that both reassures our allies while deterring an adversary. The Army may also be called upon to rapidly provide regionally aligned BCTs to a CCDR in support of an emerging crisis. Regardless of the assigned mission, managing unit readiness is important if the promised capability is to be available to a CCDR as needed.

The Army's training strategy should focus on meeting the CSA's vision for providing a ready, expeditionary land force with the capability and capacity to perform the range of military operations needed to support the joint force commander.⁴² The strategy must also account for how to maintain training readiness to

“ensure the right mix of operationally ready and responsive Total Army forces and capabilities to rapidly meet emergent Global Combatant Command requirements while maintaining an operational and strategic landpower reserve.”⁴³ Training is but one indicator of overall readiness for combat. The challenges in maintaining a trained and ready RAF-oriented Army are compounded by current fiscal constraints. The Secretary of the Army and the CSA characterized the impact of resource constraints in their 2013 posture statement to Congress:

With sequestration, the Army will not be able to fully train our Soldiers, whether through professional military education or collective unit training, in a way that enables them to operate successfully in a complex environment across the full range of military operations. The long-term readiness impacts of the resulting deficit in trained forces will jeopardize the Army’s ability to meet war plan requirements.⁴⁴

Given the CSA’s vision and pending fiscal constraints, the challenge is to meet existing requirements without creating a hollow force. The Army will not likely have the resources to maintain every BCT at a T-1 readiness level on a 24-month cycle. Additionally, the Army cannot mortgage the readiness of “operational and responsive Total Army forces”⁴⁵ and must mitigate risks associated with fiscal constraints. The task then is to develop low-cost solutions for building and maintaining readiness with the available resources.

The Army should adopt a new approach to the ARFORGEN process, one that creates a higher base level of readiness through better manning and equipping strategies. A potential solution must also consider how to mitigate the effects of sequestration on Army readiness should units awaiting a specific mission be targeted. Units can maintain a higher level of training proficiency and create a higher level of readiness by continuously manning units near 100 percent of authorization, reducing personnel turbulence, and maintaining equipment at peak readiness. Hence, personnel stability can partially offset the damage caused by budget reductions. Furthermore, raising unit readiness requires less training time and fewer resources if the unit is already manned and equipped at the highest levels. Together, these actions can mitigate the oft-criticized and obsolete industrial-age Army personnel management system where soldiers are often viewed simply as interchangeable parts.⁴⁶

Personnel tours should be increased from three to four years for Soldiers assigned to corps and below formations when RAF designated. The increased time on station would permit reduced unit turbulence by rotating only six percent of the BCT personnel per quarter. Clearly there would be exceptions to the four-year rule, such as the need to accommodate 24-month BN/BDE command team rotations. Talent management consideration should also be extended for those individuals identified for early departure to key broadening assignments. A four-year assignment cycle will also generate cost savings by reducing the number of PCS moves. Longer tours will support the RAF tenet for Soldiers to develop a more comprehensive understanding of a specific region. Former SECDEF Leon Panetta raised the notion of reversibility in the Defense Strategic Guidance. His guidance was to maintain a system that allows the military industrial base and military to quickly grow capability and capacity to respond to unforeseen threats.⁴⁷ The Army must set conditions to accommodate that guidance. Raising the readiness baseline while instituting a four year assignment process is a first step forward.

Overall unit readiness is a combined function of personnel, equipment, supply and training readiness. If the Army can resource personnel and equipment, and sustain equipment readiness for units in a reset or train/ready force pool, those units will require less time and fewer resources when called upon. A commander whose unit is manned and equipped at a high level should be able to find innovative ways to enhance training proficiency. Generally speaking, opting for a higher training base will decrease the time required to achieve level-one readiness.

The adage “It takes three to make one” applies. The phrase intimates that in order to produce a trained and ready BCT, two additional BCTs are required. One is required to conduct the current mission, a second to train to replace the first, while the third BCT is recovering and resetting. This third BCT plays a critical role in protecting the other two from support tasks and out-load requirements during a deployment.

The Army should increase the current 24-month ARFORGEN model to 36 months while modifying the existing force pool construct to improve and manage readiness (see Figure 1). Modifying the existing ARFORGEN process will support a higher baseline level of readiness while acknowledging and enhancing the importance of regional alignment.




Figure 1. The Rule of Three Training Model⁴⁸

The Army should rotationally designate BCTs that are not assigned a mission as contingency response forces (CRF). Likewise, combatant commands should designate select units as regional reserve forces (RRF). Designating units as a RRF/CRF provides a way to manage readiness through a resourcing strategy that supports enhanced baseline readiness while maintaining a regional focus. Designated RRF/CRF units would maintain a level of proficiency sufficiently high to accept any assigned mission while home station training to achieve T-1 proficiency could be accomplished in 30 days or less.

While serving as a RRF/CRF, a BCT would conduct reset, provide support to the installation, and be prepared to support deployment out-load operations. Additionally, the BCT in a RRF/CRF role allows other BCTs in the train/ready and mission availability pools to concentrate on their missions. A potential drawback to a 36-month model is that commanders and command sergeants major might not command during a mission cycle or they might prepare the unit and change command/responsibility prior to mission execution. The multiple-BCT focus recommended here also accounts for the requirements that may be expected of BCTs in support of a senior commander on a single Army post. This cyclical approach averts a tiered readiness system that has significant negative implications on the professionalism, readiness and morale of Soldiers and, moreover, remains fiscally feasible despite resource constraints.

The RAF concept does not produce any new requirements for material development for the movement and maneuver WfF that the MCoE has yet to address. The MCoE has placed significant effort on developing concepts to address future capability requirements for maneuver and reconnaissance forces. The RAF concept, however, places additional demands on the leadership and education for the movement and maneuver WfF such as regional orientation, cultural awareness and basic language competency. These training requirements are addressed in the FORSCOM training guidance and Army doctrine.

The RAF concept creates implications for the movement aspect of the warfighting function with regard to the location of Army units and an installation's out-load capability. One expectation for RAF-designated units is to be rapidly capable of global employment in order to achieve positional advantage by strategic movement. In order to meet rapid deployment requirements, the DoD should retain and build the capacity of domestic and foreign installations that are in close proximity to aerial and sea ports of embarkation. In a fiscally-constrained environment, retaining locations for rapid and optimal strategic movement should remain consistent with requirements in our National Military Strategy.

Conclusion

The Regionally Aligned Forces concept is a viable approach to providing trained and ready maneuver forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs) charged with operationalizing the prevent, shape and win strategy. The concept creates a number of challenges for the movement and maneuver warfighting function in terms of doctrine, organization, training and readiness for BCTs. This report identified existing capability gaps, provided recommendations to address those shortfalls, and discussed the risks and potential mitigation strategies involved in training and manning a BCT under current ARFORGEN policies. With additional refinement, brigade combat teams will have the capability and capacity to fully support the Regionally Aligned Forces concept: to provide ready and tailored land forces capable of meeting the combatant commander's requirements across the range of military operations.

Notes

¹ C. Todd Lopez, "Future Army Forces Must Be Regionally Aligned, Odierno Says," available from www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=118316, accessed on February 9, 2014.

² Bennet S. Sacolick and Wayne W. Grigsby: "Special Operations/Conventional Forces Interdependence: A Critical Role in "Prevent, Shape, Win"," *Army*, June, 2012, p. 39.

³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 11, 2011, p. V-1.

⁴ James Learmont, "Regional Alignment of Forces," briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, November 25, 2013.

⁵ James E. Rexford, "Regionally Aligned Forces," briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, November 19, 2013.

⁶ Learmont, "Regional Alignment of Forces," briefing slides.

⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0 w/ Change 2, *Unified Land Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 10, 2011, p. iv.

⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-6, *The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver 2016-2028*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 13, 2010, p. 3.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, p. III-1.

¹¹ Raymond T. Odierno, "CSA Editorial: Prevent, Shape, Win," available from www.army.mil/article/71030/, accessed on January 21, 2014.

¹² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 11, 2011, pp. III-41- III-42.

¹³ Odierno, "CSA Editorial: Prevent, Shape, Win."

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-0, *The U.S. Army Capstone Concept*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 19, 2012, p. 6.

¹⁶ The Chief of Staff of the Army Home Page, "Army Vision Statement," available from www.army.mil/leaders/csa/, accessed on February 9, 2014.

¹⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-90.6, *Brigade Combat Team*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2010, p. 1-1.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 1-6.

¹⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, p. 5.

²⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Brigade Combat Team*, p. 1-1.

²¹ Michelle Tan, "The Huge BCT Overhaul," available from www.armytimes.com/article/20130702/NEWS/307020002/The-huge-BCT-overhaul, accessed on March 2, 2014.

²² Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication 1-0 w/ Change 2, *The Army*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September, 2012, p. 3-2.

²³ Ibid., p. 3-3.

²⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-22 w/ Change 1, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 22, 2013, p. 1-5.

²⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The U.S. Army Capstone Concept*, p. 29.

²⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-90, *Offense and Defense*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August, 31, 2012, p. 5-1.

²⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Brigade Combat Team*, p. 6-1.

²⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron*, Field Manual 3-20.96, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 12, 2010, p. 1-3.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 1-2.

³⁰ Tan, "The Huge BCT Overhaul."

³¹ Ibid.

³² U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, "Seizing the Initiative; Meeting Joint and Army Reconnaissance and Security Requirements," draft white paper, Fort Benning, GA, December 17, 2012.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-6, *The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver 2016-2028*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 13, 2010, p. 29.

³⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Techniques and Procedures 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance Platoon*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 5, 2013, pp. 2-5, 2-8, 2-10.

³⁶ Interview conducted by author with CPT Nick Corrigan and SFC Kyle West, U.S. Army, Observers, Coaches and Trainers, Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA, February 25, 2013.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 525-29, *Military Operations, Army Force Generation*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 14, 2011, p. 3.

³⁹ John M. McHugh and Raymond Odierno, "A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2013, Fiscal year 2013," posture statement presented to the 113th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013, p. 5.

⁴⁰ Kimberly Field, James Learmont and Jason Charland, "Regionally Aligned Forces; Business Not as Usual," *Parameters* Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2013, pp. 55-63.

⁴¹ Learmont, "Regional Alignment of Forces."

⁴² Raymond Odierno, *CSA Strategic Priorities, Waypoint 2*, available from usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/329319.pdf, accessed on February 5, 2013, p. 2.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ McHugh and Odierno, "A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2013, Fiscal year 2013," p. 6.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

⁴⁶ Raven Bukowski, John Childress, Michael J. Colarusso, David S. Lyle, “Creating an Effective Regional Alignment Strategy for the U.S. Army,” Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, November 2014, p.5.

⁴⁷ Leon Panetta, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2012, p. 7.

⁴⁸ Graphic designed by authors.

RAF and Intelligence Warfighting Function

Colonel James B. Botters and Colonel Mark A. Haseman

Intelligence is about people and a study of people. It is not simply a question of studying people on the other side, but studying one's own as well. We have to learn about one another, not just about strangers.

—Sir Maurice Oldfield¹

The Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA's) Total Army Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept requires a versatile mix of intelligence capabilities and expertise within the Intelligence Warfighting Function (IWfF). The IWfF is a series of intelligence tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) whose common purpose is to "facilitate an understanding of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations."² Additionally, the IWfF is the Army's contribution to the greater Intelligence Enterprise which is the "sum total of the intelligence efforts for the entire U.S. intelligence community."³

Army Transformation and Modularity efforts and the expansion of the brigade combat team-level (BCT) intelligence structure came at the expense of the conventional Military Intelligence (MI) battalion structure. The loss of MI formations created gaps in capabilities, Title 10 training, and intelligence certifications needed for MI units to access the greater Intelligence Enterprise. Twelve years of war, coupled with substantial overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding, allowed the Army to find materiel and personnel solutions to intelligence training and capability gaps. The RAF concept builds upon these solutions within the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. IWfF solutions and the gaps created by sequestration in FY13, acceleration of FY17 force reductions to FY15, and the future 25 percent reductions in two-star level and above headquarters hinder the IWfF's ability to execute RAF. Moving forward with the RAF concept without assessing the risks created by these new gaps prevents the IWfF from prudently applying resources needed to effectively and efficiently execute the CSA's RAF intent.

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the restrictions in the 2011 Budget Control Act require the U.S. Army to reduce its end strength to 490,000 by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2017.⁴ The impact of sequestration in FY13 together with future budget reductions forced the Army to accelerate cuts scheduled to occur by the end of FY15.⁵ While acceleration provides short term savings, projected cuts will affect modernization and restructuring efforts across the force. In short, the IWfF must identify gaps created by an increasingly austere fiscal environment. The framework of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) can aid in assessing gaps which may impede the IWfF's ability to effectively implement RAF.

IWfF Implications

RAF forces "are those Army units assigned or allocated to a Combatant Commander (CCDR), and those capabilities apportioned or service retained, Combatant Command (CCMD) aligned, and prepared by the Army for regional missions."⁶ Regional missions require the active component Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve personnel to have an "understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of

the countries where they are most likely to be employed.”⁷ Within the CSA’s RAF definition, there are four specified IWtF tasks.

1. Provide IWfF support to a joint task force (JTF) capable headquarters (HQ)
2. Provide forward stationed IWfF forces and capabilities
3. Provide reach-back support from outside the Area of Responsibility (AOR)
4. Initiate Language Proficiency, Regional Expertise and Cultural Knowledge (LREC) across the Total Army⁸

The four task categories provide intelligence support to force generation, support for situational understanding, information collection, and intelligence assistance with regard to targeting and information capabilities.⁹ The challenge will be meeting the RAF initiatives in the contemporary fiscal environment. “Fiscal austerity”¹⁰ is driving changes that “not only [impact] manning and force structure, but also measures to decrease, consolidate, or divest missions, organizations, and functions.”¹¹ Consequently, the changes afoot affect the structure and resources IWfF uses to meet RAF implementation initiatives.

Intelligence WfF: DOTMLPF Analysis

IWfF support to the deployed forces and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process evolved over the past twelve years. MI senior leadership invested heavily in Information Technology (IT) infrastructure, language, culture, and Foundry intelligence training to enhance technical instruction prior to deployment. The term “No Cold Starts” stresses the importance of intelligence personnel understanding the dynamics of the operating environment (OE) across the IWfF disciplines.¹² The Army could not allow the intelligence skills of the redeployed MI Soldiers to atrophy upon return to home station. The effort of “No MI Soldier at Rest” placed troops in reach-back facilities supporting the forward commands with federated intelligence products for the units that were forward deployed.¹³ The catch phrase “No Cold Starts and No MI Soldier at Rest” is the basis for the Army’s “Intelligence 2020 and Beyond” (Intel 2020) initiatives to meet the needs of the future regionally engaged force.¹⁴

Intel 2020 builds on successes gained during twelve years of combat and focuses on improving the IWfF’s responsiveness for an increased range of contingencies. When the CSA announced the RAF concept, the IWfF stood poised to support the CCDRs with best practices to support ARFORGEN training and the CCDR’s operational requirements. Using the CSA’s definition of RAF and the MI mantra of “No Cold Starts and No MI Soldier at Rest,” the Army’s IWfF is aggressively pursuing solutions to meet the CCDR’s need to leverage the entire Intelligence Enterprise.

Balancing IWfF RAF “solutions against an ever reducing budget will require stringent oversight.”¹⁵ Intel 2020 initiatives are costly and force the G2 to make tough funding priority decisions. Modernization sacrifices have long-term second- and third-order effects, whereas sacrifices affecting the operational force (OF) entail immediate and visible impacts. Finding the right balance is important. Using DOTMLPF as a framework can assist in seeing how the IWfF can support RAF implementation. Furthermore, identifying gaps and friction points will aid in establishing a more balanced approach to IWfF resource allocations.

Doctrine

Army Doctrine Publication 2-0 (ADP 2-0) and Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0 (ADRP 2-0), *Intelligence*, outline the key tasks, core competencies, and intelligence disciplines that allow the IWfF to “facilitate an understanding of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations.”¹⁶ Joint Publication 2-0 (JP 2-0), *Joint Intelligence Operations*, provides fundamental principles and guidance for intelligence support to joint

operations.¹⁷ Although there are some nuances within joint doctrine, there are no conflicts with the IWfF's four key tasks, four core competencies, or seven intelligence disciplines. There are, however, gaps in the IWfF's abilities to efficiently meet the CSA's implied tasks for RAF.

RAF provides the CCDR a menu of options for creating a JTF headquarters to fulfill the needs of either an emergent crisis or a standing or rotational requirement.¹⁸ The CCDR's mission requirements drive the JTF's organizational structure. Therefore, the IWfF must be prepared to provide capabilities across the spectrum of intelligence disciplines within a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multi-national (JIIM) environment.¹⁹ HQ DA EXORD 052-13 aligns "active component Corps and Division HQs to provide at least one joint-capable HQs to each CCMD based on an optimization of requirements."²⁰

Establishing an effective JTF Intelligence Directorate requires significant re-structuring and augmentation to corps or division intelligence staffs in a JTF HQ. While Joint Publication 3-33, *The Joint Task Force Headquarters*, outlines the JTF Intelligence requirements, it lacks a template that allows corps and division intelligence staffs to compare their modified table of organization and equipment (MTO&E) authorizations against the intelligence staff required to execute a JTF.²¹

While there are historical examples of corps and divisions forming the base for JTF HQs, most were ad-hoc organizations forced to establish capabilities during a crisis. Establishing a Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) is not as simple as taking a J2 line-and-block chart and aligning the division or corps intelligence effort accordingly. Lack of joint experience and joint coded staff positions, combined with cuts in two-star level and above headquarters by 25 percent, will exacerbate the ability for these units to establish a JTF capable IWfF. Creating joint manning document (JMD) templates using corps and division MTO&Es against the different JTF mission parameters would enhance the transition to a JTF HQ. These templates could also identify to the CCDR enabler support required to facilitate command and control between the CCDR and the JTF HQ.

Organization

The IWfF structure within the U.S. Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and its subordinate Theater Intelligence Brigades (TIBs) provide critical strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence capabilities to their assigned geographic combatant commands and Army service combatant commands (ASCCs). These TIBs become the anchor points for the Combatant Commands RAF IWfF forces by providing technical and regional expertise to facilitate a common "understanding of the enemy, terrain and civil considerations."²²

The resizing efforts at corps, divisions, and BCTs negatively affect their organic intelligence formations and capabilities. To counter these degradations the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE), in coordination with the DA G2 and U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), designed corps-level Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigades (E-MIBs). E-MIBs will provide Regionally Aligned Forces and JTF commanders with downward reinforcing IWfF capabilities as needed. Although still in the force design process, the E-MIB initial concept shows promise in solving some gaps in capabilities and mission command from corps to the BCTs.

The preferred option for organizing a JTF HQ is to form the organization around a combatant command's service component HQ or the service component's existing subordinate HQ (such as a numbered Fleet, numbered Air Force, Marine Expeditionary Force, or Army Corps) that includes an established command structure.²³ Under the RAF concept ASCCs, corps, and division HQs are available to the CCDR to establish a JTF HQ. All of these HQ elements require significant intelligence augmentation to operate at the joint level.

The targeted force reduction of 25 percent at the two and three-star level headquarters will create additional augmentation requirements likely to impact the resource pool used to augment JTF HQs.

Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) requirements, coalition and joint network integration, or simply organizing the IWfF staff effort for JTF headquarters requirements quickly overwhelm the intelligence staffs found in corps and division HQs. Personnel within the IWfF HQ staffs lack the experiences needed to enable joint planning at the JTF level.²⁴ As a result, valuable time is wasted, usually during a crisis, as HQ personnel struggle to stand up a functioning JTF.

The Army and the IWfF should invest in the capabilities inherent within the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). The JECC “provides mission-tailored, joint capability packages to Combatant Commanders in order to facilitate rapid establishment of a joint force HQ, fulfill Global Response Force (GRF) execution and bridge joint operational requirements.”²⁵ The JECC brings operations, plans, logistics, intelligence support, knowledge management, communications, and public affairs expertise that can serve for a limited time, no longer than 120 days, with the JTF. The JECC can provide critical joint expertise to train JTF staffs during pre-deployment operations. The intelligence support functional teams within the Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE) help coordinate, manage, and synchronize intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.²⁶ The earlier a corps or division HQs can facilitate JECC coordination and training, the more quickly the IWfF staff can meet the JTF and CCDR’s requirements.

Reach-back is the “process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or materiel from organizations that are not forward deployed.”²⁷ INSCOM, TIBs, and ASCCs have used reach-back support since the 1990’s when secure digital communications became available. The expansion of bandwidth and IWfF digital capabilities over the past twelve years allow tactical and operational units to benefit from reach-back tactics, techniques, and procedures (ITPs). Organizing the IWfF staff for split-based or reach-back operations is a complicated challenge, however. The diversity of disciplines and capabilities within MI produces low-density but high-demand individual requirements. Additionally, shortages in these MI MOSs and capabilities prevent the proper manning needed at two separate locations with 24-hour IWfF coverage.

Reach-back operations within RAF create additional burdens on the IWfF staff. Reach-back requires additional personnel to support a robust and redundant architecture for intelligence systems operating on Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR), Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), and the National Security Agency Net (NSA-NET) that enables analyst access to multidiscipline intelligence traffic. These capabilities reside in sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) which incur additional resources for security and oversight. This support must be available 24/7 until the mission is complete in both the reach-back and forward deployed location.

Requirements for special security officers (SSOs), SCIF accreditation/security, foreign disclosure officer (FDO), staff liaison officers (LNOs), joint automated systems integration, and communication architecture support personnel complicate the corps and division staffs’ ability to effectively conduct reach-back operations. Prior to transformation, Department of the Army (DA) civilian positions within corps and divisions provided the continuity and institutional knowledge for many of these areas. FORSCOM Mission Support Elements (MSEs) assumed responsibilities and capabilities for some of these positions. Thus, reductions in both HQ authorizations and the civilian MSE positions jeopardize the ability to conduct reach-back as directed by the CSA’s specified task.

A comprehensive IWfF troop-to-task assessment for the personnel, equipment, and facilities is needed for reach-back or split-based operations at both corps and division. The requirements may drive certain intelligence capabilities to reside in the reach-back location with none moving forward. The IWfF can provide

the appropriate level of confidence to the forward command only if they are resourced and organized appropriately at both locations.

Language proficiency, regional expertise and cultural knowledge (LREC) are the most complicated, undefined, resource dependent, decentralized, and time consuming RAF tasks for the IWfF to accomplish. Doctrinally it is a complicated web of regulations, organizations, training resources, funding, and personnel proponent requirements. In reality, it is a group of dedicated and hardworking individuals and organizations struggling to respond to a current crisis and/or the needs of a particular combatant command. Consequently, there are no quick solutions to satisfy the RAF tasks associated within LREC.

The DA G2 is the proponent for the Army Language Program. TRADOC is the proponent for culture and language training per AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*.²⁸ While the DA G2 establishes the requirement and proficiency standards for Army linguists, TRADOC, through its assigned Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), trains Army linguists for the Defense Language Placement Test (DLPT). Over the past ten years, TRADOC and the DLIFLC have made tremendous advances in exporting language and culture training to support unit pre-deployment training requirements within the ARFORGEN cycle.

In 2010, HQ DA published EXORD 273-10 “Culture and Language Pre-Deployment Training Standards” for general purpose forces (GPF). These deployment standards required one leader per platoon sized element to receive eight to sixteen weeks of instruction from a language training detachment (LTD) provided by DLIFLC. The training is expensive, costing an estimated \$12.3 million to train 878 Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan between 2009 and 2011.²⁹ Thus the RAF operational concept builds upon successful training solutions to prepare units within the ARFORGEN cycle. Unfortunately, many of these IWfF solutions are at risk due to fiscal austerity and budgetary priorities.

In 2004, the Army transformation to a modular force re-structured the corps, division, and BCT intelligence formations with remnants of prior MI battalion structures. Battalion structures were responsible for all linguist training. The newly transformed modular IWfF formations did not receive the full training resources previously found within traditional MI formations. Further complicating the process was the practice of aligning corps, divisions, and BCTs from the same installation against different operational deployments at staggered stages of the ARFORGEN cycle. To overcome the lack of continuity, FORSCOM created civilian Mission Support Elements (MSEs) as TDA organizations on the continental U.S. (CONUS) FORSCOM installations.

The FORSCOM Mission Support Element (MSE) is a non-deployable Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organization assigned to FORSCOM and attached to FORSCOM operational commanders. It is tasked with providing designated Administrative Control (ADCON)/Title 10 support to FORSCOM units.³⁰

The MSEs assumed the ADCON/Title 10 responsibilities needed to effectively execute the ARFORGEN cycle.³¹ Language and culture training, Foundry training and equipment re-set are a few of the missions the MSE G2 conducts. However, Army National Guard, Army Reserve and Army active component units assigned outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS), such as in European Command (EUCOM), Korea, Hawaii, and Alaska, do not benefit from this FORSCOM MSE initiative.

The impact of sequestration in FY13, acceleration of FY17 force reductions to FY15, and anticipated 25 percent reductions at the two-star level and above headquarters forced the Army to reduce the civilian MSE structure effective in FY16. These reductions will affect the ability of corps, divisions and BCTs to implement RAF in accordance with the Army RAF EXORD and the CSA’s intent. Consequently, any attempt to place the

Title 10 requirements on corps and division G2 staff sections without additional resourcing will severely compound the problem.

A comprehensive review of the IWfF Title 10 functions and responsibilities must occur to clearly define the responsibilities and the resources required to execute the RAF specified and implied tasks. While the MSE is a FORSCOM initiative, it does not cover the total force IWfF requirements. Failure to address this issue early will lead to friction and gaps in the IWfF's ability to support RAF across the DOTMLPF.

A working group needs to be established to determine the personnel, facility, and resources required to execute LREC for the total force. The FORSCOM MSE G2 structure at Ft. Campbell, Ft. Carson, and Joint Base Lewis McCord (JBLM) constitute an apt starting point. The MSE structure established by FORSCOM, however, is not identical at all installations and does not include OCONUS—stationed forces which require the same capability as their CONUS—assigned brethren.

Training

The DA G2 is responsible for “policy formulation, planning, programming, budgeting, management, staff supervision, evaluation and oversight for intelligence activities for the Department of the Army.”³² The *Army Intelligence Training Strategy*, published in January 2014, is the DA G2's training roadmap for a multidisciplinary and versatile MI force that will meet the demands of a regionally-engaged and globally-responsive Army.³³ This strategy for intelligence training capitalizes on the advancements and best practices in the institutional, operational and self-development domains used to provide trained MI forces during twelve years of sustained combat operations.³⁴

The Army RAF EXORD tasks the DA G2 to “assess the impact of RAF on the institutional capabilities for situational awareness, specifically Foundry and Intelligence Readiness and Operating Capability (IROC) and foreign language training.”³⁵ Additionally, the DA G2 has functional management and oversight for both the Army Foreign Language Program and the Army Foundry Program.

Foundry assists commanders by providing training opportunities at their home installations or combat training centers which prepare, certify, and credential the highly-technical MI skill sets within their formations. Foundry training focuses on the commander's IWfF capabilities and deployment readiness needs:

The Foundry Program was established in 2006 to meet the Army Chief of Staff's directive to provide MI Soldiers with the most current intelligence training prior to deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Foundry Program has since grown to 21 Foundry nodes that provide technical training to all components. Foundry training nodes are geographically dispersed to support high densities of intelligence personnel across all components.³⁶

Most Foundry training occurs in SCIFs as it requires network access (unclassified, SIPR, JWICS, NSA-Net), classified database access, automation, subject matter experts (SMEs), mentors, mobile training teams (MTT) and live environment training (LET) funding.³⁷ The Army RAF EXORD tasks the DA G8 to determine the magnitude of additional costs of RAF implementation across the DOTMLPF.³⁸ The EXORD further tasks the DA G8 “in coordination with HQ DA G1, G3/5/7, G4, G6 TRADOC and FORSCOM to provide subject matter experts to provide facilities and infrastructure implications resulting from RAF.”³⁹ DA G2 or INSCOM input is not required.

The DA G2, INSCOM, FORSCOM and TRADOC should create a working group to appraise the ability of RAF units to perform Foundry training and IROC across the total force. In many cases, the Foundry node resides within a SCIF that is occupied by a division or corps with daily operational missions occurring within the same facility. This space problem was mitigated during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) when units on the same installation were staggered in the ARFORGEN cycles and deployments. Now that the Army is in a more stable deployment cycle with longer home station dwell times, units lack needed space within fixed facilities. While certain installations improved IT infrastructure and capabilities within existing SCIFs, the available space is finite. INSCOM can provide valuable insights given its extensive experience in building SCIFs for both CONUS and OCONUS locations.

IROC is an expansion of the “No MI Soldier at Rest” mantra for the RAF IWfF force. It uses reach-back technologies and capabilities to tap into RAF intelligence personnel to support the CCDR’s IWfF needs. IROC tasks RAF corps, divisions, BCTs and other enabler formations to provide federated intelligence products for the intelligence effort of the CCDR. FORSCOM published its IROC concept of the operations (CONOP) on December 03, 2013. IROC is defined as:

Intelligence Readiness and Operations Capability (IROC) is operational mission support that builds upon Foundry training. IROC increases readiness of MI Soldiers and units through single source and multidiscipline reach, over watch, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) operations, and other augmentation to real world intelligence activities in support of Mission Commanders’ requirements. IROC enables Soldiers to remain engaged in global intelligence operations, ensuring MI forces are continuously prepared to perform their validated missions.⁴⁰

IROC requires the same SCIF facilities and capabilities as needed by the Army Foundry Program. Aligning BCTs and divisions against different CCDR AORs compounds the problems of space, training, and IROC operations. This co-mingling of Foundry training and IROC over-watch with multiple CCDR AORs in the same confined SCIF space is as effective as running an M-4 rifle zero range simultaneously with a M1 Abrams tank table-eight qualification range. While the range is possible, it is neither efficient nor effective.

The IROC CONOP utilizes many of the TTPs used during Foundry and LET to prepare IWfF Soldiers to deploy to OIF and OEF. During the latter part of the ARFORGEN cycle, the deploying IWfF Soldiers would work from their home-station SCIFs supporting the TIB and the forward-deployed unit the Soldiers would soon be replacing. These intelligence best practices helped facilitate an understanding of the future OE these Soldiers would encounter and helped prevent cold starts upon arrival to theater. TIBs were critical in supporting this effort. The process was fairly flat between INSCOM TIBs serving as an anchor point and did not require FORSCOM oversight. However, the IROC CONOP states that “any intelligence operations conducted during an IROC activity will be directed and synchronized by FORSCOM and technically managed by the unit and the supported organization.”⁴¹ Thus, an additional layer of oversight is added when it is neither needed nor required.

Once a unit is regionally aligned, direct liaison is authorized with the assigned ASCCs. The RAF IWfF can work directly with their ASCC and corps commands for IROC missions. There is no need for an additional FORSCOM layer within the process. Additionally, IROC is a commander’s program and the IROC CONOP should invest in ways to flatten the process, encourage command presence, participation, and support throughout the execution of the IROC mission.

The DA G2 is proponent for the Army Foreign Language Program as outlined in AR 11-6. This program applies to Army linguists which is any Soldier or DA civilian with a skills qualification identifier (SQI) “L.” This means that the Soldier or DA Civilian scored at least a 2/2 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). The program also covers language capable linguists who have some language proficiency but have not met the proficiency standard.⁴² The Army Foreign Language Program management and oversight “establish[s] the Army’s linguist requirements; identifying, testing, reporting, evaluating, reevaluating, training and assigning Army linguists; while also establishing linguist proficiency standards for the Army.”⁴³

AR 11-6 outlines the requirements for commanders with Army (MI MOS) linguists to establish a command language program, (CLPs). The DA G2 stresses this in the *Army Intelligence Strategy*:

Units must comply with the policy, standards and language training guidance IAW AR 11- 6 to sustain and enhance the language proficiency of language-dependent MI Soldiers as well as language enabled MI Soldiers. Unit Commanders must establish effective Command Language Programs to organize resource and drive world-class language training for our MI Soldiers. Commanders are encouraged to leverage a wide variety of language training, including on-site Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center training (DLIFLC) approved training, Live Environment Training opportunities, Foundry offerings and Distributed Learning options. Commanders must additionally incorporate language training in operational training, whenever possible, to enhance complexity and realism.⁴⁴

As noted, the wide variety of assets and capabilities at the commanders' disposal require extensive coordination and funding to execute. At the unit level, management of the CLP usually resides within the G2 and S2 staffs. Little or no resourcing or expertise is provided to navigate a very complicated process which was once managed by the legacy MI battalions. On select FORSCOM CONUS installations the MSE G2s assumes responsibility for overseeing Army CLP requirements for both Army (MI) linguists and the GPF culture and language programs for deploying Soldiers. Fort Campbell, Fort Carson and Joint Base Lewis-McChord have experienced success assisting with both language and culture training.

By charter the MSE is not subordinate or integrated into the division or corps staffs and supports FORSCOM units only.⁴⁵ Thus units not assigned to FORSCOM, which includes those in Active component OCONUS, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves, do not have the luxury of an MSE to assist the regulatory requirements these programs incur. There is little understanding of MI language requirements and the LREC requirements that RAF creates. DA G2 staff focuses on MI linguists per their responsibilities as the Army foreign language proponent under AR 11-6. TRADOC focuses on culture and language per its responsibilities in AR 350-1. Both organizations use similar terminology, resources, and capabilities. While there are pockets of excellence at the execution level within the FORSCOM MSEs, these organizations are likely to diminish given the projected draw down of civilian positions. If civilian Title 10 positions are reduced, the responsibilities will likely overburden the under resourced G2s and S2s.

LREC and Army linguists support to the RAF concept requires further clarification. What constitutes a regional and cultural expert remains unclear from the RAF vantage. Consolidation of culture and language training, both Army linguists and GPF, under a single proponent must occur. Single proponenty will also allow for more prudent resource investment. Such a consolidation need not reside within the IWfF sections at corps, divisions or BCTs. The Army Civil Affairs (CA) branch could assume this mission and provide divisions and assigned BCTs with culture and language training oversight. The increased emphasis RAF places on culture and language should force the Army to align the CA companies, currently consolidated at the 85th CA Brigade, under the BCT and division structure. CA Soldiers can provide valuable training to both GPF and the nineteen 35P Army cryptologic linguist's authorized in each BCT.

Materiel

IWfF materiel solutions are rarely inexpensive. The IWfF must remain on the technological cutting edge to maintain advantage. The DA G2 must balance funding for future capabilities against current operational requirements. Intel 2020 initiatives are the IWfF's attempt to meet this balance while achieving the needs of a regionally aligned and globally engaged Army. However, ambitious force restructure in the midst of rapid force draw downs and shrinking budgets require sacrifices in both the IWfF's operating force and the generating

force if the RAF concept is to be implemented by FY17. The IWfF's tasks for reach-back support, Foundry, IROC, and support to a JTF HQs require further refinement of the gaps and materiel requirements needed. Gap refinement allows for the prudent balancing of resources between intelligence, modernization initiatives, and the needs of the operational force.

Foundry, IROC, reach-back, and IWfF support to a JTF HQs require a baseline of equipment that should mirror the capabilities found in the forward RAF HQ, ASCC and CCMD intelligence sections. This equipment will streamline technical support requirements and facilitate analysis between HQs. The IROC CONOP annex has an excellent layout, by intelligence discipline, of the requirements for IROC-capable facilities and can serve as a baseline for reach-back requirements as well.

Corps and divisions are not resourced for a garrison operations center and a deployable tactical operations center (TOC). For example, visualization walls (knowledge walls) are required to display the Common Operating Pictures (COPs) in both the SCIF and the operations center. Providing redundant capability allows reach-back operations personnel to have a common operating picture across multiple feeds from various networks. The reach-back sanctuary team must have an intelligence architecture that is integrated into the forward-deployed systems and networks.

The DA G2 staff should provide analysis and subject matter experts to the DA G8 for facility and infrastructure enhancements needed to fully implement reach-back, Foundry training, IROC, and IWfF support to a JTF HQs. The DA G2 staff must capture the baseline of equipment and facilities needed to implement RAF. Only by incorporating this information can the DA G8 conduct an accurate analysis of the costs associated with RAF implementation.

Leadership Development and Education

The Army is committed to the training, education, and development of those responsible for leading units in the complex and challenging future operational environments.⁴⁶ IWfF leadership development and education must include a mix of professional military education (PME) and both operational force and generating force assignments. The more diverse the “career of learning” a Soldier experiences, the greater the IWfF can execute its core competencies,⁴⁷ which include: providing intelligence support to force generation, to situational understanding, information collection, and to targeting and information capabilities.⁴⁸

Twelve years of sustained deployments and increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) created gaps within the learning continuum model. Longer dwell times at home station and slower promotion timelines will allow intelligence personnel to meet PME and assignment gates. In a time of force reductions and austere budgets, the Army must protect PME funding. Budget considerations directly impact the IWfF's ability to provide qualified personnel for RAF.

Personnel

A critical task for the IWfF is to ensure the Army has the sufficient number of MI officers, warrant officers, NCOs and enlisted Soldiers with the correct occupational specialty, appropriate training, and who are available at the right time to support RAF. These MI Soldiers comprise one officer functional area (FA), four officer areas of concentrations (AOCs), and eight warrant officer and fourteen enlisted military occupational specialties (MOSS). The IWfF personnel proponent must maintain oversight of MI force structure changes, personnel accessions, training, professional and educational development total life-cycle management for the IWfF's active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) Soldiers. When there is a change within the Army force structure during the force design process, the Army uses DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (dated 2010), and DA PAM 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and*

Structure (dated 2007) for standards of grade (SOG) tables. The IWfF's personnel proponent must validate the designs to ensure proper SOG that guarantees a healthy career management field (CMF) for all MI Soldiers. Thus, when seemingly small changes to MI MOS authorizations occur during re-design, the changes can negatively impact CMF lifecycle and career opportunities for MI Soldiers.

The near-simultaneous initiatives of grade plate reductions (GPR), ambitious intelligence modernization, and force restructure, coupled with the FY15 accelerated Army end strength reductions, have the potential to damage MI's ability to maintain healthy CMF lifecycles. Disruptions can create career or rank stagnation within the MI branch. This stagnation is detrimental to the IWfF as managing a Soldier's career with the right jobs and experiences, levels of expertise, and required technical skills is time consuming. Compounding the issue are the outdated DA PAMs 600-3 and 611-21 which do not reflect requirements of a smaller, less deployed Army.

DA PAM 600-3 and DA PAM 611-21 require immediate staffing across the Active Component, Army National Guard, and the Army Reserves to determine the knowledge skills and attributes (KSAs) needed for a regionally aligned and globally engaged Army. The IWfF should consider KSAs that include regional and cultural understanding, critical thinking skills, strategic agility, building strategic networks, and a balance of assignments between tactical- and operational-level intelligence formations. Officer and NCO career progression charts must be adjusted to incorporate longer time in grade and enhanced unit dwell times for a smaller and more deployment stable force. A Total Army Analysis (TAA) is needed to capture the GPRs, FY15 draw down of forces, and the 25 percent reduction in two-star level and above headquarters initiatives if we are to identify the capability loss associated with these changes. Any second or third order effects these reductions will have upon the RAF concept has yet to be determined.

Facilities

A critical IWfF task is to bring the JWICS to the fight. The IWfF cannot meet the CSA's RAF intent or meet the CCDR's requirements without it. Whether supporting a JTF HQ, conducting reach-back operations, Foundry training, or executing IROC missions the IWfF must function within a JWICS-enabled environment. JWICS operates at a classification level which requires that data reside within a SCIF.

Prior to Army transformation, JWICS capabilities were at division level and above intelligence units. Army transformation and modularity pushed the JWICS capability to the BCTs within the assigned military intelligence company (MICO). The BCTs received the tactical capabilities for JWICS, but did not receive resources to build dedicated SCIFs in garrison. Under the RAF concept, however, these BCT S2 sections and assigned MICOs must provide their commanders with all-source intelligence analysis of the GCC AOR to which the BCT is aligned. These S2s must execute the IWfF's core tasks of "providing intelligence support to force generation, providing intelligence support to situational understanding, conducting information collection, and providing intelligence support to targeting and information capabilities"⁴⁹ whether in garrison or forward deployed.

SCIFs are expensive to build, secure, and resource. Most corps and division SCIFs do not have room to host the BCT MICO personnel and equipment for extended periods. RAF could align BCT, divisions, and corps HQs on the same installation to different geographic combatant commands which would drive different intelligence analytical efforts. Accreditation, IT infrastructure, and security requirements make providing individual SCIFs to each BCT cost prohibitive. Conversely, there are a few BCTs within FORSCOM that have SCIFs which unfortunately creates IWfF capability gaps among the different RAF units.

BCT S2s and their assigned MICOs require a secure space in garrison that allows them to turn on their tactical JWICS networks, plug in the Distributive Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A) systems and

conduct all-source analysis for the BCT commanders. BCT S2 staffs and MICOs do not require large SCIFs as they do not have the analytical footprint or the robust IT infrastructure of the division and corps G2 Analysis Control Element (ACE) SCIFs.

The Army should create consolidated BCT SCIFs on installations which allows BCT IWfF staffs to use their assigned tactical JWICS capable systems and DCGS-A in a garrison environment. This basic facility would have the same perimeter and interior security required for a SCIF. Each BCT would have rooms to conduct all source intelligence analysis within a JWICS enabled environment. Using assigned tactical JWICS and DCGS-A systems does not require the robust IT infrastructure that the larger SCIFs contain. BCT intelligence staffs would simply require an area that allows for securing the tactical vehicle systems within the SCIF accredited security perimeter, attach the system to prime power, and run network cables inside the building to the tactical DCGS-A systems. When required to deploy, these BCT IWfF staffs simply unplug the tactical systems and depart.

The Army RAF EXORD tasks the DA G8 to determine the magnitude of additional costs of RAF implementation across the DOTMLPF.⁵⁰ The DA G2 staff must inject itself into the DA G8 assessments of increased costs of facilities, infrastructure and personnel associated with implementing the RAF concept. The DA G2 staff in coordination with INSCOM and FORSCOM should capture these additional costs with appropriate risk assessments to the RAF mission. Consequently, HQ INSCOM can also provide subject matter experts from within their Directorate of Engineers for cost estimates for both CONUS and OCONUS SCIF construction.

Conclusion

RAF missions require Intelligence Warfighting Function personnel within the Army Active Component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve to have an “understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed.”⁵¹ The IWfF must execute the RAF tasks of providing support to a JTF capable HQ; provide forward stationed forces and capabilities; execute reach-back support from outside the AOR; and conduct LREC training across the total force.⁵² Using these tasks and the DA G2’s mantra of “no cold starts and no mi soldier at rest,” the IWfF is aggressively pursuing solutions which leverage the greater intelligence enterprise.

IWfF support to the RAF concept builds upon twelve years of deployment best practices and TTPs used to prepare, train, and certify units in the ARFORGEN cycle. The Army’s previous transformation and modularity efforts created gaps in capabilities, Title 10 training, and intelligence certifications needed for MI units to access the greater intelligence enterprise. Large defense budgets and overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding allowed the Army to find materiel and personnel solutions to intelligence training and capability gaps. Unfortunately, many of these solutions are cost prohibitive in the fiscally constrained environment and are now creating capabilities gaps that are possibly unrecognized by senior leadership. To move forward without assessing the risks created by new gaps across the DOTMLPF, the IWfF cannot prudently apply resources needed to effectively and efficiently support the RAF mission.

Notes

¹ Sir Maurice Oldfield, Director of the British Secret Intelligence Service, Philip Johnson Collections of Military Quotations webpage, <http://www.philipjohnston.com/quot/milint.htm> (accessed March 5, 2014).

² Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0, *Intelligence*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 31, 2012, p. 2-2.

³ Ibid., p. 2-6.

⁴ Gary J. Volesky, U.S. Army Chief of Public Affairs, "Public Affairs Guidance for FY15-15 Army Readiness Plan," Washington, DC, January 17, 2014.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ William B. Garrett III, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. FORSCOM, "FORSCOM Intelligence Readiness and Readiness Operations Capabilities Concept of Operations (IROC CONOP)," Fort Bragg, NC, December 3, 2013. p. 1.

⁷ Kimberly Field, James Learmont and Jason Charland, "Regionally Aligned Forces; Business Not as Usual," *Parameters* Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2013, p. 56.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Intelligence," p. 2-2.

¹⁰ John F. Campbell, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, "Execution Order 052-13 (ISO Regionally Aligned Forces)," Washington, DC, Headquarters, Department of Army, December 12, 2012. p. 11.

¹¹ Gary J. Volesky, "Public Affairs Guidance for FY15-15 Army Readiness Plan," p. 3.

¹² Mary A. Legere, U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "Army Intelligence Training Strategy," Washington, DC: January 2014. p. i.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ John F. Campbell, "Execution Order 052-13 (ISO Regionally Aligned Forces),"

¹⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Intelligence," p. 2-2.

¹⁷ Department of Defense, Joint Publication Manual 2-0, *Joint Intelligence Operations* Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 22, 2013. p. xvi.

¹⁸ Headquarters, U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operations Insights and Best Practices*, Third Edition, Norfolk, VA: January 12, 2011, p. 60.

¹⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1-02, *Operational Terms and Military Symbols*, (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, August 31, 2012, p. 2-5.

²⁰ John F. Campbell, "Execution Order 052-13 (ISO Regionally Aligned Forces),"

²¹ Department of Defense, Joint Publication Manual 3-33, *The Joint Task Force Headquarters*, (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, July 30, 2012, pp. VI-6 – VI-12.

²² Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Intelligence," p. 2-6.

²³ Headquarters, U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operations Insights and Best Practices*, p. 60.

²⁴ Matlock, Chief of Staff, 1st Armored Division, "Training for a Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) division headquarters," Fort Bliss, TX, October 10, 2013, et passim, p. 4-5.

²⁵ Patrick C. Sweeney, "A Primer for the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)," Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, December 10, 2013, p. 7.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

²⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Operational Terms and Military Symbols*, p. 1-31.

²⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 4, 2009, p. 121.

²⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Language and Culture Training: Opportunities Exist to Improve Visibility and Sustainment of Knowledge and Skills in Army and Marine Corps General Purpose Forces*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2011, p. 22.

³⁰ William B. Garrett III, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. FORSCOM, "FORSCOM Intelligence Readiness and Operations Capabilities Concept of Operations (IROC CONOP)," Fort Bragg, NC; December 3, 2013, p. A-1.

³¹ James D. Thurman, Commander U.S. FORSCOM, "Modular Force C2 Execution Order (EXORD)," Fort Bragg, NC, July 20, 2010, p. B-1.

³² Mary A. Legere, "Army Intelligence Training Strategy," p. 2.

³³ Ibid., 1.

³⁴ Ibid., 8.

³⁵ John F. Campbell, "Execution Order 052-13 (ISO Regionally Aligned Forces)," p. 15.

³⁶ Mary A. Legere, "Army Intelligence Training Strategy," p. 11.

³⁷ Ibid., "Army Intelligence 2020 and Beyond," briefing slides with commentary to the National Military Intelligence Association Spring Symposium, Fairfax VA: March 21, 2013, p. 25.

³⁸ John F. Campbell, "Execution Order 052-13 (ISO Regionally Aligned Forces)," p. 18.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ William B. Garrett III, "FORSCOM Intelligence Readiness and Operations Capabilities Concept of Operations (IROC CONOP)," p. A-1.

⁴¹ Ibid., 6.

⁴² Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 11-6, *Army Foreign Language Program*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 23, 2009, p. 57.

⁴³ Ibid., p. i.

⁴⁴ Mary A. Legere, "Army Intelligence Training Strategy," p. 10.

⁴⁵ William B. Garrett III, Intelligence Readiness and Operations Capabilities Concept of Operations (IROC CONOP)," p. A-1.

⁴⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, p. 3.

⁴⁷ Mary A. Legere, "Army Intelligence Training Strategy," p. 5.

⁴⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Intelligence*, p. 2-2.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ John F. Campbell, "Execution Order 052-13 (ISO Regionally Aligned Forces)," p. 18.

⁵¹ Kimberly Field, James Learmont and Jason Charland, "Regionally Aligned Forces; Business Not as Usual," *Parameters* Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2013, p. 56.

⁵² Ibid.

RAF and Fires Warfighting Function

Colonel Gregory M. Smith and Colonel Tarn D. Warren

This is not a time for retrenchment. This is not a time for isolation. It is a time for renewed engagement and partnership in the world.

—Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta¹

As the Army transitions from its operational mission in Afghanistan and sets the conditions for the Army of 2020, a new strategy for managing forces is being developed that regionally aligns Army units to combatant commanders (CCDR) to meet their needs, including, but not limited to, employment in steady-state, theater security cooperation activities and phase 0 and phase 1 operations of OPLANs. In concept, Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) provide a scalable and tailorable capability to meet requirements for familiarity and understanding of the culture, geography, history, socio-economic issues, and operational environment in which Army forces operate. This report provides an analysis of the fires warfighting function (WfF) through the lenses of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF); captures opportunities and risks; and analyzes how the fires WfF should transform to better support the RAF concept and implementation. Recommendations that will enable the Army to better realize the full potential of RAF are advanced. They include changes to organizational manning policies, lifecycle management, operating doctrine, professional military education, mission-specific training, and equipment. As the Army embarks on this new operations paradigm, taking the time to weigh ideas and identify better solutions to the challenges faced in today's environment is critical.

The RAF concept endeavors to regionally align U.S. Army maneuver brigades, division headquarters, functional brigades, and other supporting units to a specific geographic region in support of the geographic combatant commanders' (GCC) land force mission requirements. This focused regional alignment of capability to operational requirements provides a much needed and readily usable source of cultural awareness and builds capability for Army units to "operate in a complex environment with an emphasis on the human domain."²

The concept of regional force alignment to a geographic combatant command provides a fresh and innovative method for managing readiness and availability of Army forces. The RAF concept is integral to the Army vision of being "Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged"³ and it is fundamental to the Army's ability to "prevent, shape and win"⁴ across the globe. Furthermore, the concept is "essential to the U.S. defense strategy and represents the Army's commitment to provide culturally attuned, scalable, mission-prepared capabilities in a changing strategic environment characterized by combinations of nontraditional and traditional threats."⁵ According to the Department of the Army G3/5/7:

Army Regionally Aligned Forces are defined as 1) those units assigned to or allocated to combatant commands, and 2) those service-retained capabilities aligned with combatant commands and prepared by the Army for regional missions. They are drawn from the total force, which includes the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. They consist of organizations and capabilities that are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting (or ready to support) combatant commands through reach back capabilities from outside the area of responsibility. They

conduct operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities.⁶

The RAF concept takes a new approach in managing Army forces and aligns capabilities to meet a CCDR's steady state requirements. Regional alignment of forces allows the CCDR and Army service component command (ASCC) to integrate a regionally focused and culturally aware force into theater security cooperation operations and regional contingencies by providing more predictable capability.⁷

Improved predictability is foundational to the Army enterprise and the combatant commander because the Army is better able to forecast and fund operational requirements in an era of fiscal austerity. Additionally, in a period of reduced overall manning and declining budgets, the Army must be efficiently manned, trained, and equipped to meet numerous and varied requirements of the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) global challenges to U.S. national interests.⁸ The RAF concept supports the combatant commander's theater security cooperation activities with a clearly identified, available, regionally aware, and mission-trained unit. As a cost-effective means for applying landpower, the RAF concept incorporates low-level, persistent engagement to prevent larger, more costly conflicts.

RAF detractors have seized on initial considerations to point out faults and generally advance three criticisms. First, the cost and time required to achieve language proficiency is too onerous. Second, RAF creates excessive mission duplication between conventional forces and Special Forces. And third, RAF might create "have" and "have-not" units, where the "haves" will enjoy habitual, repeated alignment to a high-profile geographic region with ongoing, high profile missions, training opportunities, and funding, while the "have-nots" will continually return to a region that offers fewer training opportunities and less operational funding.⁹ While these are valid concerns, thoughtful and deliberate planning will mitigate the risks and amplify the rewards.

When initially unveiled, the RAF concept touted language and cultural awareness as foundational pillars. Although the RAF concept incorporated foreign language familiarity in the context of developing cultural and language capability, the Army never envisioned that Soldiers would become fluent, or even conversational, in a foreign language. Almost 2,000 languages are spoken in Africa, another 2,000 in Asia, and over 200 in Europe,¹⁰ making it impossible to base effectiveness or validity of the RAF concept on linguistic facility with a native language. Yet, importantly, the RAF concept will require language and cultural sensitivity if not fluency per se.

The Army spent \$12.3 million preparing 848 Soldiers during a 16-week pre-deployment Afghan language training course between 2009 and 2010.¹¹ Even with this massive investment of time and money, there was almost no sustained language proficiency upon redeployment.¹² Given the high cost of training an individual to relatively minimal language proficiency, the inherent flexibility of hiring interpreters to meet specific operational needs, and the uncertainty of deployment locations and varieties of local dialects, the Army should acquire language skills through the use of professional interpreters augmented by bilingual local nationals and military linguists. Given these considerations, the pre-RAF language training should focus on learning salutations, a few conversational phrases, and key words to help establish rapport.

Prior to 9/11, Special Forces had primacy for training foreign security forces and developing regional expertise. Since 9/11, focused special operations counter-terror missions have created a partner-training capability void that is currently being filled by conventional forces. There is, however, no intention to place RAF units in competition with Army Special Forces. For example, conventional Army forces have been actively training Afghan and Iraqi security forces for the past decade and, consequently, have gained valuable capability and experience. With continued commitment of Army Special Forces to the Global War on Terror, conventional forces should see increased opportunities to train partner nation militaries in a variety of tasks. In

fact, the conventional force – Army Special Forces relationship should become increasingly more complementary rather than competitive. A regionally-focused conventional force could augment a deployed Army Special Forces team and multiply the effect of having U.S. military trainers in a host nation. By partnering with a RAF unit to conduct foreign security force assistance (SFA) training, Army Special Forces will benefit by receiving a culturally aware and regionally trained force multiplier while conventional forces gain from working with true regional experts.

As the Army draws down and in the face of an uncertain fiscal environment, resource equity will be a constant point of debate. For example, some units (e.g. the Global Response Force (GRF) and those forward deployed) will understandably receive a larger allocation of training and equipping dollars based on assigned or potential missions and corresponding readiness requirements. The issue of equity is compounded within the RAF discussion due to varying requirements and operational budgets of the geographic combatant commands. The argument might revolve around the idea that a brigade habitually assigned or aligned with USSOUTHCOM, for example, would not receive the missions and corresponding resources of a brigade assigned or aligned with USCENTCOM or USPACOM; and over time some assignments will be considered undesirable and fail to attract the best and brightest leaders, essentially relegating some to a second-tier status. While this could occur, the RAF rotational plan does not repeatedly align the same brigade to the same geographic CCMD.¹³ In short, the RAF concept mitigates the “have” versus “have-not” problem.

Given this background, analysis of the fires warfighting function in light of the RAF concept is appropriate. Looking through the lens of DOTMLPF, the following analysis draws upon three assumptions. First, all decisions are guided by current fiscal realities and the pending drawdown of Army forces. Second, not all GCCs will warrant equal requirements with respect to priority, funding, or force allocation. And third, the RAF concept is not an “all or nothing” concept. Not every unit needs to be aligned with a GCC.

Fires Warfighting Function and DOTMLPF Analysis

According to Army doctrine, the fires warfighting function “is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process.”¹⁴ Additionally, the fires warfighting function is responsible for “deliver[ing] fires in support of offensive and defensive tasks to create specific lethal and nonlethal effects on a target. The fires warfighting function includes the following tasks: deliver fires; integrate all forms of Army, joint, and multinational fires; and conduct targeting.”¹⁵

The fires WfF generally includes: the field artillery (FA) that “destroys, defeats, or disrupts the enemy with integrated fires to enable maneuver commanders to dominate in unified land operations;”¹⁶ the air defense artillery (ADA) whose mission is “to protect the force and selected geopolitical assets from aerial attack, missile attack, and surveillance;”¹⁷ and inform and influence activities (IIA) that are defined as “the integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decision-making.”¹⁸ IIA includes such functions as public affairs (PA), military information support operations (MISO), combat camera, and civil affairs (CA) operations.¹⁹

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) analyzes capability gaps and seeks mitigations based on the framework known as DOTMLPF. A capability gap is essentially a shortcoming or warfighting challenge that has not been encountered before and to which a solution is needed. The joint capabilities integration and development system (JCIDS) is the formal DoD procedure which defines acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense programs; DOTMLPF is a component of this system. The remainder of

this report analyzes each DOTMLPF component and offers recommendations related to capability or capacity gaps created by the implementation of the RAF concept.

Doctrine

Doctrine analysis examines the way the military conducts operations with emphasis on maneuver warfare and combined air-ground campaigns to see if there is a better way to solve a capability issue or procedural shortcoming. Moreover, this analysis seeks to determine whether existing doctrine adequately addresses the current and future needs of the force and whether existing operating procedures are causing or ameliorating any of these needs.²⁰ The RAF concept does indeed place some unique challenges on Army doctrine, and the Army is responding.

The Army has undertaken the monumental task of refining, revising, and updating its doctrine to reflect the changing realities of modern armed conflict and to make doctrine more concise, understandable, and sensible. An outstanding example of this effort is Field Manual (FM) 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*. This manual evolved from FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance (SFA) Headquarters*. The newer version more effectively addresses the full spectrum of security cooperation instead of the much narrower task of security force assistance. Although security force assistance still features prominently in FM 3-22, this manual more effectively links security cooperation to the combatant commander's theater campaign plan (TCP) and walks the reader through the process from legal authorities for action, how to plan for and employ the force, and how to build relations with partner nations and security forces. Combined with the new FM 3-22, existing fires doctrine adequately addresses the range of military operations, but must remain alert to the evolving requirements of the RAF concept.

Organization

Organizational analysis examines how we are organized to fight. It looks to see if there is a better organizational structure or capability that can solve a particular capability shortcoming. Organizational analysis also seeks to identify a problem source and to determine whether the organization is properly staffed, structured, and funded.²¹ Current fires organization is structured to mass effects at a decisive point on the battlefield. The RAF concept requires decentralized operations across vast areas and will challenge current fires command and control structures.

An examination of the RAF concept should explore how to gain efficiencies in organizational activities; define the functions of the aligned forces; and identify windows of opportunity to modify organization, manning, and equipment within formations. For the purpose of this analysis, the fires brigade is examined but the concept is applicable to any brigade-sized formation directly supporting a division headquarters. Smaller organizations, such as fires battalions, will likely require only task organization changes to support RAF missions.

The U.S. Army is determining the best way to reduce its two-star and higher headquarters staffs and other parts of the force by 25 percent amid another round of federal budget cuts. In August 2013, Army Secretary John McHugh stated, "Let there be no mistake, aggregate reductions will take place."²² Furthermore, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno added, "The money is gone; our mission now is to determine how best to allocate these cuts while maintaining readiness. We expect Army leaders, military and civilian, to seize this opportunity to re-shape our Army. This effort will take priority over all other Headquarters, Department of the Army activities."²³

Based on the projected 25 percent reduction in capacity at corps and ASCC headquarters, the Army must generate innovative solutions to maintain capability while simultaneously developing RAF headquarters'

regional awareness. One possible opportunity to enhance the regional awareness and engagement of the aligned division headquarters and associated functional brigades is to deploy a portion of the RAF division headquarters in a contingency command post (CCP) package to augment the ASCC staff for a short duration. The standard CCP manning would be modified for each augmentation cycle to provide the same relative capability to the ASCC HQ with different people. This modification would provide the RAF division headquarters staff the opportunity to gain regional awareness and develop personal relationships with their ASCC counterparts while augmenting the capabilities of the ASCC.

In modeling the above concept, the fires brigade (FiB) staff should divide into four equally capable CCP support sections based on ASCC requested capabilities, and rotate to the ASCC headquarters (HQ) for 3-month augmentation periods. With this concept, and over a 2-year assignment, a member of the aligned FiB headquarters staff would have 6 months forward deployed and dedicated to the region. In cases where the GCC or ASCC HQ is located in CONUS, the FiB CCP support section could further deploy to a forward element or joint task force in the GCC area of operations. Deployed division or FiB staff CCPs do present risks to ongoing garrison support capabilities. However, the advantages of forward deployed and regionally aware staff sections more than offset the risks, which can be mitigated by the garrison mission support element.

Inform and influence activities are capabilities that could be better shaped to support the RAF concept and the GCC steady-state missions. As currently structured, no single organization contains all of the IIA capabilities oriented on a distinct geographic region. The Army should consider creating IIA battalions, aligned with each geographic combatant command, consisting of companies with specific focus areas within that region and overlapping capabilities. For example, AFRICOM could have an IIA battalion that conducts IIA in support of the theater campaign plan with each of its four companies focused on a different subordinate regional campaign plan. Additional companies should be built in the reserve component to reinforce the active structure and provide focused regional capacity as part of annual training requirements.

These IIA companies would develop an in-depth understanding of the culture within the region and enhance the CCDR's messaging while simultaneously maintaining enough theater-wide awareness to augment each other as required. Furthermore, the division, corps, and ASCC headquarters would all retain their IIA cell (formerly the G7) to serve as a planning and coordination capability and conduit to the theater IIA battalion as required for mission execution.

Another force multiplier available for integration into the IIA function of the RAF concept is the foreign area officer (FAO). The FAO possesses unique training and skills to include language proficiency, an in-depth understanding of regional dynamics and political-military activities, and an understanding of U.S. strategic objectives in the region.²⁴ The addition of a FAO to a division staff performing a RAF mission would not only serve as a force multiplier, but would also serve as a valuable learning opportunity for the FAO. After the FAOs return from their initial in-country tour they could be assigned to a division staff, potentially in the G7, that is about to assume a RAF mission in the region where the FAO just completed a tour. A FAO brings Department of State (DoS) experience to the division staff and could serve as a valuable liaison to the U.S. embassy in the country where RAF forces are operating.

After this initial tour with a division staff and additional skill training, the FAO could be assigned to an embassy or ASCC headquarters and develop additional regional expertise. A broad understanding of Army force employment would serve FAOs well as they advance to intergovernmental assignments in embassies around the globe. These recommendations would require the accession of additional FAOs, perhaps as many as 20 more per year, to service the division and ASCC headquarters' requirements. Doing so would allow the Army to begin assessing them earlier in their career, thereby enhancing training dividends while developing more proficient senior-level FAOs.

Training

Training refers to the preparation of forces for the tactical fight and includes all activities from initial entry training (IET) to unit collective training. Analysis of training carefully examines all activities to see where improvements can be made and capability gaps closed.²⁵ Fires training should always focus on the core competencies required to deliver fires in support of maneuver forces, but the RAF concept also requires the versatility and adaptability shown in previous deployments, such as OIF and OEF missions.

The current concepts of training Army forces are commensurate with the development of the RAF strategy. As the CSA stated in October 2012 at the Association of the United States Army Conference, “The approach to accomplishing operational tasks is by organizing around highly trained squads and platoons that are the foundation for our company, battalion and brigade combat teams, organized for specific mission sets and regional conditions.”²⁶ This CSA-directed training strategy allows for fully trained troops to be available with the requisite skills, providing a full range of military capability to address global requirements. It also provides the CCDR many unique regional capabilities for executing portions of the theater campaign plan. In fact, training for the full range of military operations is a cornerstone of the Army’s mission and the RAF concept provides an opportunity for conventional forces to develop and hone skills that are useful throughout the spectrum of decisive action operations.

Any unit assigned a RAF mission must also be available to service global contingencies and must be trained to a decisive action standard that includes the ability to execute offense, defense, and stability operations.²⁷ This standard recognizes and accounts for a wide range of threats to include “guerrilla, insurgent, criminal, and near-peer conventional forces woven into a dynamic environment.”²⁸ Significantly, the proper implementation of the decisive action training standard will assist combatant commanders in dealing with these threats. Moreover, this training standard sets the conditions for the mission command culture that RAF requires for dispersed and decentralized regional engagements.

When a unit trains for a specific mission to the exclusion of all others, this unit will experience degradation in its capability to perform the full spectrum of tasks required for decisive action. The Army clearly experienced this phenomenon when it assigned convoy security missions, instead of traditional fires tasks, to field artillery battalions in OIF and OEF. Although these battalions gained proficiency in the assigned tasks and performed well in combat, many of them were not able to deliver fires in support of maneuver operations to the level required in a decisive action environment. In the white paper titled *The King and I: The Impending Crisis in the Field Artillery*, three former maneuver brigade commanders lamented the fact that field artillery units were not able to adequately compute a technical solution, provide fire support coordination, or deliver fires due to their commitment to counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.²⁹ Most striking was not the experiences and assertions by these former maneuver commanders, but rather the hard statistical data collected at the combat training centers that supported the claims. The combat training centers are the closest venue to decisive action short of actual combat and they evaluate a unit against an established standard, a standard that few FA units were able to meet after executing non-standard missions during previous deployments.³⁰

A decision to trade core task proficiency for other skills must weigh the cost and benefit of the selected option. Loss of decisive action capability is a very real concern in servicing RAF requirements. The Army will have to establish new acceptable standards for readiness across the RAF force. Is there an expectation that an FA battalion conducting RAF would be able to reform and execute massed fires in support of a maneuver operation? If so, what is the acceptable time frame for this to occur?

One possible mitigation strategy for this risk, proposed here as “2+2,” attempts to solve the possible dichotomy between RAF and decisive action. In this model, a BCT and its organic fires battalion would spend 2 years trained to a decisive action standard and held in a contingency response force (CRF) pool, followed by

a 2-year RAF mission. The decisive action period would begin with units trained to a battery live-fire standard, progress through battalion and brigade live-fires, and culminate in a CTC rotation within 6 months, establishing the unit as highly trained and available for world-wide deployment in support of contingencies. For the remainder of this 24-month RAF period, the unit would experience a controlled decline from a T-1 to a T-2 readiness level and have a plan to achieve T-1 within a specified time after deployment notification.

During the last quarter of the CRF period, a unit would shift away from decisive action tasks and begin focusing on the assigned RAF mission. During this period, the minimum training standard becomes battery live-fire and this standard is maintained during the entire 24-month RAF period. Additional unit training focuses on regional specific requirements directed by the CCDR to support the planned activities and engagements over the next 2 years. During this 24-month RAF period, a unit would maintain trained batteries without ever dropping below a T-3 training standard. If contingencies arose that required more units than exist in the standing CRF pool, commanders could pull units from RAF missions and begin training them back to a T-1 decisive action standard. As a result, the Army would still be able to generate an operational reserve to meet un-forecasted contingencies.

Due to a relative shortage of available units, fires brigades, recently re-flagged division artillery headquarters, and other functional organizations associated with divisions would not always be able to support consistent “2+2” rotational timelines. There are currently ten deployable division headquarters and six GCCs. Three division headquarters are not available, however: the 82nd (GRF), 2nd (Korea), and 25th (PACOM assigned), and two GCCs (USNORTHCOM and USPACOM) would not receive aligned division headquarters, leaving seven divisions to align with four GCCs. In this scenario, a fires brigade associated with a division may be required to spend only 18 months in the CRF pool for every 24 months aligned to a GCC for RAF missions. FORSCOM would have to manage units that cannot support the “2+2” model using staggered rotational timelines.

The reserve component also offers significant advantages by aligning units with GCCs. However, due to the limited training time available to reserve component units, the Army cannot expect them to remain consistently proficient in both decisive action and TSC tasks. Instead, the Army should build on the existing state partnership program and have National Guard units strengthen their formal and long-term relationships with partner nations. These National Guard units then participate in exercises, exchanges, and training missions with the partnered nation in support of the GCC TSC objectives. The Army might do well to explore ways to strengthen Army Reserve and National Guard regional alignment with each GCC.

While the above “2+2” recommendation is one possible solution for the readiness challenges faced with the RAF concept, the Army must not trade readiness for expediency. Instead, Army force managers must determine an acceptable level of readiness at various points in a unit’s life cycle and not employ units beyond their capabilities without adequate time and resources to train to new requirements.

As part of the fires WfF contribution to the RAF concept, fires Soldiers will likely be required to conduct engagement with and training of host-nation security forces on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for employing the host nation’s fires-related systems. The challenge with such tasks is the variety of systems among partner nations. The nations within a single combatant command will likely possess artillery pieces from the U.S., former Soviet Union, China, France, and possibly other sources. Therefore, U.S. Soldiers may be asked to provide training to partner nations on systems U.S. Soldiers have no experience operating. There are three possible mitigating solutions to this challenge: 1) provide only tactical employment training to the foreign security force (FSF) leadership, 2) retain third party experts to conduct the training U.S. forces are unable to provide, and 3) train U.S. Soldiers on the weapon system prior to deployment.

As an example of the first solution and using a short-range air defense system, the trainers could provide the FSF leaders with TTPs to employ the systems from the aspect of planning for employment, C2, sustainment, identifying, tracking and engaging threats, and other basic tenets of air defense but not operator-level employment of the specific weapon system. This option is the easiest and least costly but increases the risk of creating host nation leaders who can effectively employ the system capability in a tactical scenario but with crews who are unable to deliver the required fires.

The second solution of utilizing third-party experts would complement the first solution and provide the GCC commander with the option of providing operator-level training on a weapon system. The third-party trainers could be allied nation forces or contractors hired to provide the training and technical assistance that U.S. Soldiers are unable to offer. Although this is a solution to the problem associated with a specific skill, it could be troublesome from a political perspective and create more difficulties than it solves. Complicated or nonexistent status of forces agreements (SoFA) for third country military or contracted civilians, an inability to provide quality control over the instruction, and third country military members working toward policy goals that may not be fully in line with U.S. objectives are all challenges that the CCDR must consider. Furthermore, contractors can be expensive. Although used extensively over the past 13 years of war, declining U.S. defense budgets may well render contractor assistance cost prohibitive.

The third and final option is to train our Soldiers on the system as part of the preparation to execute the SFA mission. Fortunately, the field artillery has proven its ability to execute this option. For example, in 2010 the Army tasked the field artillery to train Afghan army cannoners on the D30 cannon system. The tasked unit deployed to the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) to receive training from an allied nation on the D30 weapon system prior to deployment to Afghanistan. In this case the cannon crewmen were able to sufficiently master the D30 weapon system employment, operation, and maintenance to provide value-added training to our Afghan partners. None of these three options are mutually exclusive and they provide the GCC the flexibility to achieve TSC goals in the most economical manner. Depending on the time and money available prior to implementation and the scope of the training, any or all may be viable.

Materiel

Analysis of the materiel aspect of DOTMLPF carefully considers the systems and equipment used by our organizations and units to ensure end-to-end capability across the range of military operations. Material analysis also attempts to determine capability gaps and the extent to which inadequate systems or equipment is the cause of these gaps.³¹ Conventional force units are equipped primarily to execute decisive action missions. The emergence of RAF missions will require equipment not generally available through existing logistic functions.

In an era of fiscal austerity, Army requests for more or improved equipment will prove challenging. However, no analysis of options is complete without considering equipment shortcomings and mitigation measures for these shortcomings. The fires WfF is structured and equipped around a very specific mission and organization, possessing limited flexibility to execute non-standard missions without augmentation. While recommendations for RAF mission-specific equipment are best reserved for mission analysis and course of action development, some generalities are worth discussion, especially general shortfalls and procurement procedures once the Army identifies and validates requirements. For example, a field artillery battalion is equipped around the concept of employing batteries as single units under the centralized control of a battalion fire direction center. This employment requires short-range communications within the battery and medium-range capabilities from the battery to the battalion. The battalion requires medium- to long-range radio

capability to communicate with their higher headquarters and is frequently augmented with additional high frequency (HF) or satellite systems for redundancy and additional reach.

The RAF concept might call for small teams operating in geographically dispersed locations within the CCDR's area of responsibility to support specific missions. A field artillery battalion will not likely possess the capability or quantity of systems to support such operations. After the unit receives the mission and conducts mission analysis to identify equipment shortfalls, it must be able to submit an ASCC-validated operational needs statement to receive a materiel solution or funding to commercially procure the required equipment. For example, Africa has very limited infrastructure but has developed a relatively robust cell phone capability. If a FA battalion sent three teams to operate under the force protection policy of the embassy, the battalion may be able to provide one high-frequency (HF) radio, leaving two teams without communications. In this case, the battalion should request a cell or satellite phone contract and establish communication architecture to support reporting to the embassy via cell phone and to the ASCC through contracted satellite phone or organic HF systems. Furthermore, the same demands of the RAF concept apply to life support systems like water purification, small solar panels for phone charging, and many other mission enablers. As the RAF concept matures, the Army should leverage lessons learned from actual missions to shape future materiel programming and budgeting, thus minimizing the need for ad-hoc solutions.

Leadership and Education

The preparation, both formal and informal, of leaders at all levels lies at the foundation of the DOTMLPF leadership and education analysis. Moreover, this analysis seeks to fully understand current and potential professional development issues, determine whether the Army has the resources to address any issues, and possibly develop ways to solve them.³² Leader development is a core competency of the Army and the last decade of war has created a generation of capable and adaptive leaders. The RAF concept requires changes to the leader development program that will strengthen mission command principles in both leaders and organizations.

Professional military education (PME) is the cornerstone of any effort to develop culturally and regionally aware fires Soldiers and leaders who are able to operate autonomously and effectively in remote and austere environments. In order to produce a more culturally aware fires leader for regional engagements in an environment that demands mission command, the Army should overhaul the PME curricula, potentially lengthening the amount of time a leader spends in formal schooling.

Outside the formal PME system, there are numerous opportunities to receive education and training that would enhance the effectiveness of fires leaders in a TSC environment. Several U.S. government agencies to include the United States Agency for International Development, Department of State, Peace Corps, Central Intelligence Agency, and Drug Enforcement Agency have training opportunities for their employees prior to overseas utilization tours. Such venues provide opportunities to train select fires personnel in specific, key aspects of regional dynamics prior to a RAF deployment, resulting in better fires leader adaptability and interagency coordination during RAF mission execution.

Formal university education short of a degree is also a possibility. A semester of college is approximately 14 weeks and would qualify for temporary duty (TDY) funds. A fires officer coming out of an operational tour and moving to an ASCC or CCMD staff could attend school TDY *en route* and receive 15-18 credit hours of undergraduate education focused on the history, politics, geography, economics, culture, and human dimension of a specific region. This option entails some expense but provides the leader with substantial awareness and considerable understanding of a region that will shorten integration time and enhance productivity. The Army should screen and select fires leaders in critical billets for this opportunity.

Finally, there are internships at various agencies, both government and private, that operate around the globe. A young fires officer finishing company-level command could spend 1 to 2 years on a service tour with a humanitarian organization and then serve on the regional ASCC staff until attending the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), subsequently returning to a staff position in the division that is aligned with that region. This arrangement would not only enhance the officer's abilities but would also provide agencies (that sometimes view the Department of Defense suspiciously) with a great opportunity to work with some of the Army's best and brightest.

What the Army should not attempt is to create a pseudo-foreign area officer outside the formal FAO process. If the Army accepts the capabilities and limitations of a fires officer and facilitates training to maximize that officer's abilities, it can produce a valuable asset to regional engagements and operations. As previously discussed, the requirement to become proficient in a language is not economical and the damage that can be done with mediocre language skills could prove significant and detrimental when negotiating agreements, contracts, or other complex human engagements. Sensitive negotiations are better left to a professional interpreter who has mastered the nuances of a language and regional dialects. The Army should not lose sight of the goal that Soldiers are regionally aware and not regional experts.

During the FA and ADA officer basic and advanced courses, there must be training on the proper use of the interpreter, studies of anthropology, and how to understand and respect societies. The Army should reach outside its own military doctrine and explore relevant information sources. One such source is the Peace Corps manual *Culture Matters: The Peace Corps Cross-Cultural Workbook*.³³ This book provides a map to guide Peace Corps volunteers through their cross-cultural experiences and has broad applicability. It is well developed, field tested, and exactly what the Army needs. With this training, fires lieutenants and captains could be assigned virtually anywhere without region specific considerations as they would be better prepared to interact and operate in the human dimension of any culture or region.

At the mid-point of an officer's career, perhaps as part of CGSC, the Army should narrow the officer's cultural focus and begin to hone regional expertise. Part of the requirement for this narrowed development falls on assignment managers, who should notify the officers of their next assignment as early as possible. Accordingly, schoolhouse curriculum developers should place regionally-specific courses later in the course to allow the student officers to make the correct regional choice. Whether the officers are going to a FA, ADA, or IIA unit for a key and developmental job or to a division staff, they should know the gaining unit's regional alignment in sufficient time to develop a reasonable understanding of the culture and factors influencing U.S. policy and strategy in that region.

Personnel

Personnel analysis carefully considers the qualifications and availability of personnel to address possible capability gaps in human capital across the force. Personnel also evaluates the Army's ability to place enough qualified and trained personnel in the correct occupational specialties at the right intervals and for the required duration.³⁴ Personnel policies guide the career path of professional Soldiers. Consequently, the Army must update these policies to reflect the emerging realities of the operational environment and requirements associated with the RAF concept.

When General Odierno unveiled the RAF strategy, he specifically addressed the current personnel system and its limitations in supporting the emerging, post-Afghanistan requirements. His intent was that any new personnel management system would "focus units during their training cycle on specific mission profiles and unique environmental characteristics."³⁵ New requirements will necessitate changes to Army personnel policies. According to General Odierno:

First, our Army Force Generation, or ARFORGEN, process has served us well in meeting our demands over the last several years in Iraq and Afghanistan. But with operations in Iraq complete and ongoing transition in Afghanistan, we will have the opportunity to adapt this process to be more wide-ranging, especially as we re-balance toward the Asia-Pacific region.³⁶

From a personnel point of view, changing the duration of the ARFORGEN cycle has been a frequent point of contention, generally tied to the traditional 2-year command tours for battalion and brigade commanders, command sergeants major, and centralized selection list (CSL) positions on division and corps staff. Although the ARFORGEN model is effective, as implemented, it can create a lower demand for commanders and sometimes delays or precludes some otherwise qualified officers from the command opportunities.

Currently, fires units proceed through three phases in their ARFORGEN life-cycles: reset, train, and available. This model usually requires a 3-year rotation of personnel and units typically experience a sharp decline in readiness during the reset period due to a mass exodus of experienced personnel and a rapid influx of replacements. This model served the Army well during the predictable deployments of OIF and OEF but is not adequate for a less predictable global environment and within the RAF concept.

To address these challenges, the Army should establish a goal for manning that would set a standard tour length in a fires unit at 4 years for non-CSL positions and manage a 25 percent annual turn-over rate with a corresponding two percent monthly turn-over rate. This personnel replacement model is congruent with the previously-discussed 2-year decisive action rotation followed by a 2-year RAF mission (2+2). The model of routine inflow of personnel to a unit served the Army well during the pre-9/11 era, caused minimal turmoil to unit readiness, and did not overburden installation support capabilities. The model also created a steady-state condition that allowed the units and the installation to better predict gains and losses and did not require a difficult and expensive personnel surge followed by long periods of low demand for Soldier and family transition services.

If a fires battalion followed the “2+2” model, a company grade leader (NCO or officer) would arrive and spend 4 years in the organization, spanning both a decisive action and RAF rotation, before departing to another unit with required PME en route. For example, a fires battalion would receive a lieutenant straight out of the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) or follow-on schooling at a rate of about one officer every month or two (32 officers authorized for a heavy FA battalion with a 48-month replacement cycle), which provides a relatively modest level of turmoil. This officer would have time to serve in the traditional positions of company fire support officer, platoon leader, and battery executive officer or battalion staff officer before departing for the Captain’s Career Course (CCC). Furthermore, the officer would experience two full rotations (2+2) regardless of where he or she arrives in the model.

This personnel management system is more difficult for the field-grade officers and command sergeants major due to the high demand for key and developmental (KD)-qualified individuals across the force. These fires leaders should continue to serve a maximum of 2 years in a KD position before moving to another. Furthermore, the battalion operations officer, executive officer, commander, and sergeant major should continue to arrive and depart on staggered cycles, have opportunities to serve in various brigade or division positions, then PCS to an appropriate developmental job after achieving KD qualifications.

Changes to the current model of personnel management will require a fundamental shift in how a successful career is viewed. The Army should revise AR 600-3, *The Personnel Development System*, to encourage and protect non-standard career tracks. The Army must also accord additional guidance to career managers and, perhaps most importantly, to selection and promotion boards to ensure officers are rewarded and not punished for pursuing non-traditional assignments in support of the RAF concept. Additionally, the 4-year

model not only extends tour length, preserving PCS dollars for the Army and allowing junior leaders an opportunity to experience the rigors of decisive action training and qualification, but it also provides an opportunity for leaders to fully experience RAF missions, providing optimal value to the GCCs. Finally, the Army should continue to refine and use its “Green Pages,” already proven more effective than existing policies at matching talent with need.³⁷

Facilities

Facilities analysis examines military-owned and other facilities to ensure optimized support of ongoing and anticipated operations and to eliminate capability gaps. Facilities analysis also seeks to expose issues with and offer solutions for base operations and maintenance.³⁸ Although the RAF concept is innovative and creates numerous institutional challenges, current Army infrastructure will still generally support the concept. There are, however, some facilities-related areas within the RAF concept to which the Army should devote greater attention.

A field artillery, air defense, or IIA unit deploying to a nation in support of RAF requires the same host-nation infrastructure that any other unit would require for life support, training, and sustainment. However, the Fires WFF possesses unique technical systems, some of which require expensive and time-consuming training. For example, firing a live shoulder-fired ADA weapon as part of gunner qualification is cost prohibitive to many nations. Fortunately, the Army can mitigate some of these issues.

The Army has made great strides in its live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) training capacity; but the Army must now make this capability available in a deployable package that can support RAF training missions. Mission training facilities that support LVC training must develop a modular component that can be “unplugged” and deployed to support technical skills training in an austere environment. With this in mind, the Fires Center of Excellence must make mobile training systems available to deploying units. A “simulator in a box” that is deployable by C-130 would enable the U.S. trainers to accelerate the FSF training and provide realistic, hands-on experience in a controlled classroom environment. It would also allow U.S. Soldiers to maintain skills proficiency when deployed and while conducting tasks other than their own core competencies. The ADA should procure an easily-deployable and rugged fire direction center (FDC) system and a Stinger simulator while the Field Artillery should do the same for FDC, call-for-fire, and cannon system simulators. Furthermore, and using virtual reality gaming techniques, the ADA should adapt currently non-deployable systems, such as the improved moving target simulator stinger missile trainer, to create smaller, easily portable capabilities.

All of these simulators exist in the Army school-house environment; the challenge is to create a deployable, self-sustaining version and making them available to RAF units in support of their missions. This capability alone could dramatically reduce the cost of FSF training while producing a more highly trained individual in less time.

Installations will also need updated facilities to conduct effective pre-RAF training. The foundation should be the installation education centers, which should serve as the central location for the language, regional expertise, and cultural centers. The Army should invest the resources needed to bring these facilities to a standard equivalent of a modern university to facilitate on-site and distance learning opportunities. Finally, the Army must modify and configure its deployment-related infrastructure to handle a persistent but low-volume deployment cycle yet retain the ability to surge in support of contingency response deployments.

Conclusion

As a first choice resourcing solution for regional challenges,³⁹ the RAF concept recognizes the complexity of the operational environment and offers well-tailored and properly-trained forces to handle a wide variety of tasks and missions in support of CCDR needs. Furthermore, this concept provides the operational adaptability and resiliency required for the range of military operations in a volatile and ambiguous world. The fires WfF core tasks provide the maneuver commander the devastating effects required for decisive action and the flexibility needed across the range of military operations. With the advent of the RAF concept, the fires community again has an opportunity and requirement to demonstrate the outstanding professional contributions to a combatant commander's theater objectives. With a focused analysis and a professional dialogue of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities, the fires community can seize the opportunity to shape the operational environment.

Notes

¹ Leon E. Panetta, "The Fight Against Al Qaeda: Today and Tomorrow," Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, DC, November 20, 2012, available from www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1737, accessed January 21, 2014.

² Dan Cox, "An Enhanced plan for Regionally Aligning Brigades Using Human Terrain Systems," *Small Wars Journal*, June 2012, available from www.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-enhancedplan-for-regionally-aligning-brigades-using-human-terrain-systems, accessed 20 October 2012.

³ Kimberly Field, James Learmont, Jason Charland, "Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual," *Parameters*, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2013, p. 56.

⁴ Raymond T. Odierno, "Gen. Raymond Odierno: Prevent, shape, and win," December 15, 2011, available from www.usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/TRADOC%20This%20Week%20Dec%2015%20%202011.pdf, accessed March 03, 2014.

⁵ Field, Learmont, Charland, "Regionally Aligned Forces," p. 56.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army and General Raymond T. Odierno, Army Chief of Staff 2012 *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 19 April, 2012, p. 8.

⁸ John R. Bray, "Strategic Analysis of Regional Alignment of United States Army Forces," Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 01, 2013, p. 3.

⁹ James E. Rexford, FORSCOM G-3/5/7 Plans, "Preparing Regionally Aligned Forces to Meet CCMD Requirements," briefing slides, Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, November 18, 2013, p. 2.

¹⁰ Stephen R. Anderson, "How Many Languages Are There in the World?," *Linguistic Society of America*, available from www.linguisticsociety.org/content/how-many-languages-are-there-world, accessed January 21, 2014.

¹¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Language and Culture Training: Opportunities Exist to Improve Visibility and Sustainment of Knowledge and Skills in Army and Marine Corps General Purpose Forces*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, October 2011, p. 1.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Rexford, "Preparing Regionally Aligned Forces," p. 5.

¹⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 2012.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-09.1, *Fire Support*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, November 2011.

¹⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-100, *U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 15, 2000.

¹⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*.

¹⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-13, *Inform and Influence Activities*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, January 2013.

²⁰ AcqNotes, “Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System (JCIDS) Process,” available from www.acqnotes.com/Acquisitions/DOTMLPF%20Analysis.html, accessed February 27, 2014.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Brendan McGarry, “Army Races to Cut Headquarters Staff by 25 Percent”, Aug 20, 2013, linked from Military.com at “News,” available from www.military.com/daily-news/2013/08/20/army-races-to-cut-headquarters-staff-by-25-percent.html, accessed March 05, 2014.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Foreign Area Officer Association, “What is a FAO?,” available from www.faoa.org/FAO-What-is-a-FAO, accessed February 05, 2014.

²⁵ AcqNotes, “JCIDS Process.”

²⁶ Raymond T. Odierno, “CSA Remarks at AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon,” Association of the United States Army Conference Speech, Washington, DC, October 23, 2012, available from http://www.army.mil/article/89823/October_23__2012__CSA_Remarks_at_AUSA_Eisenhower_Luncheon__As_Delivered_, accessed 17 December 2012.

²⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*.

²⁸ “Decisive Training Environment”, Military Training Technology, MT2 Online, Americas Longest Established Simulation and Training Magazine, Vol. 17, Issue 2, available from www.militarytraining-technology.com/mt2-home/397-mt2-2012-volume-17-issue-2-april/5470-decisive-actiontraining-environment-.html, accessed on 17 December, 2013.

²⁹ Sean MacFarland, Michael Shields, and Jeffery Snow, “*White Paper: The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s ability to provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders*,” available from www.npr.org/documents/2008/may/artillerywhitepaper.pdf, accessed March 17, 2014, p. 1.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

³¹ AcqNotes, “JCIDS Process.”

³² Ibid.

³³ U.S. Peace Corps, *Culture Matters: The Peace Corps Cross-Cultural Workbook*, Washington, DC: Peace Corps Information Collections and Exchange, 1997, available from www.peacecorps.gov/www/publications/culture/pdf/workbook.pdf, accessed January 27, 2014.

³⁴ AcqNotes, “JCIDS Process.”

³⁵ Rob McIlvaine, “Odierno: Regional Alignments to Begin Next Year,” linked from The United States Army Home Page, available from www.army.mil/article/79919/, accessed January 15, 2014.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Raven Bukowski, John Childress, Michael J. Colarusso, David S. Lyle, “Creating an Effective Regional Alignment Strategy for the U.S. Army,” Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, November 2014, p.10.

³⁸ AcqNotes, “JCIDS Process.”

³⁹ Rexford, “Preparing Regionally Aligned Forces,” p. 8.

RAF and Sustainment Warfighting Function

Colonel Matthew H. Ruedi and James D. Scudieri, Ph.D.

The United States is in the midst of implementing a responsible transition after ending the war in Iraq, drawing down in Afghanistan, and defeating Al-Qaida and its terrorist affiliates, while moving the economy from catastrophic recession to lasting recovery.¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) has developed an updated concept for providing trained and ready Army forces to the geographic combatant commanders (GCC) in support of their theatre campaign plans (TCP). This concept, advanced by HQDA, called Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), is intended to support the GCCs to shape the environment, mitigate tensions, and deter armed conflict in their area of responsibility (AOR).²

RAF provides the combatant commander (CCDR) with up to joint task force (JTF) capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to support shaping the environment. JTF capability includes Army units assigned to combatant commands; allocated to a combatant command; and those capabilities service retained, combatant command aligned (SRCA) and prepared by the Army for combatant command (CCMD) regional missions. These forces include Army organizations and capabilities from the corps down to the brigade echelon which are: forward stationed; operating in a CCMD AOR; supporting from outside the AOR, including reach-back capability; and prepared to support from outside the AOR. CCMD requirements are driving and implementing these regional missions. RAF requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries for the countries where they are deploying, as well as expertise how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.³

The Army intends that the RAF concept will “support CCMD and U.S. Government requirements to Prevent, Shape, and Win, while remaining operationally adaptable to respond to global contingencies, if required.”⁴ For purposes of the RAF concept, the U.S. Army must have trained and ready forces who will cultivate relationships with allied and partner forces during steady-state activities. Through these relationships, the U.S. Army, as part of a joint, and likely combined force, will be capable of compelling an adversary not to fight, and if necessary, be decisive victors in military actions in the land domain.⁵

Due to current and future budget considerations, doing more with less is the “new normal” for the armed forces. Therefore, the Army must find more efficient ways to be effective as it competes for these finite resources with the other services. RAF provides CCDRs with a Landpower capability to meet emerging or existing regional demands that are responsive and consistently available. In accordance with the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), CCDRs develop and execute TCPs aimed at desired, steady-state strategic conditions. Simultaneously, they develop steady-state daily operations that shape and set the theater through security cooperation activities across their AORs.⁶

To meet these upcoming challenges, the capabilities organically assigned in a brigade combat team (BCT) make it the RAF sourcing unit of choice for CCDRs. A BCT is the Army’s primary land domain maneuver force and is organized as a combined-arms team. BCTs are nearly self-sustaining for up to seventy-two hours and doctrinally require only limited external augmentation to conduct the full range of military operations (ROMO).⁷

Sustainment Warfighting Function (WfF) Support in a GCC

Prior to examining the Army Sustainment Warfighting Function (WfF) for RAF, the definitions, terms, and practices used to create a common picture and understanding are reviewed. The essence of the Army Sustainment WfF is to provide logistics support and services to Army forces in order to ensure commanders' freedom of action, allowing them to extend operational reach and prolong endurance. Successful sustainment thus increases a commander's number and quality of options.⁸ The three key elements of sustainment are logistics, personnel services, and health service support.⁹

Detailed logistics planning for the movement and support of Army forces is critical. The three elements cited above also include the overarching distribution tasks of supply and transportation, field services, maintenance, and operational contract support.¹⁰ The Army Ordnance Corps is responsible for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) doctrine, part of the Protection WfF.

Personnel services must man and fund the force, including Soldier and family readiness and enablers to promote morale. Thus, personnel services encompass a wide range of human resource management, financial, legal, religious, and military band support.¹¹

Health service support (HSS), physical and mental, has its own structure of providers, within the Army Medical Department (AMEDD). Missions include casualty care, medical evacuation, and medical logistics.¹²

The Army Service Component Command (ASCC) is the senior Army command headquarters in theater for the CCMD. As such, it assumes administrative control (ADCON) over Army forces in the GCC's AOR, unless specific exceptions apply. The ASCC fulfills major planning and advisory functions for the CCDR. The ASCC, as directed, also provides Army support to other services (ASOS), including special operations forces (SOF); coalition forces, other governmental agencies (OGA), as well as non-governmental organizations (NGO).¹³

Few appreciate the broad and complex responsibilities of the ASCC. First, it supports the GCC's requirements on a daily basis. Second, it must set the theater and/or joint operations area (JOA). Third, it can serve as the operational HQ, i.e., provide mission command, for immediate crisis response and limited small-scale contingency operations. ASCCs typically have limited forces assigned, and can request augmentation. These units consist of enablers in five areas: sustainment, signal, medical, military intelligence, and civil affairs (CA).¹⁴ This report discusses the sustainment units in detail.

Theater Sustainment Command Operations

The Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) is the ASCC's senior logistics headquarters for the AOR. The TSC is also the executor of the range of Army sustainment missions described above.¹⁵ Hence, the breadth and depth of roles and missions are daunting. The TSC is the centralized logistics command and control (C2) structure to conduct operational-level logistics for the ASCC and the GCC.

The TSC is only a headquarters (HQ) element, however. The overall structure reflects the flattening of organizations. Planners must tailor subordinate units, combining modular force HQs such as expeditionary sustainment commands (ESC), sustainment brigades (SB), combat sustainment support battalions (CSSB), and largely functional companies or smaller elements.¹⁶

The ESC has a unique role for theater sustainment. It can extend the TSC's operational reach and span of control by exercising mission command over multiple SBs. The ESC can focus support on a specific JOA within the AOR. Likewise, it could fall under the mission command of a corps HQ, another Army forces (ARFOR) HQ, or a JTF. Such a close relationship would ensure highly-responsive logistics focused on distribution and readiness in a rapidly-evolving operational situation.¹⁷

SBs consolidate missions previously performed by division support commands (DISCOM), corps support groups (CSG), and area support groups (ASG) into a single operational echelon. Capable of theater opening, theater distribution, and sustainment operations, the SBs have an even narrower area focus than the ESCs. The SBs must also have tailored organizations, built around CSSB HQs and functional subordinate companies and detachments. Specific missions may require specialty units such as movement control battalions, motor transportation battalions, quartermaster petroleum battalions, transportation terminal battalions, and ordnance battalions for ammunition and maintenance.¹⁸

U.S. Army Materiel Command Operations

U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) has the formal mission to develop and deliver “global readiness solutions to sustain Unified Land Operations (ULO).”¹⁹ Moreover, its involvement in a GCC’s AOR has evolved considerably in the last decade. Its focus is national-level sustainment, acquisition integration support, contracting services, and selected logistics support to Army forces.²⁰ Moreover, subordinate elements in theater may also support joint and coalition forces and interagency elements in acquisition, life cycle logistics, and technology (AL&T).²¹ USAMC accomplishes these numerous and diverse capabilities through various major subordinate commands (MSC). These are the U.S. Army Sustainment Command (ASC), Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB), and the U.S. Army Contracting Command (USACC).

Established in October 2006, the ASC provides logistics from the strategic through tactical levels by synchronizing AL&T. Such a wide purview necessitates support of the operational Army at home-station and while deployed, while simultaneously integrating logistics support with strategic partners, as well as linking the national sustainment base with the expeditionary Army. Major responsibilities include contracting services for equipment support, logistics synchronization for Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), and the Logistic Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). The ASC deploys several subordinate elements to an AOR: Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB), Army Field Support Battalions (AFSBn), and Brigade Logistics Support Teams (BLST).²²

AFSBs, also established in October 2006, are assigned to the ASC and, when deployed, are under the operational control (OPCON) of the supported ASCC, usually delegated to the TSC or ESC.²³ The AFSB is the major link between the generating force and the deploying operational force, greatly facilitated by their regional alignment in the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas.²⁴ The AFSB also performs USAMC national-level provider support and is a key coordinator of related AL&T actions while deployed.²⁵

The AFSBn is subordinate to the AFSB and is a deployable table of distribution and allowances (TDA) unit in direct support (DS) of the ten active-duty division HQs, consisting of Soldiers, DA civilians, and contractors. The AFSBn commands assigned and attached BLSTs. Its primary mission focus is support of deployed Army equipment systems, in particular proper coordination of national-level and AL&T efforts, to include specific logistics assistance. Other AFSBn missions with augmentation are sustainment maintenance; back-up support of field maintenance support to deployed units to perform modification work orders (MWO); and assistance in reset, maintenance, and disposition of theater-provided equipment (TPE).²⁶

The BLST is another USAMC deployable element assigned to the AFSB with a DS role, often for a designated BCT or other brigade-level units. The primary functions of the BLST are to provide subject matter experts (SME) for brigade technical systems, AL&T assistance, and technical support reach-back capability from the brigade to the applicable USAMC agency. The BLST team chief, a major, serves as USAMC’s advisor to the brigade commander and must ensure coordination of all USAMC and related AL&T support for that brigade.²⁷

U.S. Army Contracting Command (USACC) is the most recent addition to USAMC, established in October 2008. Uniquely, it provides mission command and procurement authority over all Army contracting organizations with the exception of some specialty units. USACC has two major responsibilities. First, it provides theater-support contracting through the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC). Second, its Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC) provides installation contract support to garrison operations in CONUS. The ECC's focus is contracting support in support of Army and joint operations overseas, to include garrisons outside the Continental United States (OCONUS).²⁸ The ECC does so through nine contracting support brigades (CSB), 17 contingency contracting battalions, 16 senior contingency contracting teams, and 92 contingency contracting teams.²⁹

These contracting organizations are radically different from the structures in place during approximately the first half decade of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Then, the ASCC's principal assistant responsible for contracting (PARC), a staff element, controlled the contracting support mission. Now, the Army senior procurement executive has appointed the ECC commander as the head of contracting activity (HCA), who in turn designates each CSB commander as a PARC. When deployed, the CSB is in DS to the ASCC and executes its contracting mission under the direction and contracting authority of the ECC with both command and contracting authority.³⁰

Thus, Army sustainment has evolved to respond to the drastically-different strategic environment today of non-linear battlefields and emerging threats. However, there is a lack of a single logistics commander in theater, resulting in three distinct sustainment "stovepipe" organizations with the same goal: to support deployed forces in a CCMD AOR. One is the TSC with assigned or attached Army force sustainment (FS) forces. Transition to the modular force has evolved all echelons above brigade (EAB) logistical units to function as "plug-and-play" organizations, necessitating planners to task organize capabilities, i.e., command-and-control HQ units with tailored, functional, companies and detachments. The second is HQAMC with assigned specialty support units. AMEDD health services support constitutes a third stovepipe.

A major element of Army sustainment evolution, renovation, reset, and innovation is APS. The ASC is responsible for all aspects of APS accountability, including storage, maintenance, issues, and receipts.³¹ APS is the third leg of the strategic mobility triad with airlift and sealift and improves force closure times.³² While historically 90 percent of deployed equipment and materiel moves by sealift and only 10 percent via airlift, demands beyond capability and/or capacity may compromise timely responses to short-notice crises. APS stored around the world thus reduces demand upon the other two legs of the Strategic Mobility Triad, whether for exercises, contingency plans, or crisis response.³³

The APS program is an Army strategic program and is a critical capability in support of Army forces. The program consists of unit sets of combat and support equipment, operational projects (unit equipment and supplies above authorization), sustainment stocks, war reserve stocks for allies (WRSA), and most recently, unit activity sets. HQDA G-3/5 (DAMO-SSW) is the approval authority for the release of APS/war reserve. APS is stored in five regional areas and configured to meet stated requirements by the CCDRs and ASCCs.³⁴

Activity sets are a recent addition to APS, consisting of unit equipment prepositioned specifically to equip Army forces conducting training exercises outside CONUS. The equipment is prepositioned at or near the intended training locations and maintained in APS when not issued to training units. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) established the European activity set (EAS) in early 2014 for rotating units with "a brigade combat team headquarters and battalion-sized armor task force with enablers."³⁵

Joint Sustainment Responsibilities

Executive Agent (EA) responsibility is the delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to a subordinate to act as the sole agency to perform a service or function to others.³⁶ Such responsibilities vary. They may cover only a certain geographical area, a specific operation, or a long-term mission for DoD. Some of the Army's substantial sustainment responsibilities include mortuary affairs; the detainee program; potable water support for contingency operations; military postal operations; veterinary services, which conducts food inspection; and the armed forces blood program.³⁷ The DoD has assigned no less than 47 of 90 component EA responsibilities to the Army.³⁸ The ASCC must integrate and synchronize all this support throughout the AOR.

When operating with allies or coalition partners, the SECDEF can approve an Acquisition Cross-servicing agreement (ACSA). An ACSA provides logistics support, but does not have to be strictly a cash arrangement. Replacement-in-kind or exchange-for-equal value basis is acceptable. Common services under ACSA are ammunition; billeting; food; maintenance; medical services; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL); port services; repair parts; and transportation. Prohibited items under ACSA include weapon systems; guided missiles; nuclear ammunition; and chemical ammunition, excluding riot control agents.³⁹

Per Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 164, CCDRs exercise authority, direction, and control over all forces assigned or allocated per direction of the SECDEF. The directive authority for logistics (DAFL) authorizes a CCDR to direct specific logistics actions to promote more effective and efficient execution of approved plans.⁴⁰ The CCDR cannot delegate or transfer DAFL; however, he may delegate responsibility for the implementation and management of common support requirements.⁴¹

Sustainment WfF Function and DOTMLPF

DOTMLPF is a DoD acronym for a methodology to analyze capability gaps and seek mitigations through the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process. The acronym stands for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. A capability gap is essentially a threat or warfighting challenge not encountered before and needing a solution.

Doctrine

ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment*, published in July 2012, supports ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, published in May 2012. This foundational doctrine articulates how all the elements of sustainment facilitate and support operational success. Sustainment as a WfF is critical to actively promote operational reach and freedom of action.⁴² The future strategic environment and the implementation of RAF across multiple CCMDs require Army sustainment forces to be capable of executing a range of mission types simultaneously. The updated sustainment WfF tasks in doctrine adequately address RAF requirements and do not need additional refinement.

Organization

Organization examines unit structures' ability to plan and conduct operations. Determination of any capability gaps also seeks possible courses of action (COA) for improvement. This section outlines current RAF organizational deficiencies and offers recommended solutions.

In setting a theater, the ASCC structure represents capabilities that are highly task-organized into a selected force based on METT-TC. Although each CCMD is unique, most share similar generic sustainment requirements. The ASCC tailors sustainment units as needed for required capability and capacity levels, then

echelons those capabilities as needed into theater. Again, sustainment units such as a TSC, ESC, SB, and CSSB are only headquarters units, smaller-sized elements are required to conduct logistics and sustainment operations.

Regarding sustainment headquarters structure, there are only three active component (AC) TSCs in the Army, assigned respectively to Pacific Command (PACOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and European Command (EUCOM). One U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) TSC is aligned to Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and one Army National Guard (ARNG) is aligned to Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Africa Command (AFRICOM) has no assigned TSC and coordinates through the global force management (GFM) process for support from EUCOM. There are four AC ESCs, two assigned to PACOM and the two others are with the evolving pool of service retained, combatant command aligned (SRCA) units. There are nine ESCs in the USAR and two in the ARNG.

There are 11 AC SBs, of which ten are aligned with a division headquarters; nine in the USAR; and ten in the ARNG. These headquarters units have a variable number of CSSBs assigned at home-station, but are designed to deploy independently with the ability to integrate capabilities in theater as required.

The first recommendation, for more dedicated sustainment unit support for RAF is to SRCA the ten corresponding active-duty SBs and division HQs to the same regionally-aligned GCC. Doing so would have sustainment and division HQs working together as they conduct steady-state operations. Not only would this combination be expeditionary, but it would also provide a synergistic focus for planning, training, and employment. The SB would make recommendations as to the types of logistics units required for RAF mission support to the TSC, most likely through the GEM process.

The second recommendation is to SRCA the USAR and ARNG ESCs to the GCCs in the evolving SRCA “patch chart,” and then plan, train, and support with corresponding active duty forces. A long-term alignment schedule for RAF develops relationships early, along with a mindset of coordination and teambuilding for steady-state operations. Likewise, executing SRCA of the corresponding CSSBs of those units links peacetime training and overseas engagement.

The third recommendation is to SRCA an active-duty ESC to AFRICOM. USARAF currently has no assigned TSC, as well as no other logistics enablers such as an ESC, SB, or CSSB. These units are necessary to plan, coordinate, and execute steady-state requirements, support the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and GEF missions, and potentially respond to crises in the AFRICOM AOR.

Without assigned, key sustainment enablers or capabilities, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), as the ASCC for AFRICOM, performs support functions outside its scope and charter. The GFM process and other sourcing solutions, such as coordinating with USAR and ARNG units, provide sourcing solutions that are inconsistent and untimely. The results are a lack of continuity for planning and execution, exacerbating the preparation and mission analysis for all events, and degrading shape and prevent activities.

Since October 1, 2010, there has been a standing memorandum of agreement (MOA) between U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and USARAF regarding title 10 § USC 3013 component support. The purpose is threefold: a) establish a common understanding of Title 10 U.S.C. § 162 Combatant Command operational component support requests for forces (RFF), using established global force management implementation guidance (GFMIG), b) establish a common understanding of Title 10 U.S.C. § 3013 (administrative and logistics) non-operational support provided by USAREUR where USARAF lacks the capability to execute, and c) establish processes to support Title 10 U.S.C. § 3013 (administrative and logistics) non-operational support requests for assistance (RFAs).⁴³

The USARAF/USAREUR MOA does not affect the assignment of forces per the GFMIG; rather, the MOA establishes the processes and procedures by which USARAF requests support from USAREUR and establishes processes and procedures by which USAREUR provides support to USARAF. The MOA, however,

does not replace and/or modify the GFM business rules nor does it grant AFRICOM the command authority to deploy USAREUR assigned forces without submitting an RFF. Furthermore, the MOA precludes direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) with USAREUR assigned forces, such as the 21st TSC, and USAREUR forces cannot deploy to the AFRICOM AOR without EUCOM approval and a signed SECDEF order, as per established GFM processes and procedures.⁴⁴

Consequently, support provided to Army units, crisis-response planning and execution, and theater logistics planning in the AFRICOM AOR has been excessively ad hoc. In FY13 USARAF executed a 74-percent increase in events over FY12. In FY14 this trend is projected to continue or increase slightly including theater security cooperation and support to named operations, in addition to emergent operational requirements, such as peace keeping operations (PKO) training missions; and contingency response forces.⁴⁵ Consequently, USARAF has had to conduct increased sustainment planning and execution to support the CCCR's strategic and operational objectives without the expert knowledge that these additional planning staffs bring.

If DoD were to combine EUCOM and AFRICOM into one CCMD again or merge one as a sub-unified command under the other, the current ad-hoc arrangements would end. The current arrangement has been problematic at best, and likely to get worse.

Training

Training sustainment units and leaders must be realistic, rigorous, and relevant to the future environment. The RAF concept supports all of three requirements. As deployments decrease, Soldiers will see fewer opportunities to support real-world missions; therefore, individual and unit training must be challenging and realistic to sustain knowledge and competency expertise. From the perspective of a RAF sustainment, ambiguity, change, and complexity are the norm. Training must emphasize and reflect the necessary adaptability and versatility.

A critical component across the breadth of training venues will be scenarios that force sustainment leaders to adapt quickly to wide-ranging and rapidly-evolving situations. All Soldiers must prepare for unknown events, as they train and maintain expanded, critical pre-deployment skills. The sustainment community must focus on supporting decisive action with offensive, defensive, and stability operations, while ensuring that sustainment personnel are adaptable and flexible.⁴⁶

Sustainment units must be prepared to support the full range of military operations (ROMO), from steady state to Phase V, and now both as RAF supporter and potentially RAF participant. Due to the diversity and different scales of RAF missions, many deploying formations will be small teams. Soldier training must get "back to the basics" for skills that have atrophied after 12-plus years of war. Pre-deployment training is essential in the areas of unit movement operations, asset visibility, contracting officer representative (COR), field ordering officer (FOO), environmental considerations, and field sanitation. Units from the home-station must address these areas with the supported ASCC and on pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS). Importantly, cultural and regional training needs to be added to existing training plans appropriate to the AOR for each unit.

Materiel

In studying the RAF concept for materiel requirements from a sustainment perspective, Soldiers still train at home-station on unit-owned equipment and either deploy with or fall on equipment in theater. Due to fiscal restraints, however, and possible time constraints within an expeditionary capability, HQAMC has added equipment activity sets to APS to provide additional support to RAF units. The concept entails rotating units

to coordinate and draw all or a portion of an activity set for a specific timeframe, then return it to AMC for service and preparation for the next unit.

The first equipment set, the EAS, is intended to equip Army units rotating for European Response Force/NATO Response Force (ERF/NRF) training activities to improve the readiness posture in the EUCOM AOR. The EAS is comprised of equipment from around the world, sent to Germany's Grafenwoehr training area to enable U.S. regionally-aligned forces and multinational partners in Europe to train and operate in the AOR.

The first RAF units aligned with USAREUR are projected to sign for and use this equipment in the spring of 2014 for approximately two months. The EAS consists of an armored brigade combat team (ABCT), a combined arms battalion, a brigade C2 element plus enablers located in Grafenwoehr and Pirmasens for Class VII, major equipment items. The 405th AFSB and the AFSBn-Germany will serve as the lead HQAMC elements assigned to establish the equipment set, provide storage, build a sustainment workforce, and manage future support requirements of over 3,000 major equipment and secondary items.⁴⁷

Also, the CSA approved the concept in fiscal year 2013 (FY13) of prepositioned Army equipment for an Australia activity set (AAS) to equip Army units during future multinational, bilateral, joint training activities. It is currently awaiting diplomatic negotiations for final approval. The projected density list will include a light infantry company and a forward support company (FSC). Planned composition is 114 items. A major advantage to this location is its proximity to the strategically important Pacific region.

Furthermore, HQDA, USARAF, and HQAMC should build an activity set dedicated to USARAF, consisting of an infantry BN, plus a BDE C2 element, plus enablers with support assets staged in Djibouti or Livorno, Italy, to respond to AOR missions. AFRICOM continues to be particularly challenging, due to the great continental diversity, undeveloped infrastructure, the magnitude of its land domain, and the necessity of an equipment set.

Leadership and Education

Future leaders will have to integrate and synchronize all sustainment functions throughout ULO to be effective in the 21st-century operational environment. "They must be adaptive professionals who can think critically to solve problems as they support multiple mission types concurrently and adjust to evolving circumstances."⁴⁸ They must also fully comprehend the spirit of mission command, planning and executing sustainment from tactical through strategic levels, from steady-state RAF activities to decisive action operations.⁴⁹

This mindset must include an understanding and ability to integrate and synchronize sustainment in an AOR for RAF as elements of overall theater security cooperation activities along with conventional forces and SOF while simultaneously coordinating with organizations ranging from ASCC HQ to embassy country teams. Hence the future requires greater cooperation with unified action partners to leverage capabilities of agencies and organizations with diverse perspectives and interests. Sustainment leaders must also be proficient and skilled in working with sustainment enterprises, including the defense industrial base, supply-chain management, life-cycle systems and sustainment, and theater distribution -- planning and executing across all levels. In short, leaders need the skills to achieve desired outcomes through cooperative arrangements with multiple agencies or organizations.

Professional military education (PME) must provide a baseline understanding in the sustainment enterprise that leaders can leverage in tactical, operational and strategic assignments and other broadening experiences. Continued education must build on the foundation to challenge leaders to refine the ability to apply their knowledge to think critically, solve complex sustainment problems creatively, and adapt quickly to

unforeseen circumstances as the operational environment evolves. There will be no shortages of scenarios or situations within RAF mission sets for sustainment leaders to demonstrate adaptability, forward thinking, initiative, and responsiveness to rapid and unpredictable changes and operations.

Personnel

Current sustainment unit modified tables of organization & equipment (MTOEs) for personnel may be sufficient to support RAF units -- if filled to authorized levels. The EAB task-organized companies and detachments are accustomed to tailored structuring. There are caveats, however. The DOTMLPF analysis detailed above highlights the requirement to be prepared to support ULO throughout the ROMO from steady state through Phase V. Thus, the first caveat concerns recent grade-plate reductions, which downgrade skill levels in many critical positions. Skill downgrades will have as-yet unforeseen second- and third-order effects. Second, the Army's mandated 25-percent staff reduction directly impacts those HQ whose missions are projected to expand considerably, if not exponentially, as the RAF concept proliferates across AORs. Third, the restructuring of the BCT adds a third maneuver battalion to the brigade support battalion (BSB) for additional support requirements. The potential impact remains unclear. This enhanced battalion will have its own FSC that will plug into the BSB, but the proposed reductions in BSB's functional companies will likely degrade some capabilities.⁵⁰

Facilities

The RAF concept creates implications for numerous sustainment aspects of a largely CONUS-based Army, specifically an installation's power-projection capability. One of the expectations of RAF units is to be expeditionary and capable of global employment in order to achieve positional advantage over a potential adversary by strategic movement. Unfortunately, the garrisons under the Installation Management Command (IMCOM) had already endured numerous personnel cuts since the end of the Cold War. FORSCOM's Mission Support Elements (MSE) had mitigated some of these losses, as they also assumed numerous rear-detachment functions, but no longer.

Army garrison staffs with their functional directorates are the critical enablers of force projection. The inauguration of comprehensive RAF operations during peacetime may yet highlight shortfalls that will have to be addressed if we are to ensure genuine, agile, rapid, and responsive deployment platforms.

Conclusion

The Army's Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept is a viable approach to provide trained and ready forces to CCDRs to source the prevent, shape and win strategy early, especially during steady state to prioritize shape and preclude having conflict. Sustainment provides a critical role in the successful execution of RAF and development of innovative solutions for its support.

The concept creates a number of challenges for the sustainment WfF function in terms of organization, training, and materiel for RAF units, with as-yet unforeseen consequences in personnel. This report highlights existing capability gaps created by a shortage of sustainment unit HQs and execution unit formations within the ASCCs to support their GCCs, and offers recommendations to address these shortfalls. The RAF concept, in particular SRCA, has the potential to provide the ASCCs with the capability and capacity to meet CCDRs' requirements across the ROMO.

In the absence of outright assignment to those GCCs, RAF activities in steady state warrant large-scale SRCA of sustainment units with DIRLAUTH for long-term planning across GCCs. This comprehensive SRCA

should include AC and Reserve Component force sustainment units that can integrate and synchronize home-station training, through the corresponding SB with their respective aligned division headquarters, to the appropriate ASCC.

The ASCCs must have confidence that the Army's commitment to RAF is long term, with a reasonable level of planned and forecasted predictability, both at home station and in the AOR, barring the outbreak of a major war or massive crisis. Increased risk remains with regard to two aspects of sustainment unit restructuring: a) from AC to USAR or ARNG which requires more lead time for coordination with associated mobilization issues, and b) the concentration of a larger percentage of AC FS capability in the BCTs and the reduced capability and/or capacity at EAB.

Notes

¹ Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy*, Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010, p. 7.

² Raymond Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, "Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF), Execute Order (EXORD)," Arlington, VA: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 20, 2012, p. 5.

³ *Idem*, "Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), FRAGO 1 to the HQDA Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), Execute Order (EXORD)," Arlington, VA, Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 17, 2013, p. 3.

⁴ Odierno, "RAF EXORD," p. 7.

⁵ John M. McHugh and Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, "2012 Army Posture: The Nation's Force of Decisive Action," Posture statement presented to the 112th Congress, 2nd sess., p. 6.

⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-22, *Theater Security Cooperation*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2013, p. 1-4.

⁷ *Idem*, Field Manual 3-90.6, *Brigade Combat Team*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2010, p. 1-1.

⁸ *Idem*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2012, pp. 3-4.

⁹ *Idem*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 4-0, *Sustainment*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2012, p. 1-1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1-2.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-8 and 2-9.

¹⁴ *Idem*, Field Manual 3-93, *Theater Army Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2011, p. 1-8. Since the time of writing FM 3-93 has been superseded. See *Idem*, Field Manual 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2014.

¹⁵ ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment*, p. 2-9 has a full description. Later discussion examines the lack of a dedicated TSC for U.S. Army Africa and Africa Command (USARAF and AFRICOM).

¹⁶ *Idem*, Field Manual 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2010, p. 2-1. FM 4-94 has been re-categorized/superseded. See *Idem*, ATP 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2013, p. 2-1.

¹⁷ ATP 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, p. 2-20.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-24 to 2-26.

¹⁹ "United States Army Materiel Command Home Page," available from www.army.mil/amc/, accessed on March 14, 2014.

²⁰ ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment*, p. 2-5.

²¹ FM 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, p. 1-8, now in ATP 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, p. 1-6.

²² ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment*, p. 2-6.

²³ *Idem*, Army Techniques Publication 4-91, *Army Field Support Brigade*, with Change 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2013, p. 1-3.

²⁴ FM 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, p. 1-8, now in ATP 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, p. 1-6.

²⁵ ATP 4-91, *Army Field Support Brigade*, p. 1-2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 2-3 to 2-4. Admittedly, the statement "deployable TDA" is an anomaly.

²⁷ Ibid., 2-5, 2-6.

²⁸ *Idem*, Field Manual 4-92, *Contracting Support Brigade*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2010, p. 1-1.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 1-1 through 1-2; "U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting Command Home Page," available from www.army.mil/ecc/, accessed on March 5, 2014.

³⁰ FM 4-92, *Contracting Support Brigade*, pp. 1-1 to 1-2.

³¹ Ibid., p. 3-6.

³² Dennis L. Via, "AMC Support to COCOMs," Slide #17, Briefing at the Pentagon, Washington, DC, January 14, 2014.

³³ Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-35.1, *Army Prepositioned Operations*, Washington, DC; U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2008, p. 1-2.

³⁴ Mona R. Henry Bennett, "Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Overview," Slide #31, Briefing at Redstone Arsenal, AL, October 17, 2013.

³⁵ "The United States Army Stand-To Page," available from www.army.mil/standto/archive_2014-01-27/, accessed on March 14, 2014.

³⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Memorandum 10-1*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1997, p. 2.

³⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-0, *Joint Logistics*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2013), p. D-1.

³⁸ Office of the Secretary of Defense, "DoD Executive Agent," available from www.dod-executiveagent.osd.mil/, accessed on March 29, 2014.

³⁹ ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment*, p. 2-15.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 2-2.

⁴¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2011, p. III-2.

⁴² Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 4-0, *Sustainment*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2012, p. iii.

⁴³ Robert B. Brown and William B. Garrett, "Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Army Southern European Task Force/U.S. Army Africa Regarding Title 10 § USC 3013 Component Support," October 1, 2010.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Christopher Huggins, AFRICOM G-4, e-mail message to the office of the DA G-4, October 29, 2013.

⁴⁶ Larry D. Wyche, "Army 2020 and Beyond Sustainment White Paper," Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, VA, August 30, 2013, pp. 15-16.

⁴⁷ Henry Bennett, "Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Overview," Slide # 21.

⁴⁸ Wyche, "Army 2020 and Beyond Sustainment White Paper," p. 15.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ See Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-96, *Brigade Combat Team*, when published, for specific details.

RAF and Protection Warfighting Function

Colonel Anthony J. Healey and John A. Bonin, Ph.D.

Through regional alignment, the Army will maintain its warfighting skills and complement these skills with language, regional expertise and cultural training.

—General Raymond Odierno¹

As the United States concludes the second of two major conflicts within a twelve year period, military leaders are reflecting on lessons learned, looking inward, analyzing recent innovations, and reviewing strategy in order to enhance and codify the nation's war-fighting capabilities. They are preparing for future conflicts in a rapidly changing global environment by scrutinizing equipment, doctrine, force structure, personnel, and related military systems.

The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Raymond Odierno, recently implemented the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept execution order (December 2012), which lays out the Army's strategy to support the joint force in the future operational environment. This concept provides combatant commanders (CCDRs) with tailored, responsive and consistently available Army forces, including joint task force (JTF) headquarters to respond to emerging global challenges.² Regionally Aligned Forces provide the CCDR with land forces for a variety of missions as set forth in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) in accord with the National Security Strategy (NSS).

RAF is a fresh concept for providing resources for the CCDR. The question is, however: do RAFs provide CCDRs with the best means for executing strategy in the 21st century? Continued analysis, after-action reports, and further research are warranted. This report examines one of six warfighting functions (Wffs)—Protection—to determine if RAF provides appropriate capability. Challenges and risks associated with Protection are identified using the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) problem-solving construct. This essay describes the post-9/11 environment, shows how forces will be regionally aligned, and elaborates on the Wff of Protection. The Army Service Component Command (ASCC), corps, division, and brigade levels are analyzed to identify potential capability gaps in Protection. Finally, the DOTMLPF analysis is applied to optimize the operational assets necessary to assure the protection requirements needed by CCDRs.

Background

The 21st century strategic environment poses an array of complicated challenges. Challenges include smaller conflicts, rather than large-state wars, engagements with smaller nation states with high-tech militaries, encounters with non-state actors, and possibly interventions into internal conflicts. Global challenges include boundary disputes, social and ethnic inequality, economic competition and instability, cyber warfare, world health issues, water disputes, and the impact of climate change on an increasingly multi-polar world. Twenty-first century war will exist when any state or a group, including non-state actors, employs lethal force against an opposing entity to achieve an objective.³ As General Rupert Smith asserts, however, the days of "war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs no longer exists." But conflict, confrontation, and

combat will continue.⁴ The Department of Defense Joint Publication 1 acknowledges that the strategic security environment will increasingly be “characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict.”⁵

This new global environment is fraught with challenges. It presents national security threats from state and non-state actors; international alliances is replete with changing national societies and cultures, federal budget constraints, and a socially-networked public. Further complications derive from a bi-partisan U.S. federal government with no common domestic or global strategic vision and, moreover, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that often complicate global issues. “Despite NGOs good intentions. For all their strengths, NGOs are special interests. The best of them . . . often suffer from tunnel vision, judging every public act by how it affects their particular interest.”⁶ Within a CCDR’s AOR, NGOs are not aligned with national visions of stability and prosperity. NGO’s efforts sometimes inhibit progress and sometimes deliver overlapping and redundant programs. Additionally, as the United States is more than ever closely tied and rapidly interconnected to all world actors and events, every issue is complicated. Globalization and the information revolution are major catalysts for rapid change.⁷ T. Owen Jacobs sees the environment as filled with “volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity” a strategic environment succinctly characterized by the acronym VUCA.⁸

The President’s National Security Strategy states that “we will continue to rebalance our military capabilities . . . to address the full range of military operations.”⁹ The strategy also adjusts the nation’s long-term priorities by focusing attention and resources on a wider set of countries and challenges (including both the Asian Pacific and the Middle East).¹⁰

To execute this strategy in an increasingly complex world, the U.S. Armed Forces are seeking innovative concepts. The CJCS published the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations which proposed a “globally integrated operations” approach.¹¹ The Navy and Air Force are considering the Air-Sea Battle Concept to address anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) issues. This document is globally focused, but prioritized towards the Asia Pacific and Middle East. The CSA supports the CJCS’s vision for the Army through 2020 and beyond with a posture statement of “Prevent, Shape and Win.” To realize the intent of a Prevent, Shape and Win approach, the Army must become regionally aligned, i.e., flexibly tailored for particular missions.¹² The CSA’s RAF concept seeks to achieve the President’s strategic ends through the ways and means provided by the joint force and the several services. The G3/5/7 defines RAF as:

Regionally Aligned Forces provide the Combatant Commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. This includes Army total force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.¹³

Adopting the RAF concept entails significant concerns and challenges as doing so is a shift from the steady state and shaping operations practiced for decades.

Protection

Just how viable is the RAF's concept for providing the WfF of Protection in a JIIM environment? Does it assure the preservation and survivability of the RAF throughout the CDR's operational environment? Overall, six WfFs are designed to assist commanders. "Commanders use the warfighting functions [WfFs] to help them exercise command and to help them and their staffs exercise control" throughout planning, preparing, executing and assessing operations.¹⁴ By definition, a WfF consists of "a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and establish training objectives."¹⁵ All WfFs must synchronize scalable capabilities to provide lethal and non-lethal effects.¹⁶ The Protection WfF is defined as:

The related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States and its multinational military and civilian partners, to include the host nation. The Protection warfighting function [WfF] enables the commander to maintain the force's integrity and combat power.¹⁷

Protection is a continuing activity carried out through 13 sub-tasks: employ safety techniques; implement operations security; provide intelligence; physical security; anti-terrorism measures; law and order; survivability; health protection; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operations; explosive ordinance disposal; air and missile defense; personnel recovery; and operational area security. Successful execution of these sub-tasks assures comprehensive, integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring protection (see Figure 2).¹⁸




Figure 2. Comprehensive, Integrated, Layered, Redundant, Enduring¹⁹

The Army's WfFs nest closely with the joint functions. Just as the Army WfFs reinforce and complement one another, so do the joint functions. Joint Pub 3-0 defines the joint functions as a consolidation

of “related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate synchronize and direct joint operations.”²⁰ The joint function of Protection focuses on four primary areas: active defense measures, passive defense measures, use of technology to reduce fratricide, and emergency management and response to reduce personnel and equipment loss.²¹ The joint function of Protection consists of twelve sub-tasks. Integration and synchronization of these tasks and systems can maximize operation effectiveness (see Figure 3).

- **Provide Air and Missile Defense**
- **Protect U.S. Civilians**
- **Provide Physical Security for Forces and Means**
- **Conduct Defensive Countermeasures**
- **Provide CBRN Defense**
- **Conduct OPSEC**
- **Secure/Protect Forces, Bases, Joint Security Areas and LOCs**
- **Conduct Personnel Recovery**
- **WMD Consequence Management**
- **Establish Anti-Terrorism Programs**
- **Establish Measures to Prevent Fratricide**
- **Provide Emergency Management Response Capabilities and Services**

Figure 3. Joint Function Protection Tasks²²

Other WfFs, such as C2, Fires, Movement and Maneuver, Sustainment, Intelligence are relatively straight forward. Joint and Army doctrine codified these decades ago and together they form the basis for all military operations. Protection, however, is not as clear because it spans the other five WfFs.²³ Both the Army’s and joint force’s protection measures require coordination with the other WfFs. Providing health protection, for example, requires coordination with sustainment assets. Conducting personnel recovery operations requires coordination with movement and maneuver as well as mission command.

Emphasis of Protection

The CCCR is ultimately responsible for executing the Protection WfF responsibilities and military joint security operations in his AOR—including for all assets assigned or attached. This responsibility is established in joint publications, and the President’s Unified Command Plan. When planning and executing operations or developing campaign plans, both joint and Army publications codify joint and Army responsibility to reinforce and complement one another. Army and joint foundational doctrine is designed to prevent worst case scenarios. It applies to joint operations that are conducting combined arms maneuver (CAM) or wide area security (WAS)—operation plan phases zero through five. Joint Publication 3-10, Joint Security Operations, addresses security and protection tasks for bases, base nodes, ports, and airfields. It also focuses on joint security areas designated to facilitate protection of bases.

Staffs planned and integrated all aspects of the WfFs during operations in OIF and OEF. In these operations, units incorporated robust staffs and abundant assets. If a command identified a need for a certain capability, whether it was to enhance protection with physical security barriers, the command submitted an operational needs statement (ONS) to secure the asset. Overseas contingency operations (OCO) funds were available to resource almost any capability gaps.

As U.S. forces decrease in size and capacity, and as operations focus on steady state theater security cooperation (TSC) activities and contingency planning with reduced OCO and decreasing budgets, how can

HQs and Staffs stay focused on incorporating and synchronizing the Protection WfF tasks in order to preserve the force? Presumably, U.S. military forces will operate in and outside joint security areas; they will be required to do more with less. In this environment, opportunistic adversaries may seek to exploit gaps among our allies and partners while U.S. leaders focus on narrowing U.S. footprints abroad. The U.S. military will become smaller yet remain shaped and prepared for expeditionary operations.

To execute the RAF concept, U.S. landpower forces will use smaller, more dispersed unit footprints as they conduct TSC activities. Therefore, the Protection WfF requires greater emphasis to preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power if needed. Consider the AFRICOM example: Several actors within the AFRICOM AOR pose on-going threats to U.S. interests. The AFRICOM Commander, General David Rodriguez, claims that the “highest number of high-threats [are] to our embassies is in Africa.”²⁴ He believes that African adversaries are learning from experiences in Afghanistan how best to attack U.S. facilities.²⁵ As staffs focus on coordinating and planning steady state operations to prevent and shape the environment through TSC activities, threats persist—requiring a variety of Protection WfF considerations. AFRICOM is responsible for protecting U.S. personnel and facilities across the region, whether in CJTF-HOA joint security area of operations, or the ASCC AOR not under CJTF-HOA. During steady-state and shaping operations, Protection WfF planning and tasks necessarily increase. Additionally, small unit teams across austere and large AOs require innovative means to ensure they are appropriately protected. Once an OPLAN is executed and operational phases transition from phase 1 to 4, military efforts increase, and the emphasis on Protection WfF planning and tasks decreases as established HQs integrate Protection WfF tasks. Figure 4 depicts the relationship between the Protection WfF, steady state operations and OPLAN phases.




Figure 4. Emphasis on Protection Tasks and Planning²⁶

RAF Missions

Doing more with less is the new normal. As the armed services compete for resources in a fiscally constrained environment, the Army must find increasingly efficient ways to employ the force effectively. RAF provides CCDRs with the landpower resources needed to meet emerging regional demands. The CCDRs are

required by the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) to prepare and review theatre campaign plans (TCP).²⁷ The TCP is the CCDR's vehicle for operationalizing the theater strategy. The TCP provides a framework within which CCDRs conduct TSC activities with regional partners through cooperative security and development activities and doing so informs the theater security cooperation plan (TSCP). "U.S. forces engage in security cooperation for many reasons, not just as a preventive measure, but also more frequently to help other countries' military forces become more professional, proficient, interoperable, and reliable in burden sharing."²⁸

TSC activities through the TCP or OPLANs provide the CCDR the steady-state or phase 0 shaping operations to prevent emerging crises and help ensure strategic and operational end states.²⁹ CCDR's TCPs generate mission demands. For example, AFRICOM and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conduct hundreds of TSC activities throughout their AORs to meet TCP objectives. In order to prevent and shape the AOR, CCDR missions include TSC, crisis response, and operational support. According to JP 5-0, TSC activities consist of "military engagement, multinational combined exercises, personnel exchanges, and similar security cooperation activities in order to facilitate" partnerships.³⁰ Currently, for example, the 2d Armored brigade combat team, 1st Infantry division (2/1 ABCT) is providing a security force, response force, and is conducting numerous TSC activities in the AFRICOM AOR—no less than 108 activities during its first six months. As RAF elements deploy to conduct TSC, they can provide standard security and response force packages, providing the CCDR with emergent crisis options.

RAF will also enable CCDRs to broaden the mission to include tasks other than pure TSC. The CSA approves of flexibility, but flexibility carries added risk such as undertaking operational tasks and emerging missions that are not in the brigade's scope. Expanded missions, if any, will still require a request for forces (RFF) for SECDEF approval.³¹ The completed TCP links CCDRs ends and ways to the various forms of national strategic guidance to "prevent, shape, security and peace." In short, the CCDR can conduct security cooperation activities while employing a RAF brigade to help shape the environment and prevent unstable situations from escalating into measured conflict.

Forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations help the commander shape the security environment.³² The CJTF-HOA, for example, leverages its strategic position as a regional power projection location. CJTF-HOA coordinates with African partner nations, other coalition partners, and interagency/intergovernmental entities to achieve coordinated efforts to deter and defeat transnational threats, to protect U.S. security interests, to prevent future conflicts, and to support humanitarian and disaster relief.³³

The United States Government (USG) agency with primary responsibility for foreign nations is the Department of State (DoS).³⁴ The CCDRs provide all military resources conducting TSC to support DoS efforts in country. CCDRs conduct many and varied missions: building partner capacity and capability through mil-to-mil exercises; military engagements; security force assistance; foreign military sales; and building diplomatic relations. CCDRs must work closely with the DoS to coordinate and conduct security cooperation activities. Land forces provide the means to shape the CCDR's environment to achieve the TCP objectives. Some security cooperation activities require smaller teams across numerous countries within a large AOR. Therefore, typical RAF missions include military education, security assistance, civil affairs support, rotational military exercises and engagements, reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. General Carter Ham (a former AFRICOM commander) stated that since March 2013, 2/1 ABCT supported U.S. AFRICOM in developing enduring relationships and cooperation with partner nations' land forces. RAF engagements will likely range from small travelling contact teams to support for major exercises.³⁵ As the United States draws down from two major conflicts and the Army shifts to the RAF concept, RAF brigades deployed in support of TSC activities will be smaller and more dispersed while conducting a greater variety of missions.

With smaller unit footprints across large CCDR's AORs, the biggest challenge will be to ensure that RAFs deployed for TSC activities have an overarching umbrella of protection, especially when supporting weak nation states. As Nathan Freier argues:

Future ground forces will be vulnerable to numerous hazards in almost all operational conditions. . . . [These military] forces, hardware, and secure communications and networked information sharing will all be vulnerable to lethal and non-lethal threats. . . . Even operations in the most benign environments conducted in pursuit of purely humanitarian purposes will occur under conditions of persistent threat from a variety of challenges . . .³⁶

The CCDR and his ASCC or a joint task force are responsible to plan and coordinate the Protection WfF to ensure that the Soldiers, citizens, and partnered nations are adequately protected. Theater level HQs, like ASCCs, have the capability to coordinate the overarching Protection WfF tasks, such as air missile defense and CBRN defense operations. For remote small teams dispersed throughout a large AOR, however, ASCC level HQs and JTFs must ensure that Protection WfF tasks are incorporated into the plans and orders.

ASCC and brigade HQs should not assume Protection WfF measures are redundant. To provide adequate protection, CCDRs and DoS should coordinate plans and integrate protective measures. Responsibility for ensuring seamless transitions for protection when changing HQs must be shared between these HQs. Monitoring systems and tools within the levels of command should be established to ensure working protection systems are in place. The ASCC HQs provides the military resources to achieve TSC activities; the DoS bears the responsibility for ensuring its internal systems account for these teams. Coordination and integration of capabilities throughout the joint, inter-agency, inter-governmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment bind these organizations together so as to achieve maximum situational awareness and synchronization.

HQs Capabilities

Both joint and Army doctrine codify ways to coordinate and integrate Protection tasks. The primary difference between joint and Army doctrine is the designation of the providers of protection assets and designation of responsible protection personnel. The ASCC HQs coordinate and provide the resources for requesting subordinate HQs, such as theater air and missile defense assets in a joint operational area for a JTF. Also, Army and joint doctrine differ regarding the organizational level at which Protection tasks are coordinated and integrated. ASCC HQs, Army corps HQs and division HQs have organic Protection cells in their HQs. Army BCTs do not have Protection cells. If a JTF is stood up in a CCDR's AOR, its Protection cell is typically an afterthought during Phase 0. Instead, these HQs stand up ad hoc cells and assign personnel to coordinate functions as an additional duty. Moreover, the BCT HQs normally do not deploy during RAF missions; rather, they remain at home station planning and coordinating subordinate units for these missions. For theater steady state operations, the ASCCs are responsible for the Protection WfF. During Phase 0 in an operation or contingency plan, JTF HQs are responsible for protection of the RAF troops on the ground. Also, ASCCs and JTFs must coordinate through the DoS country teams to coordinate Protection WfF tasks. A significant challenge identified by 2/1 ABCT was the lack of interoperability of hardware, communications, and networks between the ASCCs and JTFs and small teams on the ground. For example, 2/1 ABCT small unit teams do not have satellite phones or computer reach back on secret computer servers (SIPR access).³⁷ TSC activities properly planned and resourced, with coordination across all HQ's functional cells, staffs, and the DoS country teams could identify these shortfalls and provide protection resources.

BCT Level

BCTs are the RAF's primary unit. The BCT HQs can integrate and coordinate Protection WfF tasks among staff members. But, they will be challenged as they carry out all other assigned tasks. They can quickly be over tasked as they plan and execute home station training while concurrently deploying multiple subordinate units. For example, the 2/1 ABCT commander organized subordinate units and staff to plan, prepare, and execute missions directed by the U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) while also maintaining the capability to deploy a contingency expeditionary force (CEF).³⁸

When BCTs deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the theaters were well established and after two or three years mature. HQs were available at levels from brigade to theater, augmented with service and joint staffs to plan, integrate, and execute the numerous Protection WfF tasks. Those HQs had functional systems in place that incorporated the Protection WfF into the daily operations and plans. For example, in OIF the Central Command (CENTCOM) Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) designated the commander, 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), as the joint security coordinator for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. As unit commander, Major General Harold Bromberg conducted and synchronized several protection activities, to include leading vulnerability assessments and force protection boards. Consequently, during OIF a single commander standardized, integrated, and coordinated force protection standards which were comprehensive and promoted clarity.³⁹ Additionally, ASCC and corps level HQs overlapped their explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) assets within the BCTs' AOs to coordinate and mutually support these enablers.

RAF units conducting theater security cooperation activities, crisis response, and mil-to-mil exercises tend to operate in immature and austere theaters. So the OIF enablers and organizations may not be available for RAF operations. Accordingly, ASCCs or newly established JTFs will be challenged to implement steady state or phase 0 operations. As the RAF concept matures, these challenges will be mitigated as BCTs acquire institutional knowledge of the region, build on established relationships, and incorporate interagency interoperability with the ASCC or a JTF HQs.

DOTMLPF analysis

Doctrine provides the guidance around which military organizations organize, plan, train, and fight. Doctrine drives the organization's training, material acquisition, and leadership development. Doctrinal analysis reveals the way the military conducts operations and may reveal better ways to close capability gaps.⁴⁰ An existing joint and service doctrinal basis addresses the application of Army and joint Protection functions and attendant staff organizations. Emphasis on the Protection WfF has matured since 2001. The June 2001 FM 3-0 *Operations* did not cite Protection as a Battlefield Operating System (BOS)—which identifies the physical means needed to accomplish missions. FM 3-0, however, lists Protection as an element of combat power.⁴¹

The Army recently issued Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-37 *Protection*. The ADP identifies the fundamentals and the ADRP provides elaboration of the fundamentals. Army doctrine now identifies Protection as an important WfF that must be incorporated into plans, training and execution to preserve the force and maximize operations effectiveness.⁴² ADRP 3-37 nests with ADRP 3-0 *Unified Land Operations* which describes Protection as continuing activity and a WfF, and clearly aligns this function with the joint definition of the same.

Army doctrine defines Protection and its enablers; it lists the protective tasks, which ensure systems are synchronized and integrated throughout the operations process. This new Army doctrine provides overarching guidance and a conceptual framework for explaining how the Army conducts Protection to support

commanders while conducting unified land operations. The doctrinal principles depict the Protection WfF as a layered, comprehensive, redundant, integrated and enduring activity that must be carefully planned and adequately resourced.⁴³ Consequently, the ADRP 3-37 provides a list of fourteen supporting Protection tasks incorporated throughout plans and orders. With regard to health protection, for example, the ADRP 3-37 provides specific directions and a checklist of sub-tasks to ensure appropriate health protection measures are established “to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well-being of Soldiers.”⁴⁴ Army doctrine also specifies the organization, duties, and responsibilities of Protection cells; it explains how to integrate the Protection WfF into the operations process by conforming to Protection WfF principles.

Joint Publication 3-0 *Joint Operations* and 3-10 *Joint Security Operations* provide doctrine overviews of overarching protection frameworks for the joint staff and HQs, including guidance of incorporating protection into the joint operation planning process (JOPP). Both joint and Army publications are complementary. For example, both doctrines identify supporting Protection WfF tasks that align with each other; however, ADP 3-37 identifies two additional supporting tasks: provide intelligence support and provide internment and resettlement.⁴⁵

Generally speaking, Army doctrine has a more holistic view of the Protection WfF than does joint doctrine. Additionally, Army doctrine provides a field manual for theater security cooperation. FM 3-22 explains operations in steady state and shaping environments. Joint doctrine does not specifically provide a commensurate manual to explain steady state operations. Current joint doctrine is primarily focused on preventing worst case scenarios: phased operations and contingency plans.

What is needed is a joint publication that addresses steady state operations or security cooperation. Joint Publication 3-10 *Joint Security Operations* provides a baseline for the joint environment; it specifies responsibilities, levels of threats, and techniques and procedures for managing joint security areas. The document, however, is CAM, WAS, and decisive action centric. Although this joint publication does allow joint force commanders (JFC) to establish the operational framework while providing for flexibility, it does not address TSC activities within the joint security area.⁴⁶ Joint doctrine should provide specific guidance on the full range of military operations, to include steady state operations consisting of TSC activities as well as humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

Additionally, useful doctrine should also incorporate some of the State Partnership Program (SPP) National Guard Brigades’ techniques and procedures as models. For twenty years, the 48th IBC T Georgia National Guard (NG), for example, has partnered with the country of Georgia. It has developed functional systems and working procedures for the United States Army Europe (USAREUR), the DoS Georgia Country Team, and the National Guard Bureau. Brigade liaison officers are attached to USAREUR and rotated every two years. Planners are embedded with the country team, coordinate upcoming military activities, and address force protection concerns for small teams that deploy to Georgia.⁴⁷ Improving joint doctrine will help to both acknowledge and address the challenges and capability gaps that exist in steady state activities like these.

Organizational analysis examines how the force is structured to fight at all levels: theater, corps, divisions, brigades, and others. The goal is optimal structure that will maximize unit effectiveness.⁴⁸ Three concerns exist, however. First, are corps, divisions, and BCTs HQs properly staffed to ensure that Protection WfF capabilities are integrated into the operations? Currently, corps and division HQs are designed to operate, when augmented, as single JTF HQs. They currently have authorized personnel to manage the tasks typically conducted during the past twelve years of conflict. With the new round of force structure recommendations, corps, divisions, and BCT HQs are scheduled to reduce staffs and change structure. A recommendation from the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) for organizing the Protection cell resulted in eliminating and transferring positions to the RC. A 25 percent HQs personnel reduction, currently pre-decisional,

eliminates the Protection cell and reduces the HQs staff capacity. The responsibility for the Protection WfF is now assigned to the Movement and Maneuver cell. With reduced Protection WfF expertise, HQs staff will depend on the Movement and Maneuver Cell to fully integrate and support commanders' Protection WfF requirements. This cell must support tasks to enable sustainment (i.e., general engineering and counter-IED operations) and to preserve the force (i.e., survivability, base camps, and urban search and rescue).⁴⁹ If this remains the case, then the HQ's staffs sections will not be optimally organized to execute the appropriate Protection WfF tasks. Reductions in key enablers, staff cells, and expertise reduces organizational unity of effort which, in turn, undermines the full range of military operations.

JTF HQs are usually built from a corps and division HQs organization. In standing JTF headquarters, the joint security cells are typically ad hoc, mission-set dependent, and heavily augmented for major combat operations. However, they are not usually manned for steady state or phase zero operations. The number of tasks, requirements, and oversight do not change with the type of mission—whether it is security cooperation activities or decisive action. Protection cells, joint security cells, even protection working groups continuously monitor and evaluate the ongoing functions. Requirements to incorporate the Protection WfF for RAF and SPP units across the CCDR's AOR remain. Any reorganization of the Protection cells that mandates reduction in the HQs staff weakens the commander's flexibility and capability to protect the force.

A second concern is that BCTs lose their military police (MP) platoons in 2014, leaving the BCTs with no MP enablers. This loss reduces the BCTs' capability to conduct supporting Protection WfF tasks, specifically enforcement and internment. While this loss can be mitigated with the additional BCT maneuver battalion, reliance on maneuver battalions for law enforcement will detract from their capability to conduct core maneuver tasks.

The third concern is that the proponent for EOD is organized to support the Sustainment WfF. EOD should be aligned under the Protection WfF proponent in the MSCoE. Most EOD core tasks support Protection WfF tasks; for example, providing explosive ordnance disposal support is a Protection WfF supporting task. Aligning the EOD proponent under the MSCoE ensures unity of effort and provides a direct line of communications, eliminating the need for complex coordination among multiple centers.

The elimination of HQs Protection cells in corps and divisions, the loss of IBCT's MPs, and misaligned proponents pose considerable risk. Such losses will weaken IBCTs' capacity while complicating staff functions to integrate Protection into operations. Furthermore, division HQs have no brigade level organizations to draw upon to compensate for these losses. CBRN, MP, and engineer (EN) functional brigades are not associated or aligned with the divisions, unlike the sustainment and fires brigades.

During downsizing, the Army must make the right bill-payer choices for future Army capabilities. Cutting MP, Air Defense, CBRN, Engineers, and Aviation personnel in headquarter staffs, thus eliminating Protection cells—all Protection enablers—will lead to gaps in planning and integrating the Protection WfF and systems necessary to preserve combat power on the ground.

The Army should align Reserve Component maneuver enhancement brigades (MEBs) with CCDRs or Army divisions. MEBs can augment ASCC and JTFs HQs with those MP, Engineer, Aviation, and Air Defense (ADA) staff enablers for six-month rotations. MEB augmentees enhance these HQs to provide the proper emphasis on the Protection WfF and compensate for reduced staff positions. MEBs could be aligned to a division and provide this resource in the absence of the 25 percent reduction. The MEB is indispensable to the current force; it provides focused protection and assures mobility for the supported commander. Normally MEBs operate in support of divisions, but MEBs can support corps and higher level commands. The Reserve Component must plan carefully to provide the MEBs with appropriate timelines and predictability to train, fund, and deploy.

The Army should deploy small corps and division Protection cells to the ASCC or JTF HQs for six month rotations to augment these staffs. This augmentation cell would come from the corps/division HQs aligned with the CCDR, and it would include MP, ADA, Aviation, and CBRN personnel. Even the RAF BCT could augment some of its HQs personnel to support its organic deployed units. This provides a couple of advantages. First, it is cost effective since augmenting the Protection WfF assets to assist the ASCC or JTF HQs is more economical than providing additional HQs. Second, these augmentees are trained protection cell personnel from the organic RAF home station, so ad-hoc cells are not needed. These augmentees have a relationship and established ties with the RAF elements down range. This linkage facilitates home station reach back for any coordination. Additionally, they can serve as a liaison team for both the forward HQs and home station BCT.

Finally, the Army and MP proponent should conduct further analysis on the elimination of MPs from the BCTs. The MSCoE Protection proponent declares MP support to the BCTs will be provided from the echelon above Brigades (EAB) force pool. Also, a revised doctrinal rule of allocation (ROA) provides an MP company to support each committed BCT in phases I-III, and one MP company plus one MP platoon in phase IV.⁵⁰ Under this concept, there are not enough AC MP units to support this proposal, and the MP proponent is looking for a RC solution.⁵¹ This is a vital Protection WfF asset and enabler for BCTs throughout all operational phases including steady state and shaping operations; an asset that needs to be preserved.

Training analysis is concerned with how to prepare forces to operate from the individual level through advanced collective levels, including during joint exercises, while seeking techniques to offset capability gaps.⁵² Units struggle to properly and appropriately train their Soldiers who deploy to the regionally aligned areas. Detailed country clearance and deployment checklists and training requirements are required for small units and individual Soldiers. There is a large onus on the BCT HQs to ensure Soldiers are thoroughly and diligently prepared for deployments. Sufficient time must be allocated to complete force protection checklists.

Lessons learned from 2/1 ABCT should be leveraged. RAF units, for example, should leverage country teams for expertise to gain a situational understanding of country security. RAF units should coordinate early and often with country teams to determine alert procedures of deployed RAF teams when significant changes in the security environment are noted.⁵³ Last, the MSCoE should consider increasing Protection WfF educational opportunities that focus on Protection WfF tasks for RAF personnel. For example, MP courses may introduce students to a country's legal system. Likewise, survival training schools offered by the Special Forces Warfare Center and School can sharpen a Soldiers' survivability skills.

Materiel analysis examines the systems and equipment needed by the force to optimize operational effectiveness. Through recommended acquisitions, it also seeks to eliminate capability gaps. Likewise, inadequate or antiquated systems should be replaced.⁵⁴ The 2/1 ABCT after action-report indicated that small unit teams had limited communication capability and were unable to communicate with higher echelons. Additionally, the African theater lacks communications infrastructure in many areas where the brigade personnel and teams were dispatched. Most RAF teams were dependent on civilian cell phones and hotel internet. Force protection considerations, cyber threats, and large physical security factors strongly justify the Army's investment in appropriate communications capability.⁵⁵

AFRICOM is an austere environment, and the RAF BCT MTOEs do not support robust secure communications to sustain numerous small teams that deploy separately while operating within a large AOR. These units should have access to SOF type communications equipment. RAF missions should be augmented with portable satellite communications to provide reliable communications either organic to regionally aligned BCTs or resourced to the small teams by the ASCC HQs.⁵⁶ Additionally, some off the shelf commercial

technology might serve well to enhance accountability, reporting, and communications with country teams or higher HQs.

Leadership and education analysis examines overall professional development across the entire rank structure and seeks new solutions to eliminate capability gaps.⁵⁷ The leadership and education of personnel is adequate to implement the RAF concept and assure the Protection WfF. A large part of educating leaders and Soldiers involves learning the culture, regional expertise and language (CREL) to understand the RAF environment and area of operations. A great example is 2/1 ABCT's Dagger University. To further prepare for specific, assigned RAF missions, 2/1 ABCT created a brigade-level training program to fulfill a myriad of Army, FORSCOM, and USARAF deployment and training requirements. The Dagger University program is offered monthly to prepare for upcoming training missions and incorporates all pre-deployment tasks.⁵⁸ Dagger University enables Soldiers/students to understand the threat. The BCT can tailor the university to any regionally aligned AO. It enhances the Protection WfF for the individual Soldier and small deploying units. Students receive specialized information about insurgencies in briefings tailored to the region. Additionally, information, briefings, and updates from ASCC HQs, JTF HQs and the regional security officer (RSO) modified the force protection measures to address differing conditions. 2/1 ABCT contacted the Department of State RSO to determine additional threat and force protection measures.⁵⁹ RAF BCTs should establish their own educational protocol, possibly modeled after Dagger University.

Personnel analysis considers the availability of qualified people for the complete range of military operations.⁶⁰ Proposals for personnel reductions are currently being staffed and recommended in corps, divisions and BCT HQs. Impending reductions will impact the HQs staff cells and enablers. Corps HQs' loss of 21 positions, division HQs' loss of 14 positions, and BCT HQs' loss of the MP platoon all add up to less capability to integrate the Protection WfF tasks and systems into future operations. The proposed reductions would eliminate 40 percent in maneuver support and protection positions in the division HQs. Such a reduction far exceeds the aggregate 25 percent goal across all HQs. The single most important component of Army organizations is personnel. Proposed reductions include creating a dual-hatted Provost Marshall additionally serving as the Protection cell chief in both corps and division HQs and eliminating or consolidating some engineering positions. In order to protect the force, the Army must find the right balance of personnel and capability while accommodating mandated downsizing.

Reducing protection enablers could pose risk to many future steady state operations as the Army transitions to the RAF concept. Organizations outside RAF units may be called upon to support RAF missions. Tasking and matching Protection WfF enablers from the RC and other functional brigades to build ad hoc teams at the brigade-and-below level does not assure unity of effort.

The Reserve Component MEBs should be aligned with regionally aligned divisions. MEB HQs have sufficient staff assets and equipment to provide and integrate the Protection WfF. Aligned MEBs can augment ASCCs or JTF HQs with a robust joint security cell. This cell could be tailored and packaged to meet the needs of the augmented HQs. The MEB staff could rotate every six months and provide augmentees to the JTF HQs. Or, alternatively, it could provide augmentation to the aligned region's ASCC HQs. Additionally, it could regionally align permanently with that CCDRs AOR, thereby providing continuity for the MEB.

Facilities analysis is concerned with installations, military property, and related industrial facilities critical to force readiness and seeks to determine how facilities can be better utilized.⁶¹ Current facilities are adequate to assure the viability of the RAF concept within the Protection WfF. However, while outside the remit of this study, host nation facilities do affect the protection of U.S. forces and should continue to be carefully considered during RAF planning and execution.

Conclusion

The RAF concept is viable from a Protection perspective. Many relevant systems are in place and these systems will continue to improve, so that ASCC CDRs and JFCs will be able to conduct Protection. ASCC HQs have some overarching regional assets to ensure Protection (such as Air Missile Defense and Cyber Cells).

Integrating and focusing TSC activities and SPPs successes into the foundational doctrine remains a concern, however. This can be done through analyzing 2/1 ABCT after-action reviews that address Protection. Small units should have SOF-type communications packages. Additionally, BCTs should build appropriate education platforms and leverage Army training opportunities that address Protection skills. MEBs should align with CCDRs and divisions to provide opportunities to deploy division and BCT staff Protection enablers to enhance ASCC and JTF HQs. This initiative will assure effective Protection for the landpower forces. If the preponderance of future missions are executed in steady state and shaping operations, they will mostly participate in theater security cooperation activities aligned with the CCDRs theater campaign plan. Therefore, RAF units must emphasize thorough planning, synchronization, and integration of the Protection WfF. The more HQ staffs are resourced, the better they can focus on Protection at all levels for any type of operation. And, importantly, they are better prepared to leverage resources in a timely manner to ensure safety and security within the AOR. Carefully developed, integrated, synchronized Protection WfF plans for joint operations within the JIIM environment will help mitigate emerging crises while preserving combat power.

Notes

¹ Raymond Odierno, "2013 Army Posture Statement," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 5.

² John F. Campbell, Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7, Execute Order to Regionally Aligned Forces, 27 December 2012.

³ Brett W. Andersen, *Clausewitz's continued relevance and foundation for educating critical thinking skills*, Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 22, 2012, p. 6.

⁴ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, New York: Random House, 2005, p. 3.

⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013, p. I-10.

⁶ Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 1 January/February 1997, p. 55.

⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Joint Operating Environment 2013*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March, 2013, p. 2.

⁸ Stephen J. Gerras, ed., *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 3rd ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA: U. S. Army War College, 2010, p. 10.

⁹ Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010, 14.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 9.

¹¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2012, p. 1-8.

¹² John M. McHugh and General Raymond Odierno, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1992, p. 5.

¹³ James L. Huggins, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, HQDA G3/5/7, "FRAGO 1 to the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) EXORD," Washington, DC, HQDA, October 17, 2013, p. O-3.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 16, 2012, p. III-2.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 16, 2012, p. III-2.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. III-6.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011, p. III-29.

²⁰ Ibid., p. III-1.

²¹ Ibid.

²² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), p. III-30

²³ Major M. Matthews, "Protection Workshop," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Leonard Wood, MO, U.S. Army, January 27, 2007.

²⁴ AFRICOM: *Regionally Aligned Forces Find Their Anti-terror Mission*, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131020/SHOWSCOUT04/310200014/>, accessed January 30, 2014.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ See also U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, *Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), p. III-39.

²⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011, p. I-6.

²⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *Theater Security Cooperation*, Field Manual 3-22, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, January 22, 2013, p. 1-4.

²⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011, p. II-4.

³⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *Theater Security Cooperation*, Field Manual 3-22 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, January 22, 2013), 1-9.

³¹ U.S. Department of the Army G3/5/7, "Regional Alignment of Forces," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Washington, DC, Department of the Army, October 19, 2013.

³² Ibid., p. v.

³³ *Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa*, <http://www.hoa.africom.mil/>, accessed January 20, 2014.

³⁴ Robert J. DeSouza, *Regional Alignment of Forces, Authorities Issues with a Moving Target*, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 6, 2014, p. 17.

³⁵ Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Carter Ham, U.S. Commander Africa Command, 1 March 2012, p. 9.

³⁶ Nathan Freier, *Beyond the Last War: Balancing Ground Forces and Future Challenges Risk in USCENTCOM and USPACOM*, Washington, DC Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2013, p. 70.

³⁷ Director, U.S. Army Irregular Warfare Center COL Gus Benton, "2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Learned Report," memorandum for record, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 31, 2013.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Security Operations in the Theater*, Joint Publication 3-10, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 2, 2010, p. II-2.

⁴⁰ AcqNotes, <http://www.acqnotes.com/Acquisitions/DOTMLPF%20Analysis.html>, accessed January 30 2014.

⁴¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 14, 2001, p. 4-3.

⁴² Ibid., p. 5-15.

⁴³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Protection*, ADP 3-37, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 31, 2012, p. 7.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 1-10.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 1-3.

⁴⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Security Operations in the Theater*, Joint Publication 3-10, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 2, 2010, p. I-1.

⁴⁷ Jason Ellington, U.S. Army National Guard, Operation Officer SPP, 48th IBCT Georgia National Guard, telephone interview by author, January 30, 2014.

⁴⁸ AcqNotes, <http://www.acqnotes.com/Acquisitions/DOTMLPF%20Analysis.html>, accessed January 30, 2014.

⁴⁹ LTC Marvin L. Griffin, e-mail message to author, January 22, 2014.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ James M. Loffert, "IBCT Senior Mentor Symposium #23, Executive Summary," memorandum for IBCT Community of Purpose (CoP), Fort Bragg, NC, January 14, 2014.

⁵² AcqNotes, <http://www.acqnotes.com/Acquisitions/DOTMLPF%20Analysis.html>, accessed January 30, 2014.

⁵³ Director, U.S. Army Irregular Warfare Center COL Gus Benton, "2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Learned Report," memorandum for record, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 31, 2013.

⁵⁴ AcqNotes, <http://www.acqnotes.com/Acquisitions/DOTMLPF%20Analysis.html>, accessed January 30, 2014.

⁵⁵ Gus Benton, "2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Learned Report."

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ AcqNotes, <http://www.acqnotes.com/Acquisitions/DOTMLPF%20Analysis.html>, accessed January 30, 2014.

⁵⁸ Gus Benton, "2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Learned Report."

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ AcqNotes, <http://www.acqnotes.com/Acquisitions/DOTMLPF%20Analysis.html>, accessed January 30 2014.

⁶¹ Ibid.

RAF and SOF Integration

Colonel Scott W. Kelly and Colonel Chad A. McGowan

The United States defense community is facing an extremely challenging security environment based on factors both foreign and domestic. The country must find effective, yet efficient methods for best safeguarding national interests. To this end, the U.S. Army has begun development and implementation of the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept, while U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has done the same with its Global Special Operations Network (GSN) model. This paper will examine these initiatives and propose several recommendations for both the Army and USSOCOM that could quickly and significantly improve the cumulative, synergistic value of these efforts. In the current and projected security environment, it is essential to maximize the effectiveness of the RAF and GSN concepts.

The Global Security Environment

“The decline of the state and political order is only inevitable (and has historically been observed) after the breakdown of any preceding empire and any kind of preceding world order, as happened recently following the breakdown of the former USSR and the end of the Cold War.”¹ The bi-polar world that existed after World War II effectively maintained relative peace through enforcement and balance by the two great super powers. Bi-polarity, however, is no longer the global security paradigm and consequently, the influence of tribal, ethnic, business, religious, and criminal entities has risen resulting in more chaotic and less stable security conditions.² Increasing instability is anticipated to continue, as many of the sovereign national borders in Africa and the Middle East, established during a colonial period are being contested along tribal or ethnic divisions.³ The effects of globalization significantly complicate and contribute to this destabilization of the security environment.

Globalization is the process that has exponentially increased the rate and frequency by which goods, services and information move around the world.⁴ Prosperity has significantly increased in many places with detrimental consequences in others. Conflict and tension have increased as various cultures and values collide. Nations that previously would have had minimal mutual contact are now directly connected. People feel dissatisfied and sometimes threatened as their exposure to other ways of life and standards of living increases, yet remains outside their control.⁵

Additionally, globalization has interconnected the world in such a way that an event or decision on one side of the globe can significantly impact another part of the world. Globalization has little regard for the traditional notion of borders or entry points; globalization is simply too pervasive for any nation-state to fully resist. Another exacerbating factor of globalization is the speed with which the world moves. Effects and changes now occur at a staggering rate. These conditions can become security issues as state and non-state actors begin to identify and employ globalization as an instrument to achieve their own interests. Globalization will continue to affect trends and patterns worldwide and generate increasing security challenges.

The increasing complexity of the security environment is compounded by dire economic conditions. Financially, the U.S. is not as strong as it once was. While there is evidence of growth in the economy, the

growing amount of national debt poses a genuine security threat with no tangible plan for bringing it under control for at least a decade.⁶ The fiscal situation is driving the DoD along with other executive departments, to make deep, substantive budget cuts. The U.S. cannot afford its current security expenditures. The directed level of cuts is forcing our military to reexamine its strategy for safeguarding the nation while simultaneously recovering from two major wars.

The U.S. is emerging from more than a decade of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, two conflicts that placed significant demands on the military's ground forces in terms of both operational tempo and mission complexity. At best, both of these operations will be viewed as marginally successful and at worst, as having contributed directly and significantly to the decay in U.S. power due to over expenditure of national resources. Regardless, the effect on the U.S. public has generated an attitude of war weariness. The nation seeks a less adventurous foreign policy, with a decreasing use of military forces and a renewed focus on economic conditions at home.⁷ While this idea is appealing, the U.S. will struggle to maintain its national interests around the globe if it retrenches, particularly as the established world order faces tremendous threats.

National security experts recognize that the nation must pursue the smart application of its military capabilities in coordination with the other instruments of national power. Recently at an Aspen Institute forum, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy remarked:

When America comes out of a period of war, we are tempted to turn inward as isolationist impulses assert themselves. When I look at the world, I see problems for which it's difficult to imagine solutions without an international response.⁸

In spite of the U.S. population seeking retrenchment and more isolationist foreign policy, the United States Government (USG) has recognized the need to remain engaged around the world in order to protect the nation and its interests. Acknowledging the interconnectedness of the global community of state and non-state actors makes it unrealistic for any country to isolate itself from the world without experiencing significant risks to its own well-being. This interconnectedness is particularly true for the U.S. as a global super-power with economic interests in all regions of the world. While public opinion may force political decisions to reduce the scope and scale of foreign military operations, the nation's armed forces will remain essential to shaping and preventing conflict, as well as furthering U.S. interests overseas. The continued need for strong, engaged armed forces remains clear based on guidance from the nation's senior leaders.

Security Cooperation is defined in Joint doctrine as:

All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.⁹

This is an integral mission for the military. That security cooperation is tasked to combatant commanders (CCDR) from the highest level of the USG is recognition that recurring and continual engagement with other military forces around the world is vital to our nation's security.

Engaging with foreign military elements has been essential to military operations over the last two decades. This conclusion was advanced in a study by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) division of the Joint Staff (JS) J-7, charged with evaluating the last decade of war. The purpose of the study was to inform the joint force development cycle about how to build a more responsive, versatile and affordable military. This study summarized 11 strategic themes after examining a wide range of operations including:

conventional warfare, counter insurgency, humanitarian assistance, defense support to civil authorities and counter-terrorism (CT).¹⁰

One of the key themes identified was coalition operations and the significant benefits that the country gains through such activities. The JCOA made several key recommendations on how to ensure the military is appropriately postured and prepared to execute future operations. An essential finding was that the military needed to increase engagement and training with key potential partners in order to build relationships and opportunities for influence. The JCOA report highlighted specifically theater security cooperation (TSC) activities as a viable way to achieve such partnerships.¹¹ The need to build military-to-military relationships was a common finding across several JCOA themes, including host nation partnering, building partner capacity, understanding the environment, which incorporated leveraging forward presence, as well as the significance of improving language capabilities and cultural proficiency.¹²

Senior defense officials have recognized how critical cultural understanding is to military operations. Most recently, the CJCS directed the establishment of an Asia-Pacific Hands Program. Growing out of the identified success of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program for Operation Enduring Freedom, the Asia-Pacific Hands Program will develop “regionally attuned command-line officers” through deliberate educational opportunities, assignments and regional experiences.¹³ Currently, aside from foreign area officers and linguists, only special operations forces (SOF) under USSOCOM possesses apt cultural expertise and language capabilities. The need for such capabilities is reflected in efforts to expand that command in scope and authorities.

USSOCOM’s Global SOF Network (GSN)

USSOCOM is currently the global SOF provider and also responsible for synchronizing the planning for global CT operations in the functional combatant commander role. Additionally, as the DoD designated lead for security force assistance, USSOCOM has a synchronizing responsibility for the planning of global training and assistance efforts. To accomplish these responsibilities, the command is comprised of a 4-star headquarters located in Tampa, along with service components in various continental U.S. locations. Of note, the theater special operations commands (TSOCs), previously assigned to the GCCs, were recently assigned to USSOCOM, which now assumes responsibility to organize, train and equip these elements. While USSOCOM will assume combatant command (COCOM) for the TSOCs, they will remain under the operational control (OPCON) of the designated GCCs as the SOF component command for each region. More significant, however, are the increased authorities provided to USSOCOM; shouldering the responsibility for deploying and, when directed, employing SOF globally with the approval of the GCCs.¹⁴ These changes reflect recognition by national security leaders that the future global security environment will be chaotic and complex. In response, USSOCOM is attempting to develop more anticipatory and preventive mechanisms for managing security issues as described in the command’s Global Special Operations Forces Campaign Plan (GCP-SOF).

The GCP-SOF’s mission reads:

USSOCOM provides trained, equipped, ready, and regionally aligned SOF in support of GCCs, and leverages the whole of government, allies, and partners, to conduct sustained special operations as part of a broader strategy to eliminate threats to U.S. interests and protect the American people.¹⁵

Four Lines of Effort are detailed: 1) Persistent Focused Alignment, 2) TSOC Command and Control Capability, 3) Whole of Government unity of effort, and 4) International Cooperation Framework. By these efforts,

USSOCOM seeks to address persistent instability with persistent engagement through developing a Global SOF Network (GSN).¹⁶

GSN is a key component of SOF being more responsive, more flexible and better prepared for a wider range of missions. The network consists of: USSOCOM headquarters and its service components, the regional TSOCs, interagency and allied partnerships that include the International SOF Coordination Center (ISCC) and Regional SOF Coordination Centers (RSCCs). The plan also increases USSOCOM's presence within the National Capital Region (NCR) in order to deepen the connectivity to the USG interagency through establishing a USSOCOM-NCR organization.¹⁷

The ISCC and RSCCs would be new organizations within the command. The ISCC is a cell located at Tampa comprised of senior SOF representatives from allied and partnered nations. The concept is to facilitate cooperation among international SOF organizations to more effectively prevent security issues and/or respond more rapidly and appropriately once a challenge has emerged. While the ISCC will have no C2 authority or responsibility, it will provide a venue for close coordination among various allied SOF. Of special significance will be ISCC use of a classified information technology network that allows for rapid information sharing among members at the appropriate classification level. The capability for two-way secure communication among the diverse nations' SOF will greatly facilitate collaboration. USSOCOM intends to have U.S. interagency participation within the ISCC from the various organizations of the USG that have security-related expertise and assets. If approved, this structure will move the country closer to a whole-of-government approach for managing security issues.¹⁸

The RSCCs are also envisioned to be a part of this GSN designed to "provide geographic combatant commanders and chiefs of mission with an unprecedented unity of effort and an enhanced ability to respond to regional contingencies and threats to stability." The RSCC will mirror the ISCC located in Tampa, but with a particular regional focus of efforts and membership. The concept seeks to ensure regional issues do not grow into larger theater problems that would demand larger expenditures of national resources.¹⁹ In addition to these organizations, USSOCOM is requesting other infrastructure growth as part of the GCP-SOF.

In light of USSOCOM receiving COCOM of the TSOCs, the command is proposing significant growth in size, capabilities, and functions for the TSOCs. The GCP-SOF conceives of the TSOCs as the operational hub for SOF efforts within the GCCs. The initial capabilities document identifies three capability gaps that currently exist within each of the regional TSOCs. Specifically, the ICD maintains that the TSOCs must be able to function as the core of a joint task force (JTF) Headquarters (HQ), execute distributed C2, and manage information across different organizations. Each of these capabilities will require growth in manpower, facilities and communication architecture.²⁰ Unfortunately, these required enhancements come at a time of constricting budgetary conditions for the DoD.

This fiscal reality is reflected in guidance from the Vice CJCS in response to the proposed GSN concept, which reads:

Per CJCS PLANORD dated 19 April 2013, the GSN must fully reflect likely resource constraints and maximize the use of existing infrastructure. At a minimum, it must be cost-neutral and offer scalable options under reduced costs and force structure.²¹

More significant is the initial response from the legislative branch. Congressional analysis has expressed real concern with USSOCOM being able to achieve such bold expansion even under "normal" budgetary conditions, let alone in an increasingly restrictive budgetary environment. Specific areas mentioned by the Congressional Research Service were the growth of USSOCOM-NCR, the TSOCs, and the RSCCs. Additionally, since USSOCOM receives manpower from the services, the proposed growth in personnel to

achieve the GSN will be challenging as all the military Services are expected to drawdown. The Army, being the largest contributor to USSOCOM, will take the most significant reductions in funding and has already announced a 25 percent reduction in Army 2-star HQs and above.²² However, like USSOCOM, the Army is also attempting to reorganize itself to meet challenges associated with global security environment.

U.S. Army Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF)

The Army recognizes the current and future security environment as one of persistent instability and conflict.

The strategic and operational environments are driving the United States and its allies and friends, toward an emphasis on shaping missions in unstable regions in addition to preparing for existential threats. We anticipate an expanding range of smaller, shorter, rapidly changing missions.²³

As the bulk of land-component forces of the joint force, the Army is attempting to equip, train and organize its forces to better meet CCDRs' requirements. A central component is the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept, the purpose of which is to increase the quality and quantity of Army capabilities provided to the combatant commanders. The latest definition for RAF from a Department of the Army Fragmentary Order dated October 17, 2013 states:

Regionally Aligned Forces provide the Combatant Commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities Service retained, CCMD aligned and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. Includes Army total force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including reach-back; and prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.²⁴

RAF is a new model for training, deploying and employing Army forces in support of CCDRs requirements. As such, the Army is developing new processes and methods for execution. Currently, all Army elements within the operational force will fall into one of three categories: 1) *assigned*; forces that are given to the CCDRs by the SECDEF to fulfill their missions and responsibilities as directed by the Unified Command Plan (UCP), 2) *allocated* forces provided by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with SECDEF priorities to meet validated CCMD requirements, and 3) *service retained, CCMD aligned*; Army units that remain under Army service control but are aligned to CCDRs.²⁵ This final term is newly developed and not reflected in the UCP. The verbiage replaces the term "distributed" but still provides CCDRs with no directive authority over forces earmarked as aligned. The verbiage does, however, authorize a direct liaison from the RAF unit to the CCMD through the GCC's Army Service Component Command (ASCC). This connectivity assures that the RAF unit understands the requirements of its anticipated or directed missions within the AOR.²⁶

The Army foresees many benefits for the CCMDs and the joint force through the implementation of the RAF concept. These aligned units will be more regionally attuned and better prepared to meet the requirements of a theater commander. The alignment of Army elements up to and including a corps will give the CCDR another JTF-capable HQs that is focused on the region, along with the requisite established relations.

Two other benefits that the Army envisions are providing a cost effective option for achieving theatre campaign plan objectives and having responsive planning support for the CCMD as needed.²⁷ While the Army anticipates many benefits, managing and executing such a new concept comes with many challenges. Consequently, the institutional Army is adjusting to meet this new requirement.

The Army, through Forces Command (FORSCOM), uses the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model in order to ensure it provides appropriately trained, equipped and manned forces at the required time to achieve directed missions. This process had to be tightly managed during the last twelve years of war as brigade combat teams (BCTs) were in extremely high demand, a wide array of new equipment and capabilities were being fielded, and requirements in theater changed regularly. During this wartime period, the Army used a three-year cycle to take a unit through resetting, preparation and then deployment. With the RAF concept, ARFORGEN is being adjusted to a two-year cycle for Active Component forces comprising one-year of *Reset, Train/Ready* and one-year of *Available*. Reserve Component forces will execute a five-year ARFORGEN cycle.²⁸

The intent of the ARFORGEN cycle is to bring BCTs to the highest level of readiness (C-1) as well as provide them initial region specific training during the first year. The second year, *Available*, will contain more robust regional training tailored to specific requirements, as well as that period during which the BCT is prepared to deploy elements in support of a CDRs TSC activities, bilateral / multilateral military exercises, or for operational missions.²⁹ A BCT will depend on external support to train for the regional nuances and culture of their aligned AOR.

The 2/1 Armor brigade combat team (ABCT) was the first Army unit to execute the RAF concept. Their baseline, foundational training was to achieve mission essential task list proficiency for decisive action culminating in a successful rotation to the National Training Center. Additionally, however, the brigade worked on developing their culture, regional expertise and language (CREL) capability. This required the brigade to tap into several different organizations outside their formation. Such organizations included the 162nd Infantry Brigade (Ft. Polk, LA), the Naval Post-Graduate School, Kansas State University, the Asymmetric Warfare Group, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute.³⁰ The unit established a robust and formalized training methodology for instructing Soldiers in CREL that they called 'Dagger University.' This 'university' exposed leaders and Soldiers to recurring sessions familiarizing them with history, culture, religion, geography, economy, governance, security capacity/threats, tribal factors, engagements, media operations, negotiations and the use of interpreters. The brigade was able to successfully develop relationships with various subject matter experts from a range of organizations who could best prepare the deploying Soldiers for the RAF mission.³¹ These may not be lasting relationships for this brigade however.

The Army currently rotates the alignment of BCTs which means the next time 2/1 ABCT is a regionally aligned brigade then it may be directed towards a completely different AOR. Additionally, divisions and their habitually assigned BCTs are not regionally aligned to the same region. The 1st Cavalry Division began preparing for the RAF mission in the fall of 2013. The division itself will be aligned to U.S. Central Command in the Middle East. The 1st BCT will be the RAF in the European Command AOR, while the 3rd Brigade will align to the U.S. Pacific Command.³² This construct will generate inefficiencies in home-station training as well as preclude unity of effort.

Recommendations

Both the Army and USSOCOM are attempting to implement change in order to better provide for national security while the DoD is experiencing tremendous budgetary pressures. Recommendations for improving both the RAF and GSN concepts include areas where greater synergy is needed. A DOTMLPF-P

analysis can assist in framing the recommendations. DOTMLPF-P, an acronym used to denote a method for evaluating potential changes in the joint force, stands for: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).

Doctrine refers to the fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective.³³ TRADOC serves as the Army's doctrinal hub although each basic branch maintains a 'center of excellence' that facilitates the development and proliferation of their specific war-fighting principles. Additionally, USSOCOM has the J-7/9 Directorate of Training, Doctrine and Capability Development that serves in this capacity for its mission. Three changes in doctrine will improve the overall effectiveness of the military's GSN and RAF initiatives.

Addressing conventional force (CF) and special operations interoperability is the first needed doctrine change. Military interoperability has improved significantly over the last decade, but unless the lessons learned are incorporated into doctrine, they could well be lost. Coordination measures, task organization structures and C2 constructs must be included. Additionally, each element must address deployment and employment tactics, techniques, and procedures within the other's doctrine. Increasing awareness of the points of interdependence between CF and SOF elements for success in the complex security and budgetary environment is imperative. Improving interoperability will significantly improve the implementation of the GSN and RAF models.

The second recommendation under *doctrine* is to institutionalize the concept of the human domain. The ability to understand peoples, culture, tribal affiliations, customs, religion, and sources of power, is essential to effective military operations. We have learned that over the last two decades. The recent Army effort to establish a 7th Warfighting function, *Engagement*, with Army SOF as its proponent, is critical to enhancing sensitivity to the significance of influence in the human domain. The idea of engagement is a needed addition in doctrine as it addresses an essential aspect of modern war fighting. Formalizing the construct within doctrine will undergird the human domain and assist both RAF and SOF operations in support of GCCs.

A final area that needs to be addressed in *doctrine* is capturing both the RAF and GSN concepts within service doctrines. While both are emerging models, the Army and USSOCOM need to ensure that best practices, roles, missions and methods are captured. It is essential to institutionalize these concepts accurately throughout the Army, SOF and joint force in order to achieve greater collaborative effects.

The military defines *organization* as a unit or element with varied functions enabled by a structure through which individuals cooperate systematically to accomplish a common mission and directly provide or support joint warfighting capabilities.³⁴ Three aspects of organization are addressed: 1) culture, 2) assigning of forces, and 3) directed duties and responsibilities for CCDR subordinate commands. USSOCOM and the Army must change their cultures if the RAF and GSN concepts are to achieve optimal effectiveness.

The Army must recognize it stands at a transition that represents a tremendous opportunity for the service. The significant external factors that are forcing changes provide a rare period when the institution can make substantive and lasting adjustments in its culture to achieve a more capable Army. In the current culture, the Active Component (AC) BCT is viewed as the standard of measure for the service. Unfortunately, this downplays the bulk of Army capabilities. The Army needs to recognize that the most critical functions are outside the BCT to include cyber, missile defense, logistics and mission command; these capabilities are essential to the joint fight. This recognition can be advanced in the RAF concept by highlighting capabilities the Army can provide from outside the BCT. The Reserve Component (RC) is also a large part of this restructured vision.

The Army must continue efforts to change the Service's cultural perspective on the AC-RC dynamic. Far too much parochialism exists with the net effect of preventing a sound force mix, readiness timelines, and equipping that is needed given the current fiscal environment. Such bias is amply reflected in the public

bickering among senior Army and Army National Guard officials.³⁵ Organizing the total Army, encompassing the totality of the AC/RC, to best meet the nation's security requirements for both state governors and the joint force is imperative. This effort will require evaluating when a capability is needed in the progression to major combat operations to assure the right capability is in the right component, accurately arrayed for appropriate regional missions. Such adjustments will require deliberate effort to change the total Army culture, not only by senior leaders within each component, but also by their subordinate constituencies.

The Army must protect and promote the wartime culture of independent action by subordinates. Junior leaders have to be trained, encouraged and expected to effectively operate in the absence of supervision. This requirement for mission command will be critical for the successful implementation of RAF as a method for managing Army forces. The epitome of mission command, junior leaders must be selected for RAF missions based on their ability to operate independently. These leaders must think creatively and solve problems, all within the legal, moral and ethical norms of our nation and service, and do so without supervision. A culture of de-centralized execution must be fostered, trained and demanded from CF leadership.

Independent action of this type is already expected in the special operations community. SOF personnel are specially selected, trained and equipped to operate as part of a small element in remote, often hostile, environments. Unfortunately, a portion of the current GSN effort is trending away from this core aspect of SOF culture. USSOCOM is seeking to build more HQs and increase the ability to execute C2 from a distance. The SOF culture has moved towards a more professional, centrally managed and technologically dependent "service-like" institution. SOF's publicly recognized successes and corresponding growth since 9/11, has

brought Special Operations to a level similar to the rest of DoD wherein the most important priority among the hierarchy is the growth of the bureaucracy. This largely unconscious effect is to be expected; any large organization experiences it quite naturally.³⁶

USSOCOM needs to resist the temptation towards institutional entrenchment and retain the culture's *raison d'être*: small teams executing sensitive operations with little guidance and no supervision.

The most significant organizational change the Army needs to make in the RAF concept is to *assign* forces to the CCDRs rather than just aligning them. Aside from the institutional Army and the Global Response Force, all Army elements need to be assigned to a CCDR. This should be done after analysis by HQDA in conjunction with CCDRs on the appropriate capabilities (e.g., armor, infantry), force mix (e.g. AC, RC) and capacity to include a theater response force package. This evaluation should also include Army force requirements for the functional combatant commands. Assigning operational Army forces to CCDRs would negate FORSCOM's primary function as a force provider. The rest of FORSCOM's responsibilities could be assumed by HQDA, TRADOC, and the CCDRs. Reallocating these missions might allow the Army to draw down FORSCOM entirely. However, the potential exists for additional HQs reductions across the assignment of enabling elements, as well. CCDRs would assume training and readiness oversight (TRO) across the force just as European Command and Pacific Command currently exercise over their assigned forces. Additionally, HQDA and the JS would need to establish mechanisms for assuring a baseline capacity of readiness across Army capabilities within the GCCs. This analysis would mitigate the risk of assigning all Army forces to CCDRs.

The benefits of assigning forces would help to make the Army better postured, more responsive and more capable of supporting the CCDRs. While transfer authority across CCMDs would remain with the SECDEF, CCDRs could utilize their assigned forces in their own AORs under existing COCOM authorities. Currently, aligning forces does not establish any command relationship between the RAF element and the CCDR; he simply does not have the authority to direct training, deployment, and exercises. Additionally,

through assigning forces, units would cultivate deeper relationships and cultural awareness while enhancing the CCDR's capability and a more forward focused Army.

Assigning forces to CCDRs is something that USSOCOM needs to pursue as well. While most SOF elements have been regionally oriented for years, significant benefits, as noted previously, are gained by assigning SOF forces directly to the GCCs. Benefits include cost and manpower savings through closing the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC). Similar to FORSCOM, this layer of command would no longer be required. Further efficiencies would be gained as other SOF capabilities were assigned to GCCs, specifically civil affairs and military information support operations units. Additionally, having both SOF and CF assigned to the same CCDR would strengthen their operational relationships. It is imperative that the Army and USSOCOM encourage such interoperability as the DoD pursues greater efficiencies in providing for national security.

Two other organizational changes that will improve SOF/CF interdependence involve a better division of labor between theater elements. The first gains efficiencies for GSN and RAF. Rather than USSOCOM growing the TSOCs' capability to C2 and sustain SOF operations over the expanse of their AOR, the Army and USSOCOM should formalize the ASCC's responsibilities in this regard. The Army, along with the other services, has the directed requirement to provide support to SOF operations, as well as maintaining JTF capable HQs. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the benefits of 'mixed' command structures, i.e., CF elements working for SOF and vice versa. The benefit would eliminate the need to build and sustain two 'JTF-capable' HQs, both the ASCC and the TSOC.

Re-alignment of responsibilities would also capitalize on existing infrastructure and personnel, as well as protecting SOF trained operators from having to supplement TSOC staffs. Such a change would require minimal expansion of the ASCCs by establishing them as three-star or four-star JTF-ready commands. Army billets could be gained through closing down the three Army corps HQs. This would move the Army's most talented three stars forward into the GCCs. The corps' responsibilities could be divided among the divisions, TRADOC and the ASCCs in order to maximize Army capabilities under the CCDRs. Any risk associated with closing three Army corps would be mitigated by the enhanced ASCCs capabilities.

The second division of labor will create more effective implementation of RAF and GSN. The TSOCs should be designated as the supported command for planning, organizing, and coordinating all TSC activities. This directive would include a TSOC assuming OPCON of the Army's RAF elements and directing the training, validation, and management of deployments for security cooperation. Such a change would allow the TSOC to evaluate the right force for the right mission across the AOR, having the flexibility to place SOF into more sensitive areas, yet gaining economy of force through employment of CFs where appropriate. The norm would be a mixed team of SOF/CF tailored for the TSC activity or operational missions. In order for such an integrated team to be both cohesive and effective, they will need to train together during pre-deployment.

Training is the instruction of personnel to increase their capacity to perform specific military functions and associated individual and collective tasks.³⁷ SOF/CF integration has become a near routine event during the last ten plus years of war and proven to be extremely effective. USSOCOM states:

Lessons learned from Afghanistan indicated that prior to a combat rotation, units should train and integrate early to foster relationships, instill the "one team, one fight" mentality, understand each other's staff planning procedures and defuse any misconceptions or friction points. CF integration with SOF is a proven strategy and is critical to accomplishing GCC goals.³⁸

With resources becoming increasingly constrained, it will take concerted effort by the Army and USSOCOM to capitalize on potential SOF/CF training opportunities. This can be facilitated by assigning co-

located units to the same CCDR, i.e., 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) and the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, KY assigned or aligned to Central Command.

Training efficiencies can also be gained by capitalizing on the resident capabilities within each formation. CF personnel will generally need instruction on regional cultures, interagency/country team familiarization and language training. Expertise for these areas resides within the SOF community. CF units bring considerable capacity for planning, staff operations, and the execution of conventional operations. Overall effectiveness can be achieved by SOF and CF through deliberate, habitual, and fully cooperative joint training.

Materiel refers to all necessary to equip, operate, maintain and support joint military activities (without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes).³⁹ While common within SOF, communications equipment for use by small RAF teams in more remote environments has yet to be authorized by the Army. Satellite communications and systems that ride a commercial network will be required. Enhanced communication capabilities will be required to facilitate coordination, support, and assistance for CF elements. Ensuring communication systems are interoperable with SOF in the specified region is essential.

To further increase the interdependency between CF and SOF, USSOCOM should implement tighter restrictions on its use of Major Force Program (MFP) 11 funds. MFP-11 is the funding mechanism that USSOCOM has developed to acquire special operations-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies and services. Congress has expressed concern with the possibility that use of MFP-11 funds will expand beyond its intended purpose. Legislators are exercising greater scrutiny over these dollars to prevent waste and/or inefficiencies.⁴⁰ Fortunately, the more USSOCOM is reliant upon the military services, the more interdependence is achieved between SOF and CF. USSOCOM, to the greatest extent possible, should capitalize on any equipment or service that can be acquired through any military department. While increasing interoperability is important for material solutions, it is particularly salient for the professional military education (PME) system.

Leadership and education is the product of a learning continuum consisting of training, experience, education, and self-improvement.⁴¹ Senior military leaders view continuing education of a professional Soldier as critical and each military service offers appropriate training programs and educational venues. All service departments and USSOCOM can gain efficiencies. In order to improve interdependence and gain efficiencies, the Army and USSOCOM need to pursue combined educational opportunities and eliminate duplicative educational venues. With the growth of SOF unique education tracks, the services have fewer contacts between SOF and CF personnel, effectively reducing relationships and diminishing interdependence. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the commander of USSOCOM must reverse this trend. A change will enhance working relationships and improve GSN and RAF collaboration.

Improving CF Soldiers' knowledge and understanding of SOF will also improve the effectiveness of both RAF and the GSN. The Army must increase PME that impacts SOF. Programs of instruction must address the interdependence and incorporation of SOF in combat operations. Changes are needed at every educational level from pre-commissioning through the strategic level, including at the Sergeants Major Academy. Indeed, a SOF familiarity certification might be an appropriate addition to existing Army education programs. Implementing familiarity certifications would enforce the importance of understanding SOF throughout the Army. More importantly, doing so will provide a deeper pool of CF service members who are properly trained to function with USSOCOM, a TSOC, or some other special operations task force.

Army leaders will require more extensive and deeper exposure to regional and cultural studies. Greater PME exposure will improve the effectiveness of the RAF model by preparing leaders who are better attuned to the human domain. For select noncommissioned officers (NCO) and officers, appropriate language training must be incorporated into their professional education courses. Extant military educational systems must adjust if they are to better prepare professional military personnel for regionally oriented service.

Within the DOTMLPF-P construct, *personnel* connotes the development of manpower and personnel plans, programs and policies necessary to man, support and sustain the Army.⁴² Personnel policies for the Army must be adjusted not to simply encourage but to require regional specialization. While some military specialties would not be regionally aligned, the majority of service members would concentrate on a specific AOR. Such a change is consistent with the CJCS's recent Asia-Pacific Hands Program and would incorporate a career specialization with a specific AOR. Area specialists beyond those found in SOF and serving as foreign area officers (FAO) are needed to better meet CCDRs requirements if the RAF concept is to become both viable and effective.

Given that 45 percent of joint SOF are Army personnel, the Army drawdown will impact USSOCOM.⁴³ The command must identify which positions require personnel with deep SOF training, experience and education and which billets can be manned with talented Army CF service members. An evaluation of SOF-unique billets is particularly necessary across the TSOCs given the anticipated growth needed to fulfill the GSN concept. Despite force reductions, however, the Army must be prepared to assign talented, command-track CF personnel the TSOCs. Doing so will require implementing directive personnel policy changes.

Both USSOCOM and the Army must promote the cross pollination of CF and SOF personnel into different formations. Tours must be career enhancing, professionally rewarding, and should include serving as planners and liaison officers within appropriate operational HQs. Adjusting assignment policies will pay dividends by strengthening the connective tissue between SOF and CF, thereby enhancing both the RAF and GSN efforts.

No recommendations are offered under a DOTMLPF-P analysis for facilities. *Facilities* are considered real property consisting of one or more: buildings, structures, utility systems, associated roads and other pavements, and underlying land.⁴⁴ USSOCOM has requested additional growth in certain TSOC HQs in order to shoulder their expanded mission as described in the GCP-SOF. Fiscal constraints, however, will make any military construction (MILCON) challenging. Gaining efficiencies through interdependence with the ASCCs may well prove critical.

Policy, the final area of analysis, addresses any DoD, interagency, or international directives and practices that effectively prevent the implementation of changes in the other seven DOTMLPF-P areas.⁴⁵ At least two Army policies must be changed in regard to the RAF management model. The first is the policy of requiring RAF units to be C-1 before assumption of the RAF mission set. This requirement means the unit is fully mission capable for decisive action, encompassing combined arms maneuver and wide-area security. The policy wastes precious readiness dollars since the Army trains a force up to the highest level only to immediately decrease that readiness by sending portions of the unit abroad to execute TSC missions. Once capabilities are deployed on RAF directed missions, then it is no longer C-1 as those capabilities remain unavailable to the unit.

In order to be prepared for any contingency, the Army must husband the units that are trained to C-1. Elements executing RAF missions should be trained specifically to their mission profile. This will create two demand signals from the CCDRs: 1) forces capable of executing named contingency plans and 2) forces capable of executing TSC activities or other missions. Another benefit to removing the requirement for RAF elements to be C-1 is that a greater number of Army personnel will be ready and available for RAF missions. More service members will undertake missions in support of a CCDR while others conduct intensive, high-end training and stand ready to respond to contingencies.

The second Army policy that must be changed to establish enduring alignment below the division level. Having division and corps staffs with continual alignment to a specific theater is valuable, but the ability for service members to execute missions in an AOR may prove decisive for the CCDRs. The Army should direct

individual service members towards regional specialization and then ensure they serve in BCTs or equivalent units that are continually aligned with that theater. Habitual alignment will provide enhanced depth of knowledge and added regional expertise. Moreover, an enduring alignment of units, resources, and personnel should build enhanced understanding and positive relationships with coalition partners.

Summary

The RAF and GSN concepts are viable approaches for providing the GCCs and the nation with highly prepared and fully capable military forces which, importantly, can serve to enhance efficiency during a period of fiscal belt tightening. Military initiatives must achieve the maximum value while expending fewer resources. By incorporating many of the changes recommended here, the Army and USSOCOM could improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of the GSN and RAF initiatives.

Notes

¹ Andreas Herberg-Rothe, World Security Network Newsletter, Berlin: World Security Network, February 21, 2009, available from www.clausewitz.com/readings/Herberg-Rothe/Herberg-Rothe21FEB2009.pdf#zoom=100, accessed on October 13, 2013.

² Thomas C. Fingar, et al. "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World," Washington, D.C: National Intelligence Council, November 2008, available from [tp://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf), accessed on December 30, 2013, p. vi.

³ Robin Wright, "Imagining a Remapped Middle East," *The New York Times*, September 28, 2013, available from www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/opinion/sunday/imagining-a-remapped-middle-east.html?_r=1&, accessed on October 22, 2013.

⁴ Merriam-Webster. "The Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary," available from www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/globalization, accessed on October 23, 2013.

⁵ Robert L. Hutchings, et al. "Mapping the Global Future," Pittsburgh: National Intelligence Council, December 2004, available on www.dni.gov/files/documents/Global%20Trends_Mapping%20the%20Global%20Future%202020%20Project.pdf, accessed on December 30, 2013, p. 10.

⁶ CNN Wire Staff, "Mullen: Debt is Top National Security Threat," August 27, 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/08/27/debt.security.mullen/> (accessed February 22, 2014).

⁷ Pew Research Center, "U.S. Foreign Policy: Key Data Points from Pew Research," Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, January 6, 2014, available from www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/u-s-foreign-policy-key-data-points/, accessed on January 11, 2014.

⁸ Sandra I. Erwin, "Army Ponders Its Post-War Identity," *National Defense Magazine*, blog entry posted December 1, 2013, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1350> (accessed December 30, 2013).

⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, accessed on December 30, 2013, p. 235.

¹⁰ George J. Flynn, *Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations*, (Suffolk, VA: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, Joint Staff J7, June 15, 2012), V and 1. The eleven strategic themes included; Understanding the Environment, Conventional Warfare Paradigm, Battle for the Narrative, Transitions, Adaptation, Special Operations Forces (SOF) – General Purpose Forces (GPF) Integration, Interagency Coordination, Coalition Operations, Host-Nation Partnering, State Use of Surrogates and Proxies, Super-Empowered Threats.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 31.

¹² Ibid., p. 6.

¹³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin E. Dempsey, "Asia-Pacific Hands Program," memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Services and Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Washington, DC, December 5, 2013.

¹⁴ Andrew Feickert, *U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 18, 2013, pp. 2-3.

¹⁵ (Secret) William H. McRaven, "Global Special Operations Forces (SOF) Campaign Plan (GCP-SOF)," Tampa, FL, USSOCOM, October 15, 2013, Executive Summary (Unclassified) pp. i-iii.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Howard Altman, "Tampa to Become Epicenter of International Special Ops Coordination," *The Tampa Tribune*, October 18, 2013, available from www.tbo.com/list/military-news/tampa-to-become-epicenter-of-international-special-operations-coordination-20131018/, accessed on December 30, 2013.

¹⁹ Donna Miles, "USSOCOM Officials Work on Plan for Global Network," *American Forces Press Service*, June 3, 2013, available from www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120193, accessed on December 30, 2013.

²⁰ (FOUO) USSOCOM Global SOF Network Operational Planning Team, "Initial Capabilities Document For Theater Special Operations Command and Control," Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, September 11, 2013 Version 0.5, pp. 4-7. [This information is drawn from a FOUO document, but the portion of the information cited is unclassified.]

²¹ Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James A. Winnefeld, Jr., "Global SOF Network 2020 Concept of Operations," memorandum for Under Secretaries of Defense, Military Service Vice Chiefs, and Combatant Commanders, Washington, DC, October 16, 2013.

²² Feickert, p. 22.

²³ Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland: "Regionally Aligned Forces: Business *Not* as Usual," *Parameters* 43, no. 3, Autumn 2013, p. 58.

²⁴ (FOUO) James L. Huggins, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, HQDA G3/5/7, "FRAGO 1 to the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) EXORD," Washington, DC: HQDA, October 17, 2013, p. O-3. [This information is drawn from a FOUO document, but the portion of the information cited is unlimited unclassified.]

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ James Learmont, HQDA G-3/5/7 Stability Support Division, "Regional Alignment of Forces 25 November 2013," briefing slides, Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, November 25, 2013, pp. 4, 6.

²⁸ Huggins, p. O-4.

²⁹ Learmont, p. 8.

³⁰ Fiona Greenyer, "Dagger Brigade," *Military Simulation and Training Magazine* (Lake Mary, FL: Halldale Media, Inc., February 2013), available from www.halldale.com/insidesnt/culture-training/dagger-brigade, accessed on March 10, 2014.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Rose Thayer, "1st Cavalry gears up for regional alignments," *Fort Hood Herald*, October 9, 2013, available from www.kdhnews.com/fort_hood_herald/across_the_fort/st-cavalry-gears-up-for-regional-alignments/article_0764cb74-3053-11e3-b256-0019bb30f31a.html, accessed on December 30, 2013.

³³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 19, 2012, p. A-4.

³⁴ Ibid., p. A-5.

³⁵ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Army, Guard on the Brink of War: NGAUS Fires First Salvo," January 15, 2014, available from www.breakingdefense.com/2014/01/army-guard-on-brink-of-war-ngaus-fires-first-salvo/, accessed on February 22, 2014.

³⁶ Grant M. Martin, "The Sublime: The Paradox of the 7th Warfighting Function," November 25, 2013, available from www.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-sublime-the-paradox-of-the-7th-warfighting-function, accessed on January 1, 2014.

³⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army Force Modernization Proponent System*, Army Regulation 5-22, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 25, 2011, p. 11.

³⁸ USSOCOM, "Joint DOTMLPF Change Recommendation for Theater Special Operations Command HQs Command and Control, v 0.2," Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, October 19, 2013, p. 9.

³⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Manual for the Operations*, p. A-5.

⁴⁰ Feickert, p. 14-15.

⁴¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Manual for the Operations*, p. A-5.

⁴² U.S. Department of the Army, p. 11.

⁴³ Linda Robinson, *The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces, Council Special Report No. 66*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, April 2013, p. 9.

⁴⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Manual for the Operations*, p. A-5.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. A-6.

RAF and ARFORGEN

Colonel Robert A. Dawson and Mr. Robert C. Coon

The United States Army's concept to regionally align units to geographic combatant commands is over 5 years old.¹ Operation New Dawn's end and the falling requirement for Army units in Afghanistan have created an opportunity for the Army to accelerate regional alignment from concept to force management policy.² Despite recent concept modifications, the fundamental purpose of regional alignment has not changed--how can the United States Army best prepare units for combatant command employment to protect or preserve United States' interests in the face of a constantly changing international security environment, domestic budget constraints, and recent historical experiences in preparing and maintaining unit readiness?³

This essay examines the impact of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) Policy on the Army's ability to generate trained and ready forces through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process and subsequent impact on the six geographic combatant commands. Regional alignment of forces provides combatant commands Army units prepared for employment across the range of military operations specific to a geographic region. Maintaining the Army Force Generation process allows the Army to prioritize resources and manage readiness for operating units supporting regionally aligned missions.⁴ However, refining both the Regionally Aligned Force and Army Force Generation policies allows the Army to better prepare and manage Army units for combatant command employment. Twelve policy recommendations are advanced for enhancing Regionally Aligned Force and Army Force Generation policies.

The global security situation is complex. Fifteen United Nations' peacekeeping operations and over 50 armed conflicts are in progress worldwide. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence highlights a multitude of threats in the 2014 Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment.⁵ Additionally, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance establishes priorities and missions for the Department of Defense.⁶ Despite ongoing conflicts, known threats, and strategic planning guidance, no one knows exactly when, where, or in what magnitude Army units will be activated to defend United States' interests. In a 2011 speech, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlighted the United States' predicament in preparing for future conflicts when he stated that the United States Government had no idea one year before missions began in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait or Iraq, that the United States would be so involved.⁷

Domestically, the Department of the Army is shaped by the effects of the 2011 Budget Control Act and future defense budgets, the reduction of Army troop end strength due to the end of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and debate regarding the future role of the Army in United States foreign policy.⁸ Regardless of debate outcomes, Army units must be trained and ready to respond.

General Odierno approved the Army's current definition of Regionally Aligned Forces in July 2013:

Regionally Aligned Forces provide the Combatant Commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities Service Retained, Combatant Command (CCMD) aligned and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. Includes Army total force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility,

including providing reach back; prepared to support from outside the responsibility. Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.⁹

This broad definition encompasses the majority of active-duty Soldiers in the operating force plus combined Army Reserve and Army National Guard units assigned or allocated to combatant commands and available for employment within a fiscal year. The definition does not differentiate the specialized capability the Army is building. The definition does, however, focus all Army command elements to continue to develop, synchronize, and prepare for policy implementation.

The Army developed the RAF policy over the last several years. United States Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 *United States Operating Concept 2016-2028* and TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6 *United States Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver* in 2010. These pamphlets introduced RAF concepts and established the theory that by regionally aligning Army units with combatant commands, Army units would be trained and prepared with the capability to rapidly understand the operating environment, the capability to act more effectively, and the ability to accomplish mission objectives in any cultural situation in support of combatant command requirements.¹⁰ The Department of the Army formally introduced the “Regionally Aligned Brigade” policy during the Department of Defense press briefing on major budget decisions in concert with the defense strategic guidance released in January 2012.¹¹

General Odierno stated his vision for a broader regional alignment of forces in addition to brigade combat teams focused on security cooperation in a blog post in March 2012.¹² General Odierno envisioned that Regionally Aligned Forces would improve the Army’s contributions to geographic combatant commands by spreading cultural and regional awareness that had previously been the province of select Army units, e.g., Special Forces or Civil Affairs, to all units and leaders in the conventional force.¹³ Since then, RAF policy has developed into one of General Odierno’s top five priorities and an essential concern for the Department of the Army Staff.¹⁴ Fiscal year 2014 represents the 2nd year of a 5-year plan to develop and implement Regionally Aligned Force policy.¹⁵

Regionally Aligned Forces support the 2012 strategic guidance objective to build a strong global security environment and build partner capacity by pursuing new partnerships while reinforcing existing ones, participating in multi-national exercises, providing rotational presence, and participating in security cooperation activities.¹⁶ In addition, Regionally Aligned Force policy directly addresses four of the 11 strategic themes identified by the Joint Staff J-7’s Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) Division’s *Decade of War Study, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations*.¹⁷ The four areas are: understanding the environment, special operations forces (SOF) and general purpose forces (GPF) integration, coalition operations, and host-nation partnering.¹⁸

The six geographic combatant commanders testified to Congress on the posture of their areas of responsibilities in March 2013. The commanders’ testimonies shared a common theme: the need to engage the countries in their respective AORs by building and strengthening partnerships and alliances.¹⁹ In order to support combatant command mission requirements, the Army’s 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, was the first Army unit designated and trained under the RAF force policy to conduct missions in support of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM).²⁰ The 2nd Brigade conducted more than one hundred missions in over 30 countries in support of USAFRICOM in the first 10 months of employment.²¹ Meanwhile, 1st Armored Division’s Headquarters was the first division headquarters under RAF to participate in United States Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) 2013 Eager Lion Exercise (June 2013).²² The Army announced that in fiscal year

2014 over 60,000 Soldiers would participate in over 5,600 events in 162 countries, many as part of the new regional alignment policy.²³

Army Force Generation

Army Regulation 525-29, *Army Force Generation*, states that the ARFORGEN process is:

The structured progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of the combatant commander and other Army requirements. The ARFORGEN process is the Army's core process for force generation.²⁴

Approved in 2006, ARFORGEN is the Army's cyclical system to manage units' training, manning, and equipment readiness levels.²⁵ ARFORGEN systematically allowed the Army to concurrently generate operating forces required to deploy in support of Iraq and Afghanistan operations, complete transformation to a modular force, and increase the size of the Army.²⁶ Prior to 2006, the Army managed units based on tiered readiness according to the unit's geographic location and the deployment timeline for supporting a contingency plan.²⁷ In order to implement ARFORGEN, the Army identified and synchronized no fewer than 21 major manning, equipping, or training policies.²⁸

ARFORGEN created three categories for Army units. The first category is Reset, or those units recently returned from a mission that are at the lowest levels of readiness in manning, equipment-on-hand, and are not resourced or scheduled to conduct collective training events. The second category is Train/Ready, or those units that are training, or completed training and available. The Army increases levels of manning, equipment on hand and training resources for those units in the Train/Ready category. Finally, the Available force category refers to those Army units at the highest state of readiness. Available units have the most Soldiers and equipment-on-hand, and have completed a capstone collective training event such as a combat training center rotation.²⁹

ARFORGEN provides the Army two important force management features that support combatant command requirements. First, ARFORGEN timelines are adjustable, based on the demand for Army units, to meet steady state, surge, or full-surge requirements.³⁰ For example, between 2004 and 2012 the Army generated forces to support unit deployments of 12-months, 15-months, and 9-months based on specific requirements from USCENTCOM.³¹ Second, ARFORGEN also allows the Army to prioritize equipment, personnel, and training resources to manage units based on combatant command demand.³² These two force management features accommodate the Army's need for flexibility in building forces in accord with combatant command requirements.

Since inception, the Army has refined ARFORGEN to meet the demand for forces in accord with institutional policies even as available resources fluctuated.³³ In February 2012, General Odierno hinted at likely ARFORGEN changes by mentioning the "Future Force Generation Model."³⁴ General Odierno approved ARFORGEN changes in April 2012 which allowed the Army to make a public announcement regarding upcoming changes during the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Sustainment Symposium and Exposition in May 2012.³⁵

Army Regulation 525-29, *Army Force Generation*, was published in March 2011 and a revised regulation has not yet been released. Despite the absence of an updated regulation, recent Army budget and strategy documents as well as news articles identify three significant changes in the way ARFORGEN manages Army units.³⁶ These changes will impact RAF policy implementation. The 2011 ARFORGEN regulation managed all operating forces as single composite group as they progressed through an ARFORGEN cycle.³⁷ ARFORGEN

now creates three groups to manage forces as they progress through the reset, trained/ready, and available cycles, more specifically the mission force pool, the rotational force pool, and the operational sustainment force pool.³⁸

The mission force pool is comprised of Army units assigned to combatant commands and low-density priority units that must maintain a high level of readiness. Mission force pool units do not have the opportunity to rotate through the ARFORGEN process based on demand.³⁹ The rotational force pool contains Army units that are allocated in response to combatant command's mission requirements, apportioned against a combatant command's contingency plan, or required to conduct a rotational deployment to a geographic combatant command theater.⁴⁰ Army forces conducting regionally aligned missions are managed in the rotational force pool.⁴¹ Finally, the operational sustainment pool includes Army units that are not assigned to a combatant command, allocated against a contingency operation, or apportioned against a contingency plan.⁴² The Army resources sustainment pool units are at reduced manning and equipment-on-hand levels.⁴³ The reduced demand for units to conduct operations in Afghanistan allows the Army to maintain units at a level of readiness consistent with their actual or planned utilization and the resources available.⁴⁴

The second significant change for Army units is the decision to transition training at Fort Irwin and Fort Polk to "decisive-action" training from the "counter-insurgency" training conducted over the last decade.⁴⁵ For over 10 years, units conducting mission rehearsal exercises (MREs) at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk focused on counter-insurgency scenarios in preparation for operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.⁴⁶ Decisive-action training builds on lessons learned while operating in Iraq and Afghanistan while focusing on the Army's core competencies: combined arms maneuver and wide area security, as identified in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*.⁴⁷ Decisive-action refers to the Army's ability to conduct continuous and simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability missions, or defense support of civil authority as a mission might require.⁴⁸

Beginning with the March 2012 NTC and the October 2012 JRTC unit rotations, units not designated to deploy to Afghanistan for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM are scheduled for decisive-action training.⁴⁹ In fiscal year 2014, 19 of the 21 scheduled combat training center rotations will be decisive-action training.⁵⁰ The shift in training focus is critical if we are to prepare Army units for contingency response first, then for other missions like regionally aligned missions. Army units supporting regionally aligned missions will conduct decisive-action focused training despite the unit's focus on theater security cooperation activities. Doing so supports contingency operations should they be required.⁵¹

The third change to unit management is the decision to have active-duty units in the rotational force pool move from a 36-month to 24-month ARFORGEN cycle in October 2012.⁵² The Department of the Army Fiscal Year 2014 Budget highlights the shift to a 24-month readiness cycle as a major program change in order to support decisive-action training.⁵³ Despite the reduced requirement for brigade combat teams to support operations in Afghanistan during budget uncertainty, the Army requested fiscal year 2014 funding for combat center rotations for 21 brigades, five mission command team training events (MCTPs) for division headquarters, and one mission command team training event for a corps headquarters.⁵⁴ Army forces supporting RAF missions are managed under the 24-month readiness cycle.⁵⁵

Managing readiness challenges is not unique to the United States Army. The British, German, and French Armies are also balancing budget reductions with enhancing unit readiness.⁵⁶ The British Army adopted a 36-month tiered readiness cycle known as the Army 2020 Formation Operational Readiness Mechanism (A-FORM) to manage British units while German and French Armies adopted rotational readiness models similar to ARFORGEN.⁵⁷ Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, other recent military operations, defense budgets, and

how each respective country views future conflicts shape British, German, and French readiness decisions.⁵⁸ A “one-size-fits-all” approach to training and resourcing military units to maintain readiness does not exist.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) learned important force generation lessons while leading combined military operations. NATO synchronizes unit readiness complexities for countries participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan while the UN brings troop contributing countries (TCCs) together to support UN approved missions.⁵⁹ Key observations from NATO, UN, British, German, and French Army force generation experiences include: developing a long-term strategic vision for readiness management, managing unit readiness according to a unit’s assigned mission, conducting scenario-based readiness simulations to determine future force and resource requirements, conducting regular force generation synchronization conferences, and making force generation responsive to operational requirements based on unit capabilities.⁶⁰ The Army should consider using these observations to inform and facilitate unit ARFORGEN cycles when planning RAF missions.

RAF and ARFORGEN Recommendations

As the Regionally Aligned Force policy is implemented, thereby transforming ARFORGEN, every Army unit will feel the impact. Regionally Aligned Forces and ARFORGEN policy refinement allows the Army to prepare and manage Army units for combatant command employment. The Army force modernization proponent system manages change by outlining how a capability or function impacts Army doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF).⁶¹ Evaluating current or new capabilities, policies, and procedures against the DOTMLPF areas offers the Army a comprehensive problem-solving method to manage change and synchronize solutions in order to enhance warfighting capabilities.⁶² DOTMLPF analysis, while not unique to the Army, does support the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) if joint doctrine or joint capability areas (JCAs) are impacted.⁶³

Challenges

In less than two years, the “Regionally Aligned Brigade” concept became the “Regionally Aligned Forces” policy.⁶⁴ The definition’s evolution, as well as the Army’s willingness to modify the original definition and vision to win acceptance in the Army and the broader defense community, contributes to policy confusion.⁶⁵ The Army must clearly define and precisely articulate what the Regionally Aligned Force policy is, and what the policy is not, if there is to be any hope of establishing a common understanding and terms of reference for the defense community. Currently, organizations within and outside the Army have different visions and understandings of RAF policy.⁶⁶ Despite limited regionally aligned unit experience, the Army is now building Regionally Aligned Force policy with an entire force package to include enabling units based on initial feedback from combatant commands.⁶⁷ A doctrine recommendation is for the Army to return to the original regional alignment vision with the brigade combat team functioning as the central core capability. Confusion is created by poorly articulated policy and thin definitions. By not focusing on core capabilities when seeking policy acceptance by external stakeholders, confusion results. Not every combatant command can readily justify requiring a brigade combat team or an Army force package to conduct RAF missions.

The Army must develop the Regionally Aligned Force policy despite internal and external arguments regarding its merit and capability.⁶⁸ Any contingency that requires a large commitment of Army forces prior to implementation may well risk the policy itself. The five-year implementation plan illustrates Army bureaucracy while highlighting failure to show institutional agility and urgency to generate appropriate force capabilities to support combatant command missions. Policy change is, in fact, one element that effectively prevents faster

policy implementation. With regard to doctrine, the Army needs to accelerate institutionalizing RAF policy. By refining and focusing on a core capability, producing, for example, 12 habitually aligned brigade combat teams, the Army could expedite implementation.⁶⁹ Policy modifications, possibly including growth, should occur in the future and be based on combatant commander feedback and mission demand.

Current global force management timelines require combatant commanders to submit initial force requirements to the Joint Staff 21-months before the fiscal year of employment begins.⁷⁰ ARFORGEN allows the Army to identify units to fill these requirements and enter the reset and training cycle prior to employment. The assumption that geographic combatant commanders can validly identify missions and the Army can identify appropriate forces to conduct those missions 21-months in advance can be difficult. Stakeholder planning efforts may not be synchronized.⁷¹ The Secretary of Defense approves forces for employment in January prior to the fiscal year of employment. However, global force management rules allow a combatant commander to request forces 120 days prior to employment.⁷² The 120 day request for forces does not permit a unit to realize the ARFORGEN resourcing benefits unless the unit is habitually aligned with a combatant command. A doctrine recommendation is for the Army to be responsive in supporting late or out of cycle requirements by building flexibility into ARFORGEN and training and manning policies in support of combatant command requirements. Habitual alignment of brigade combat teams to RAF missions enables the Army to support emerging requirements due to unit familiarity with the region despite where the unit may be in the ARFORGEN cycle.

Since 2007 ARFORGEN has allowed the Army to generate forces to support global operations by prioritizing resources for deploying forces. ARFORGEN revisions allow the Army to avoid the lingering pre-2001 “tiered readiness” institutional stigma.⁷³ Future demand for Army forces and budget resources will determine ARFORGEN’s long-term role as the system the Army utilizes to manage force readiness.⁷⁴ One way to overcome tiered readiness is to separate and manage units by mission. For example, the British Army creates forces based on three assigned primary missions.⁷⁵ The reaction force is designed to respond to contingency operations and is maintained at the highest readiness levels.⁷⁶ The adaptable force conducts stabilization and engagement missions and maintains lower readiness levels.⁷⁷ A doctrine recommendation is for the Army to retain ARFORGEN in order to manage readiness according to unit missions. ARFORGEN allows the Army to synchronize manning, equipping and training policies. The Army must be careful, however, not to create too many unit force pools cycling through ARFORGEN such that conflicts over resource prioritization result.

Army unit readiness reporting allows commands to provide comments, and based on the commanders’ opinion, to subjectively upgrade or downgrade readiness levels.⁷⁸ ARFORGEN manages the progressive unit readiness levels of training, manning, equipment on hand, and equipment readiness. However, force reductions, budget constraints and the Army Reset program’s synchronization impacts unit resourcing. As resources are reduced, the Army needs a valid and objective way to assess resourcing levels. A doctrine recommendation is for the Army to suspend, at least temporarily, a command’s ability to subjectively upgrade the unit’s overall readiness assessment. Quantitative, empirically verifiable data should define unit readiness in addition to the commander’s assessment and comments through the unit status reporting process as the Army draws down. Commands must resist the desire to maintain that a unit can accomplish specific mission tasks when the unit is neither trained nor resourced appropriately.

The decision to maintain active-duty brigade combat teams assigned to the rotational force pool in a 24-month ARFORGEN cycle while conducting decisive-action training is ambitious yet may well prove to be financially unsustainable. A twenty-four month period of readiness matches the most demanding unit ARFORGEN cycle over the last decade.⁷⁹ Supplemental contingency funding supported increased readiness, but that is no longer the case as forces are departing Afghanistan.⁸⁰ By assigning all brigade combat teams,

including regionally aligned units, to the ARFORGEN rotational force pool, the Army is posturing favorably for future resource prioritization decisions during an era of declining resources. A training recommendation is for the Army to explore alternatives to the 24-month ARFORGEN cycle for regionally aligned brigade combat teams, and alternative courses of action to decisive-action training. The Army must accord priority training and resourcing to global response forces, contingency forces, and then Regionally Aligned Forces. Generating fully trained and resourced brigade combat teams that are not aligned with a contingency force mission may not be fiscally possible.

Developing cultural awareness is important and takes time. ARFORGEN unit training plans are as important for Soldier preparation in support of a mission as the actual mission itself. As Regionally Aligned Force policy matures, Soldiers will benefit from repetitive cultural training events and missions, and repetitive regionally aligned unit assignments. As the overall size of the Army retracts, and 12 to 14 percent of Army manpower turns over annually, the fastest way to develop Soldiers culturally is by repetitive assignments to regionally aligned units.⁸¹ A personnel recommendation is for the Army to overhaul mid-grade and senior personnel assignment policies in order to encourage commitment to the Regionally Aligned Force policy. The Army should adapt manning policies that maximize assignments in regionally aligned units and support the long term viability of the policy while achieving a return on investment in Soldier capabilities. Manning guidance, for example, should specify progressive assignments in aligned units, or units focused on the same geographic region. A battalion commander who supported regionally aligned missions in support of USCENTCOM would be an ideal candidate to serve as a staff officer in United States Army Central Command (ARCENT) or USCENTCOM.

Opportunities

Regionally Aligned Force policy focuses on conducting military-to-military engagements with host nations. As the policy matures, combatant commands and the Army should consider what capabilities United States allies possess that can integrate into multi-lateral engagement and campaign plans. Strategic guidance acknowledges and emphasizes the idea that the United States will partner to solve international problems. Yet our allies are reducing defense budgets just as we are.⁸² Lack of appropriate and necessary synchronization with United States allies may expose capability gaps at a critical time. For example, in 2012, Britain and France announced the development of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force in order to respond to any crisis that impacts combined interests.⁸³ A doctrine recommendation is for the Army to work with combatant commands to expand regional engagements that necessarily include regional allies while conducting regionally aligned missions. The goal is to establish long term multi-lateral partnerships.

RAF policy increases Soldier awareness by incorporating and emphasizing culture and language training. As the Army implements Regionally Aligned Force policy, ARFORGEN will produce aligned units with the potential to significantly increase Army capabilities for combatant commands to accomplish theater objectives. Repetitive missions in support of combatant commands allow Army units to establish relationships with host nation military personnel. An organizational recommendation is for the Army to commit to habitually aligning brigade combat teams with geographic combatant commands and to extend the alignment to multiple ARFORGEN cycles. Habitually aligned units will then remain available to support contingency operations should they be required.

Regionally Aligned Forces and ARFORGEN policies can capitalize on the Army's flexibility to develop tailored force packages consistent with the modular force concept. Modularity demonstrated the Army could generate and synchronize diverse force capabilities to accomplish combatant command missions.⁸⁴ Retaining units not assigned to combatant commands allows the flexibility to generate a tailored force. Combatant

commands can request force packages when missions require. A brigade combat team can fulfill a preponderance of security cooperation activities, however. A recommendation is to retain Army units not assigned to combatant commands in order to centralize training and resources while generating tailored forces to support combatant command mission requirements.

The Army should retain almost all forces as “service retained, combatant command aligned” in order to conduct regionally aligned missions. FORSCOM will centralize training and readiness management for unassigned, service-retained units. As the Army’s force structure reduces, centralized force management synchronizes and prioritizes resources, and provides the Army, Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense flexibility to fulfill mission requirements with a robust pool of Army forces, while preventing a duplication of effort and unnecessary competition for budget resources needed to expand Army service component commands. A training recommendation is for the Army to initiate “Cultural Centers of Excellence” at Fort Polk and Fort Irwin to support centralized regionally aligned programs of instruction. The fourteen Army installations with brigade combat teams could create local training centers similar to “Dagger University” at Fort Riley.⁸⁵ Habitually aligning units with combatant commands will allow units to develop quality training by developing long-term relationships with regional subject matter experts at home station. Failure to habitually align units with combatant commands results in units and installations requiring resources to provide customized training during each ARFORGEN cycle.

The synchronization of ARFORGEN and Regionally Aligned Force policy allows the Army to overhaul personnel policy. Current personnel policies provide flexibility to meet requirements, and expose commissioned officers to diverse experiences, yet the existing policies sometimes fail to make practical decisions that best serve the Army.⁸⁶ The Army personnel system is focused on individual career progression, rather than unit effectiveness.⁸⁷ The Army announced the extension of enlisted tours to 48 months in 2013; however, it has yet to reform personnel policy in accord with RAF policy.⁸⁸ A personnel recommendation is for the Army to modify enlisted, officer and command tours, and extend brigades to multiple ARFORGEN alignment cycles with the same combatant command. This allows the Army to realize returns on investment made in culture, language and regional expertise training.

Implications

A contingency that requires a substantial commitment of Army forces in the near-term places Regionally Aligned Force policy implementation in jeopardy due to the multi-year rollout plan. The Army can realize “quick-wins” if it identifies and habitually aligns brigade combat teams to the six geographic combatant commands. The Army could then determine, based on demand, the need to align division headquarters or enabling units. Failing to habitually align brigade combat teams to combatant commands results in an increase in training resources required during future ARFORGEN cycles, complicates future ARFORGEN alignment cycles, fails to establish personal, long-term relationships with host nations and combatant command staffs, and fails to capitalize on Soldiers’ regional experiences.

Combatant commands request forces through the global force management process based on Secretary of Defense validated requirements. Service retained, combatant command aligned forces should be retained by the Army to support global requirements. Regionally Aligned Force policy alone does not justify Army force assignment to combatant commands. Once Army forces are assigned to combatant commands, the Secretary of Defense is the approving authority to change the assignment. The Army loses the ability to centrally manage and synchronize training and resources for Army units, and does not determine unit priorities.

The Army is committed to ARFORGEN to manage unit readiness. ARFORGEN allows the Army to manage resources and identify how much of the Army is trained and ready to conduct a mission at any time.

Future resources will dictate whether a 24-month, 36-month, or alternate ARFORGEN cycle is sustainable. The Army must use ARFORGEN to position the operating force in a predictable cycle to generate the units needed to meet planned or unplanned combatant command mission requirements. The Army must balance the costs and resources required to generate units that are not a response or contingency force, or identified to conduct other missions in support of combatant commands.

The 2004 Global Defense Posture Review and 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) results determine current Army unit locations.⁸⁹ ARFORGEN and Regionally Aligned Force policy synchronization allows the Army to support current and future global mission requirements despite the Army being concentrated in the Continental United States. Regionally Aligned Force policy keeps Army units aptly prepared and globally engaged at minimal cost.

Conclusion

Regional alignment of forces provides combatant commands with Army forces prepared for rapid employment across the range of military operations unique to a combatant commander's area of responsibility. The Army has modified the policy to increase Regionally Aligned Force capabilities over the last 2 years, but external factors have championed alternative policy visions. The Army should seek Regionally Aligned Force policy "quick-wins" and advance full implementation as soon as possible. Regionally Aligned Force policy concepts alone, however, do not justify an Army force package nor Army unit assignment to combatant commands.

Maintaining the Army Force Generation process allows the Army to prioritize resources and manage readiness for operating forces supporting regionally aligned and contingency missions.⁹⁰ Refining Army Force Generation policy, however, allows the Army to synchronize the resources required to generate and manage Army units for efficient and effective global engagement. The Army must prepare to adjust ARFORGEN resourcing policies to support future mission requirements.

Soldiers with 20-years of service today have witnessed the post-Desert Storm drawdown; conducted "military operations other than war" and experienced tiered readiness in the 1990s; witnessed a shift from a forward-based to a Continental United States-based Army; participated in major combat operations in the Middle East; and spent over a decade conducting counterinsurgency and stability operations. Throughout these experiences, one key lesson resonates. Regardless of the unit of assignment or location, the Army will train and resource units to accomplish the mission.

Notes

¹ For references that discuss the formulation of regionally aligned force concept prior to 2010, see, Scott G. Wuestner, *Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm, Letort Papers*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2009; Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-6, *The United States Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver 2016-2028*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2010, p. 7; Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2010, p. 25.

² Joseph Logan, "Last U.S. Troops Leave Iraq, Ending War," available from www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/18/us-iraq-withdrawal-idUSTRE7BH03320111218, accessed on January 5, 2014; Mike Mount, "U.S. Official: Afghanistan Surge Over as last of extra troops leave country," available from www.cnn.com/2012/09/20/world/asia/afghanistan-us-troops/, accessed on January 5, 2014; C. Todd Lopez, "Future Army Forces Must Be Regionally Aligned, Odierno Says," available from www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118316, accessed on January 5, 2014.

³ Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland, *Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2013, p. 55.

⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 525-29, *Army Force Generation*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2011, p. 3.

⁵ U.S. Congress, "Current and Future Worldwide Threats," Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., February 11, 2014, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014, pp. 5-8; *United States Institute of Peace Home Page*, available from www.usip.org/countries, accessed on January 6, 2014; *The United Nations Peacekeeping Home Page*, available from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml, accessed on January 6, 2014.

⁶ The White House, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2012, pp. 10-14.

⁷ Robert Gates, "Secretary of Defense Speech", Speech at the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, available from www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539, accessed January 10, 2014.

⁸ C. Todd Lopez, "Odierno: Sequestration could lead to hollow Army," available from www.army.mil/article/80058/Odierno__Sequestration_could_lead_to_hollow_Army, accessed on January 5, 2014; C. Todd Lopez, "Reorganization hits brigade combat teams," available from www.army.mil/article/106893/Reorganization_hits_brigade_combat_teams/, accessed on January 5, 2014; Kris Osborn, "Air-Sea Battle endures amid strategic review," available from www.dodbuzz.com/2013/04/05/air-sea-battle-endures-amidst-strategic-review/, accessed on January 5, 2014.

⁹ James L. Huggins, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, HQDA G3/5/7, "FRAGO 1 to the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) EXORD," Washington, DC, HQDA, October 17, 2013, p. 0-3; Field, "Regionally Aligned Forces," p. 56.

¹⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The United States Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver 2016-2028*, p. 7; Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*, p. 25.

¹¹ Leon E. Panetta and Martin E. Dempsey, "Major Budget Decisions Briefing," Washington, DC, Pentagon, available from www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4962, accessed on January 14, 2014; Barack H. Obama, Leon E. Panetta and General Martin E. Dempsey, "Defense Strategic Guidance Briefing from the Pentagon," available from www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4953, accessed on January 14, 2014.

¹² Raymond Odierno, "Regionally Aligned Forces: A New Model for Building Partnerships," *Army Live: The Official Blog of the United States Army*, available from www.armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/aligned-forces/, accessed on December 16, 2013.

¹³ Odierno, "Regionally Aligned Forces" blog post, March 2012.

¹⁴ Raymond Odierno, "CSA lays out strategic priorities for uncertain future," available from www.army.mil/article/113256/CSA_lays_out_strategic_priorities_for_uncertain_future/, accessed on January 16, 2014; Raymond Odierno, "Waypoint #2: Follow up to CSA's Marching Orders," available from www.army.mil/article/118873/Waypoint__2__Follow_up_to_CSA_s_Marching_Orders/, accessed on February 21, 2014.

¹⁵ Huggins, "FRAGO 1 to the HQDA RAF EXORD," 0-7; Lance Bacon, "New world-wide deployments: Who's going where, New deployment model ties 60,000 to new missions," *Army Times*, available from www.armytimes.com/article/20130603/NEWS/306030006/New-world-wide-deployments-Who-s-going-where, accessed on December 16, 2013.

¹⁶ Obama, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership," 3; Odierno, "Regionally Aligned Forces" blog post, March 2012.

¹⁷ George J. Flynn, *Decade of War, Volume I, Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations*, Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff, J-7, June 15, 2012.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁹ U.S. Congress, "United States Africa Command Posture," hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 113th Cong., 1st sess., March 7, 2013, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013, p. 6; U.S. Congress, "United States Central Command Posture," hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 113th Cong., 1st sess., March 5, 2013, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013, p. 5; U.S. Congress, "United States European Command Posture," hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 113th Cong., 1st sess., March 19, 2013, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013, p. 3; U.S. Congress, "United States Northern Command Posture," hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 113th Cong., 1st sess., March 20, 2013, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013, p. 16; U.S. Congress, "United States Southern Command Posture," hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 113th Cong., 1st sess., March 20, 2013, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013, p. 6; U.S. Congress, "United States Pacific Command Posture," hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 113th Cong., 1st sess., March 5, 2013, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013, p. 16.

²⁰ C. Todd Lopez, "Dagger Brigade to align with AFRICOM in 2013," available from www.army.mil/article/82376/Dagger_Brigade_to_align_with_AFRICOM_in_2013/, accessed on November 18, 2013.

²¹ Daniel Stoutamire, "Daggers discuss mission lessons," available from www.fortrileypost.com/newsdetail.asp?article_id=9030, accessed February 17, 2014.

²² C. Todd Lopez, "1st Armored Division troops aligned with CENTCOM, ready for Eager Lion kick-off," available from www.army.mil/article/104693/1st_Armored_Division_troops_aligned_with_CENTCOM_ready_for_Eager_Lion_kick_off/, accessed on December 16, 2013.

²³ Lance Bacon, "New world-wide deployments: Who's going where, New deployment model ties 60,000 to new missions," *Army Times*, available from www.armytimes.com/article/20130603/NEWS/306030006/New-world-wide-deployments-Who-s-going-where, accessed on December 16, 2013.

²⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Force Generation*, Army Regulation 525-29, p. 1.

²⁵ Charles C. Campbell, "ARFORGEN: Maturing the Model, Refining the Process," *Army Magazine*, Vol. 59, No. 6, June 2009, p. 50; U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Force Generation*, Army Regulation 525-29, p. 8.

²⁶ U.S. Congress, "United States Army Posture," hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 16, 2011, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013, p. 10; U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Force Generation*, Army Regulation 525-29, p. 1.

²⁷ Campbell, "ARFORGEN: Maturing the Model," pp. 50-51.

²⁸ Howard Bromberg, "The Future of Army Force Generation: A Total Army Approach, Part II," Speech at the Annual Association of the United States Army Conference 2011, Washington, DC, October 10, 2011.

²⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Force Generation*, Army Regulation 525-29, p. 1.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

³¹ David Chu, "Measuring Boots on Ground (BOG)-Snowflake," available from www.library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/3301/2004-11-22%20From%20David%20Chu%20re%20Measuring%20Boots%20on%20Ground-Snowflake-%20Memo%20Attachment.pdf, accessed on February 10, 2014; U.S. Department of the Army, "ALARACT 298/2011, Army Deployment Period Policy," available from www.armyg1.army.mil/militarypersonnel/ppg/hyperlinks/adobe%20files/ALARACT_298_2011_ARMY_DEPLOYMENT_PERIOD_POLICY.pdf, accessed on February 10, 2014; Jim Garamone, "Gates Extends Army Tours in Iraq to 15 Months," available from www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=32764, accessed on February 10, 2014.

³² U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Force Generation*, Army Regulation 525-29, p. 2.

³³ Campbell, "ARFORGEN: Maturing the Model," p. 52.

³⁴ Lance Bacon, "Odierno: Brigade cuts needed to reorganize," available from www.armytimes.com/article/20120303/news/203030314/Odierno-brigade-cuts-needed, accessed on December 15, 2013.

³⁵ "Army Forces Command Presents New ARFORGEN Structure at AUSA Sustainment Symposium," *Army Sustainment*, Vol. 44, Issue 4, July-August 2012, p. 64.

³⁶ Andrew Feickert, *Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 5, 2013, pp. 9-10; Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Equipping Guidance 2013 through 2016: From Afghanistan through Sequestration toward Regionally Aligned and Mission Tailored Forces*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2013, pp. 17-19; Huggins, "FRAGO 1 to the HQDA RAF EXORD."

³⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Force Generation*, Army Regulation 525-29, p. 3.

³⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, "Army Equipping Guidance 2013 through 2016," pp. 18-19.

³⁹ "Army Forces Command Presents New ARFORGEN," 64; U.S. Department of the Army, "Army Equipping Guidance 2013 through 2016," pp. 18-19.

⁴⁰ "Army Forces Command Presents New ARFORGEN," 64; U.S. Department of the Army, "Army Equipping Guidance 2013 through 2016," p. 19.

⁴¹ Huggins, "FRAGO 1 to the HQDA RAF EXORD," p. 0-4.

⁴² "Army Forces Command Presents New ARFORGEN," 64; U.S. Department of the Army, "Army Equipping Guidance 2013 through 2016," p. 19.

⁴³ U.S. Department of the Army, "Army Equipping Guidance 2013 through 2016," 19.

⁴⁴ "Army Forces Command Presents New ARFORGEN," p. 64.

⁴⁵ Matthew Cox, "Army Adopts new training focus," available from www.dodbuzz.com/2012/10/23/army-adopts-new-training-focus/, accessed on January 16, 2014.

⁴⁶ Kelly Jo Bridgewater, "Decisive Action Training Environment: Future Training Grounded in Today's Intelligence," available from www.army.mil/article/91690/Decisive_Action_Training_Environment_Future_training_groundedin_today_s_intelligence/, accessed on January 16, 2014; Michelle Tan, "DATE Gives U.S. Army Training a Reboot," available from www.defensenews.com/article/20120411/TSJ01/304110003/DATE-Gives-U-S-Army-Training-Reboot, accessed on January 16, 2014; "Stand-To! Today's Focus: Decisive Action Training Environment," available from www.army.mil/standto/archive/issue.php?issue+2012-03-08, accessed on January 16, 2014.

- ⁴⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2012, pp. 2-8.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 2-2.
- ⁴⁹ Tan, "DATE Gives U.S. Army Training a Reboot."
- ⁵⁰ Ibid.
- ⁵¹ Huggins, "FRAGO 1 to the HQDA RAF EXORD," p. 0-6.
- ⁵² Cox, "Army Adopts new training focus."
- ⁵³ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates, Volume 1, Operation and Maintenance, Army Justification Book*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2013, p. 4, p. 41.
- ⁵⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates*, p. 94.
- ⁵⁵ Huggins, "FRAGO 1 to the HQDA RAF EXORD," p. 0-4.
- ⁵⁶ Michael Shurkin, "Setting Priorities in the Age of Austerity: British, French and German Experiences," available from www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR222/RAND_RR222.pdf, accessed on January 5, 2014.
- ⁵⁷ Sir Peter Wall, "Transforming the British Army: An Update – July 2013," available from www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Army2020_Report.pdf, accessed on January 16, 2014, p. 15; Shurkin, "Setting Priorities in the Age of Austerity," pp. 1-2, 27, 35.
- ⁵⁸ Shurkin, "Setting Priorities in the Age of Austerity," pp. 1-3.
- ⁵⁹ Adam Smith and Arthur Boutellis, "Rethinking Force Generation: Filling the Capability Gaps in UN Peacekeeping," *Providing for Peacekeeping* May 2013, No. 2, New York: International Peace Institute, pp. 8, 18.
- ⁶⁰ Smith, "Rethinking Force Generation," May 2013; Shurkin, "Setting Priorities in the Age of Austerity," 2013.
- ⁶¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 5-22, *The Army Force Modernization Proponent System*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2009, p. 1.
- ⁶² Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 71-9, *Warfighting Capabilities Determination*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2009, pp. 30-31.
- ⁶³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 3170.01H, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2012; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS Manual)*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2012.
- ⁶⁴ Andrew Feickert, *Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 25, 2013, p. 3; Huggins, "FRAGO 1 to the HQDA RAF EXORD," p. 0-3.
- ⁶⁵ Field, "Regionally Aligned Forces," 55; COL James Learmont, HQDA G-3/5/7 Stability Support Division, "Regional Alignment of Forces," briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, November 25, 2013; LTC James Rexford, FORSCOM G-3/5/7 Plans, "Preparing Regionally Aligned Forces to Meet CCMD Requirements," briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, November 18, 2013.
- ⁶⁶ Learmont, "Regional Alignment of Forces," briefing, November 25, 2013; Rexford, "Preparing Regionally Aligned Forces," briefing, November 18, 2013; COL James Learmont, HQDA G-3/5/7 Stability Support Division, "Regional Alignment of Forces," briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, December 11, 2013.
- ⁶⁷ Stoutamire, "Daggers discuss mission lessons."
- ⁶⁸ Field, "Regionally Aligned Forces," p. 55.
- ⁶⁹ Author calculations. If the Army aligned two brigade combat teams per geographic combatant command, then one BCT would be available to conduct missions, while the other BCT trained for the following year's mission. This would require 12 BCTs to support regionally alignment. Future modifications can add enablers, divisions, or corps as required by demand.
- ⁷⁰ Cherie S. Emerson, HQDA G-3/5/7 Global Force Management Division, "Global Force Management," briefing, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, December 10, 2013.
- ⁷¹ Emerson, "Global Force Management," briefing, December 10, 2013.
- ⁷² Ibid.
- ⁷³ "TRADOC Commander: No plans to return to 'tiered readiness' in building future Army," available from www.ansa.org/meetings/2012/annualmeeting/pages/chapterpresidentsdinner.aspx, accessed on February 1, 2014.
- ⁷⁴ Sebastian Sprenger, "New Force-Generation Model Lays Ground Rules for Active, Reserve Use," available from www.insidedefense.com/inside-the-army/inside-the-army-11/05/2012/new-force-generation-model-lays-ground-rules-for-active-reserve-use/, accessed on February 9, 2014; U.S. Department of the Army, "Army Equipping Guidance 2013 through 2016," pp. 11-12.
- ⁷⁵ Wall, "Transforming the British Army," p. 3.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 6, 15.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 220-1, *Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 15, 2010, Para 4-5, 4-6; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Pamphlet 220-1, *Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army Procedures*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 16, 2011.

⁷⁹ Thom Shanker, "Army is Worried by Rising Stress of Return Tours to Iraq," available from www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/washington/06military.html?_r=0, accessed on February 9, 2014; Robert Merriman, "Rotation Plan Confirms Army is Overstressed," available from www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Defensewatch_090403,00.html, accessed on February 9, 2014.

⁸⁰ Carlo Munoz, "White House to Congress: No more war funding," available from www.thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/304877-white-house-to-congress-no-more-war-funding-, accessed on February 6, 2014; General Raymond Odierno, U.S. Army, *Planning for Sequestration in Fiscal Year 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review: Statement of Chief of Staff of the United States Army before the House Armed Services Committee*, 113th Cong., 1st sess., September 18, 2013.

⁸¹ Author calculations determined that approximately 12 to 14 percent of Army manpower turns over annually after reviewing manpower data in the Fiscal Year 2014 Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report; U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report, Fiscal Year 2014*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2013, pp. 7, 20, 44.

⁸² Richard Norton-Taylor, "Armed forces budget to be cut by 500M British pounds," available from www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/mar/20/armed-forces-budget-cut-500m, accessed on February 9, 2014; Malcolm Chalmers, "The Squeeze Continues-UK Defence Spending and the 2013 Budget," available from www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=commentary&ref=C51506B24A254C, accessed on February 9, 2014.

⁸³ Simon Michell, "Anglo/French Joint Training: Developing the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force," available from www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_2013_Michell_-_Anglo-French_Joint_Training.pdf, accessed on February 9, 2014.

⁸⁴ Michael Hoffman, "AUSA: Army could cut up to 13 BCTs," available from www.dodbuzz.com/2012/02/24/ausa-army-to-cut-up-to-13-bcts/, accessed on January 4, 2014.

⁸⁵ Daniel Stoutamire, "Dagger University prepares Soldiers for missions to Africa," available from www.army.mil/article/103815/_Dagger_University__prepares_Soldiers_for_missions_to_Africa/, accessed on December 7, 2013.

⁸⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, "HQDA EXORD 10-13 ISO the HQDA FY13-15 Active Component Manning Guidance," ALARACT 293/2012, October 18, 2012; Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno, "Fiscal Year 2015 (FY15) Centralized Selection List (CSL) Command and Key Billet Slating Guidance," Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, Washington, DC, June 28, 2013.

⁸⁷ Pat Towell, "Forging the Sword: Unit manning in the U.S. Army," available from www.csbaonline.org/, accessed on January 7, 2014.

⁸⁸ Jim Tice and Lance Bacon, "PCS Extended: Army lengthens tours to four years," available from www.armytimes.com/article/20130520/NEWS/305200010/PCS-extended-Army-lengthens-tours-four-years, accessed on February 21, 2014; Huggins, "FRAGO 1 to the HQDA RAF EXORD."

⁸⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, "Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture: Report to Congress," available from www.dmzhawaii.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/global_posture.pdf, accessed on January 16, 2014; U.S. Department of Defense, "Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission: Final Report to the President," available from www.brac.gov/Finalreport.html, accessed on January 16, 2014, Appendix D, Appendix K.

⁹⁰ Author note. According to Army Regulation 525-29, *Army Force Generation*, March 14, 2011, "Operating forces" is defined as those organizations whose primary purpose is to fulfill global operational requirements.

RAF and JTF Capable HQs

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy C. Davis and Colonel Robert M. Balcarage

A Regionally Engaged Army shapes and sets theaters for regional commanders employing unique Total Army characteristics and capabilities to influence the security environment, build trust, develop relationships, and gain access through rotational forces, multilateral exercises, mil-to-mil engagements, coalition training, and other opportunities.

—General Raymond Odierno¹

Regionally Aligned Forces are the ways that the Army will accomplish its ends or vision of being “globally responsive and regionally engaged” with reduced means in forces, headquarters, and budgets. For the last decade the U.S. Army focused on Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Central Command (CENTCOM) was the United States’ main effort while other combatant commands were economies of force in respect to force allocation.² With the end of OEF and OIF, the U.S. Army has an opportunity to shape itself for the future challenges of reduction in force levels, fiscal resource constraints, global threats, and withdrawal of forward-deployed U.S. forces. Senior leaders in the Army seized that opportunity in 2010 by introducing the concept of Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF).³ Initially applied to brigade combat teams (BCTs), the RAF concept expanded to corps and division headquarters in 2012.⁴

Achieving the Army Vision through the RAF concept requires stronger commitment in habitual alignment of headquarters, units, and individuals, and holistic commitment by the joint community and the Army in enabling corps and divisions to be joint task force capable headquarters.⁵ Regionally aligned corps and division headquarters provide the mission command and operational linkage between the geographic combatant commanders (GCC) and tactical forces. This paper establishes the historical context of how America has postured forces, and then explains the interconnection between the Joint Vision 2020, the Army Vision, and RAF concept to ensure effective forces for the future. Next, the paper examines the impact of RAF and the importance of the corps and division headquarters as JTFs in certification, augmentation, alignment, and employment. Finally, the paper discusses the issues and opportunities of the RAF concept across current doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facility (DOTMLPF) systems.

Historical Context

The U.S. Army remained globally engaged after World War II, as many units and headquarters lived and trained forward deployed in regions of Europe and Asia. The Department of Defense (DoD) aligned operational units to those regions based in the Continental United States (CONUS) through war plans. In 1950, half of the Army’s ten active divisions were overseas. At the height of the Cold War the Army grew to eighteen divisions with five forward-based. In 1998, the Army had six corps headquarters with three forward deployed.⁶ More recently, the Army continues to draw down and draw back.

The next adjustment to Army structure occurred in 2004. General Peter Schoomaker initiated modularity in order to change the fixed combat echelon in the Army from the division to the brigade combat team. Modularity provided commanders more tailorable forces for operations and contingencies. The Army developed a more joint and expeditionary mindset as the ending of the Cold War and the transition to a

preponderance of the force being CONUS-based resulted in operational requirements for smaller, self-contained brigade elements.⁷ Modular division and corps headquarters could serve in the roles of army forces commander (ARFOR), joint forces land component commander (JFLCC), or JTF headquarters in which to “plug” the needed mix of brigades and subordinate elements to accomplish missions.⁸ The simultaneous execution of OEF and OIF required the Army to focus on a highly-effective and efficient system to rotate ready modular forces in support of CENTCOM through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. The ARFORGEN process efficiently rotated units through reset, training, and deployment phases in order to prioritize and manage readiness over long periods of high demand.⁹

Two significant changes impacting corps and division headquarters were the inactivation of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the disestablishment of standing joint force headquarters – core elements (SJFHQ-CE). JFCOM was a functional command established in 1999, focused on joint development, experimentation, training, and integration. In 2003, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) authorized each GCC to establish a SJFHQ-CE to be the core element around which to establish joint task forces. These elements possessed joint education, situational understanding of the regional operating environment, and understanding of the GCC’s vision. JFCOM manned two SJFHQ-CEs, which European Command (EUCOM) frequently requested to be the core element around which to build joint task forces. In 2008, JFCOM reorganized its SJFHQ-CE section into the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC).

JFCOM inactivated in August 2011.¹⁰ The Joint Staff assumed most of JFCOM’s functions. With the closure of JFCOM, the JECC became part of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to continue supporting JTF formation for GCCs.¹¹ While successfully employed by combatant commanders, resource management decisions resulted in the disestablishment of SJFHQ-CEs in 2011.¹² Closing JFCOM and disestablishing SJFHQ-CEs saved money, but reduced enabling resources and dispersed remnants which GCCs need to build a critical requirement for joint headquarters. One option to fill that requirement is corps and division headquarters, but these headquarters need joint manning, joint training events, and a regional focus.

The Army is now reduced to three CONUS-based corps headquarters and ten active divisions, with only two divisions based outside continental United States (OCONUS). Corps and division headquarters add a capacity most nations with either smaller militaries or only local defensive forces do not possess. Therefore, these headquarters are a scarce, global resource to synchronize effects and operations at the operational level across the joint interagency intergovernmental multinational (JIIM) environment.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, described the future environment and the globally integrated operations required for the Nation in the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*. This concept envisions joint and partner elements combining quickly to integrate echelons and capabilities to leverage advantage against threats characterized by “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, competitor states, violent extremism, regional instability, transnational criminal activity, and competition for resources.”¹³ The Army RAF concept, especially the role of divisions and corps as JTF-capable HQs, complements the concepts, and resultant force employment implications.

The requirement for organizations to form and deploy with global agility to execute mission command in a JIIM environment is critical. Regional expertise in organizations and individuals facilitates global posture and speed through understanding from increasingly CONUS-based forces, in order to empower operational and informational networks in GCCs, functional commands, and across the JIIM environment. Headquarters require versatility as “broad trends in warfare cannot often be discerned in advance, it will be impossible to predict with certainty when, where, and for what purpose Joint Forces will operate.”¹⁴ Finally, both Joint Force 2020 and the RAF concept highlight the importance of regional expertise, interoperability, mission command, and relationship building.¹⁵

Regionally Aligned Forces Concept

The Army defines RAF as:

Regionally Aligned Forces provide the Combatant Commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities Service Retained, Combatant Command aligned and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. Includes Army total force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.¹⁶

This definition provides clarity of purpose, emphasis on relationships, and focus for Army forces and headquarters. The purpose is clearly to support the assigned, allocated, or aligned forces with the capacity and capability that GCCs require. The concept emphasizes the importance of relationships and environmental understanding. Organizations develop relationships and trust across the JIIM environment based on regional missions and exercises before crises. The subordinate command tailors the training, manning, and equipping to the environment and unique interoperability requirements. The RAF concept also facilitates efficiencies in training and education in cultural, regional expertise, and language skills (CREL) focused on a specific region or defined area. Habitual relationships and geographic focus reduce the time to "cold start" a headquarters for a mission or exercise and enables more efficient stewardship of resources.

Army units now fall under one of three different support relationships to GCCs for the purposes of RAF implementation. They are assigned, allocated, or service retained/combatant command aligned (SRCA) through a mission alignment order. SRCA is an Army term that is understood by the Joint Staff, but not yet recognized in joint doctrine.¹⁷ These relationships allow for direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) with ASCCs and GCCs, but the headquarters remain assigned to FORSCOM until operationally required.

RAF Nested in the Army Vision

The Army Vision in the 2013 Army Posture Statement is:

The Army is regionally engaged and globally responsive; it is an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational environment. As part of the Joint Force and as America's Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility and depth to Prevent, Shape and Win.¹⁸

The benefit realized through regional alignment is in developing and sustaining regional relationships and understanding to the combatant commander's advantage. American forces demonstrated agility and versatility as conventional forces executed diverse missions over the last thirteen years of war. Many assumptions valid in Iraq and Afghanistan may not be valid in future conflicts, from size of coalition, permissible entry points, size of the U.S. Army, and presence of a mature infrastructure. The Army must transition from a counter-insurgency focus to global understanding in order to facilitate the agility, versatility and depth to "Prevent, Shape and Win." In the words of Sun Tzu, "What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge."¹⁹

To be globally responsive, specific units must develop understanding or that foreknowledge of specific regions through engagement. While the Sun Tzu quote was in reference to the use of spies, the preceding verse is applicable to the current security environment, for “to remain in ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments is the height of inhumanity.”²⁰ The RAF concept is the most efficient and effective way to develop understanding to meet combatant commander requirements from an increasingly CONUS-based force. Because habitually aligned units develop and maintain communications and relationships with counterparts in their supported GCC, the insights and understanding gained in those relationships may in the future bear the fruits of anticipation.

A critically important aspect to the Army’s vision statement’s strategic approach is preventing conflict and shaping the environment. RAF units accomplish this vision through steady-state activities in all geographic combatant commands in support of their theater security cooperation plans (TSCP). Units accomplish the effects of preventing and shaping through engagement, access, relationship building, partnership, and capacity-building investments prior to crisis. In deliberate operations, achieving stability in phases 1 (shaping) and 2 (detering) is key to preventing escalation of regional conflict.²¹ Post-conflict, RAF forces provide the best option to sustain gains in phase 4 (stabilize) and phase 5 (enable civil authority) as the cultural understanding, relationships, and capacity building are most critical.²² Being regionally engaged through steady-state operations across the globe, while having the capacity to be globally responsive, is the best strategy for the means available. Using corps and division headquarters for mission command leverages the experience and power of executing JIIM engagement at the general-officer level, habitually focused on specific regions.

RAF Corps and Divisions as a JTF-Capable Headquarters

The Army corps is the operational headquarters for decisive land combat. The division is the tactical headquarters designed to synchronize brigades in full spectrum operations. Each can become a JTF with augmentation and certification.²³ Joint Publication 3.33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, states the preferred way to build a joint task force is around an existing headquarters.²⁴ In FM 3-92, *Corps Operations*, and the soon-to-be published FM 3-94, *Division, Corps and Theater Operations*, the JTF role is doctrinally secondary to the roles of ARFOR or land component commander.²⁵

The reputation and power of a U.S. JTF headquarters is built upon JTF past performance, a rigorous certification process, authorities of the commander, and synchronizing effects of joint manning. “A combatant commander (CCDR) will be the JTF establishing authority in most situations, but SecDef, a sub-unified command commander, and a commander, joint task force, also may establish subordinate JTFs.”²⁶ The Army’s goal is to make all corps and divisions JTF Capable HQs by 2017 in support of the RAF concept and combatant commanders.²⁷ Becoming JTF capable requires meeting expectations of the supported CCDR in mission-essential tasks (METL), preparing a joint task force joint manning document (JMD), preparing a joint mission-essential equipment list (JMEEL), implementing a joint training plan, and possessing and reporting acceptable mission readiness posture as that JTF-capable HQ (see Figure 5).²⁸

Two major challenges in employing divisions and corps as joint headquarters are the time required to (a) build situational awareness and (b) build the joint team. Regional crises requiring a JTF, by nature, are expedient events. The average planning time for HQs to build and deploy as a JTF for a contingency is forty-two days.²⁹ Activating Reserve Component (RC) individuals or accomplishing JMD sourcing in time to employ is problematic, not to mention having them arrive for team building and the planning process. The more ad-hoc an organization is, the longer it takes to achieve common vision, training certification, and unity of action. In augmenting the core of a JTF-HQ, the command receives personnel from joint organizations, individuals from other services, inter-organizational partners, liaison officers, and possibly the JECC.³⁰ Each source has

different strengths, weaknesses, and responsiveness to consider in building and certifying the JTF. Repetition of JTF exercises and operations in aligned regions increases competency and speed in building teams, based on mutual understanding of requirements, shortfalls, and capabilities in that GCC, and even in specific regions designated by the GCC.




Figure 5. Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters Readiness³¹

The JECC formation provides a stopgap in manning and equipment with joint capacity until individual augmenters arrive. The JECC provides mission-tailored, joint capability to establish JTFs for a short period of use, maximum of 120 days; longer through the request for forces (RFF) process. The JECC consists of three elements: a Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), a Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE), and a Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE).³² Once JMD augmentation positions become filled, the JECC elements return to USTRANSCOM. Combining JECC expertise, in critical joint functions absent from corps and division headquarters with the RAF HQs regional expertise for the critical planning and initial phases of deployment and employment of the JTF, is a powerful technique to build speed and capacity.

Under RAF, the Army requires corps and divisions to train as JTF-capable HQs, implying multiple roles for the corps and divisions. Adding the task of "operate as a JTF-capable HQs" distributes the command's focus in three directions: training, readiness and exercise missions under the Title 10 and AR 220-1; home-station requirements; and JTF certification requirements. Army headquarters' certification requirements, while complementary, do not satisfy joint requirements, especially if the joint manning and equipping is not complete or the certification of exercises is not from a joint source.³³ The headquarters continue to have multiple foci when deployed as a JTF HQs and must fulfill ARFOR requirements, potentially some degree of CFLCC duties, meet requirements of the ASCC, and continue to meet home-station requirements. The multiple roles force the JTF headquarters to operate up, down, across, and back.

Alignment

Regionally aligning the headquarters focuses and develops depth in situational awareness, thus reducing the impact of a cold start. This focus is critical for planners in operations, logistics, communications, and intelligence war-fighting functions (WFF). This focus also increases the depth of relationships and interoperability with foreign partners or other departments and agencies of the government already being built by previous exercises as part of the TSCP. During the Cold War, return of forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises developed that level of partnership, interoperability, and coalition resolve against the Soviet Union. REFORGER included North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and U.S. forces from both CONUS and Europe in large, annual exercises on location in Europe. The focus on regions in the RAF concept increases familiarity with standing contingency and operational plans in a similarly resolute and consistent manner.

Greater staff situational understanding increases operational effectiveness. Often, joint task forces receive augmentation by higher-level staff members from that GCC. In coalition operations, JTFs must leverage U.S. and host-nation liaison officers. "Commanders and staffs must account for differences in partners' laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language."³⁴ JTFs can use multinational officers in key positions to underscore their inclusion and gain clarity on the cultural differences from their experience and regional perspective. The habitual nature of RAF increases the common vision between headquarters. Corps and division habitual alignment is especially important for the Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP), which permanently assigns exchange officers between U.S. and foreign staffs.³⁵ If headquarters routinely change alignment, then the utility of the MPEP experience is lost both for the U.S. and the exchange country. The long-term alignment of corps and division headquarters will increase the speed and effectiveness to execute an operational mission in the same region as aligned, should the requirement develop.

The Department of the Army (DA) goal is to align divisions habitually by 2017 once the drawdown from Afghanistan reduces operational demand. The current habitual alignments are I Corps to PACOM, III Corps to CENTCOM, and XVIII Airborne Corps to the Global Response Force (GRF) mission.³⁶ At the division level, the Army assigned the 25th Infantry Division and 2nd Infantry Division to PACOM.³⁷ CENTCOM's current requirements are two divisions to the OEF mission and a portion of 1st Armored Division to Jordan.³⁸ The 82nd Airborne Division is allocated to the Global Reaction Force mission.³⁹ The requirements leave five active divisions and ten National Guard divisions to cover AFRICOM, NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM and EUCCOM.⁴⁰ However, as long as the rotational division requirement remains in Afghanistan, a division is committed to the train up for OEF and one division is in reset from OEF. BCTs require another decade to all be regionally aligned, based on operational requirements and budgetary effects on readiness.⁴¹ The current alignments do not preclude the use of those forces in other theaters based on contingency operational requirements, but designate the corps and division headquarters as the sourcing solution of choice by the Army for those regions.

RAF does not drastically adjust force management, but provides better focus and alignment to regional or mission sets earlier. The RAF concept provides units and headquarters with real-world missions and depth in regional expertise contributing to TSCPs. RAF links GCC demand to resources and readiness. Headquarters thus build habitual relationships with the GCCs, ASCCs, U.S. Government agencies in the region, and host-nation militaries. SRCA permits that linkage while FORSCOM retains responsibility for Title 10 requirements and flexibility to manage readiness and deployments based on global requirements.

If FORSCOM does not habitually align brigades with the same GCC as the regionally aligned division for the long-term, then efforts dissipate across multiple AORs. The concept does not align all brigades

numbered in military heraldry with that division, as the GCC may need a mix of infantry, stryker, and armored brigade combat teams. Training resources for CREL is more efficient at home-station if the alignment of brigades does not change except for contingencies. There is additional benefit in the GCC and ASCC giving guidance to brigades through divisions that are aligned and have a common understanding and vision. Division and brigade alignment will not always be possible, but FORSCOM should prioritize habitual RAF alignment as sourcing criteria for SRCA.

Combatant Command Approaches

CENTCOM and PACOM applied the RAF concept against unique operational requirements. CENTCOM deployed the 1st Armored Division (-) in Jordan as a response to conflict in Syria. PACOM's Pacific Pathways approach applies RAF units against the PACOM TSCP exercises, while PACOM postures equipment and units to address any emerging operational needs. In both cases RAF headquarters, GCCs, and partners gained advantage from regionally-focused headquarters with JTF capability.

When the Army expanded the RAF concept to corps and division headquarters in May 2012, 1AD aligned with CENTCOM, who then used 1AD headquarters for exercises with Saudi Arabia and Jordan in 2012 and 2013. In addition, the division headquarters supported CENTCOM forward command posts with individual personnel. CENTCOM also focused the division on a specific known area of conflict and concern, the Levant region of Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. CENTCOM fulfilled TSC and manning requirements while developing the regional expertise, JIIM relationships, and the capacity of the 1AD Headquarters. Regional focus led to 1AD being not just the sourcing solution of choice for the GCC, but also for the Jordanians in Exercise Eager Lion 2013.⁴²

This regional alignment focused 1AD's CREL training to a specific region and mission profile. Within the AOR, 1AD headquarters tailored command posts and develop a joint and multinational mentality on a real-world problem through multiple exercises. Receiving that focus early also provided the division time to reach back to the Army War College and its Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) for help, along with humanitarian assistance training from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Additionally, a result of regional alignment and early planning was the resourcing of the JECC to train the division headquarters' staff.⁴³

In May 2013, 1AD headquarters deployed a tactical command post forward to base outside Amman, Jordan to become CENTCOM Forward – Jordan (CF-J) with augmentation from other services, multinational LNOs, and some civilians.⁴⁴ The mission in the words of SECDEF Hagel was to, “improve readiness and prepare for a number of scenarios” in response to escalation of the Syrian crisis.⁴⁵ Thus, 1AD provided the U.S. a core headquarters element that was trained, possessed previous relationships with the Jordanian military, and understood the operational and strategic environment. This agility provided options to the combatant commander who created political leverage for the Obama administration, shaped the environment, and potentially prevented the expansion of conflict. Once the strategic direction changed, the headquarters quickly transitioned preparation to build military capacity, assist with refugee management, and sustain U.S. resources that filled gaps in Jordanian defenses.⁴⁶

The RAF approach allowed the division to develop depth in environmental understanding. CF-J adjusted the required senior rank structure based on the mission, potential force size, and political dynamics.⁴⁷ First Armored Division continues to leverage the JECC, PKSOI, and other organizations to refine their situational awareness. The experience garnered from previous exercises proved invaluable as the division formulated a shared vision and strategic narrative with the Department of State (DoS) and USAID, while balancing the strong relationship with the Jordanian military.

Having fewer divisions challenges the Army to sustain deployments over time, surge forces, and maintain reserves for contingencies. The 1st Armored Division changes personnel from its home-station headquarters to CF-J, as there is no capacity to rotate division headquarters based on the mission continuing indefinitely and the commitment of other Army divisions elsewhere.⁴⁸ Thus, CENTCOM committed its aligned division. CENTCOM would have to request another headquarters to fill any emergent requirement for a full division, which would not have the advantage of alignment to the AOR.

Rebalance to the Pacific through RAF

The effect of not employing PACOM units to OEF will effectively rebalance Army forces to weight the Pacific theater based on the number of assigned units.⁴⁹ Under RAF, 2ID with a rotational RAF armored BCT; 25ID with its brigades from Hawaii and Alaska; and I Corps Headquarters, with 7ID and its brigades, support the PACOM GCC.⁵⁰ PACOM's dilemma is how to sustain regional engagements across the vast AOR.

PACOM sustains an aggressive TSCP with multiple exercises, involving corps and division headquarters. In 2013, I Corps and 25 ID completed JTF certification exercises through joint exercises in the Pacific AOR.⁵¹ Corps and division HQs sent a tactical headquarters element to regional TSCP events to gain Pacific experience through coordination, exercise control, and as the principal training audience.⁵²

US Army Pacific (USARPAC) developed the Pacific Pathways plan to operationalize RAF employment, exercise the movement, and confirm the access of Stryker units afloat in the Pacific. Units deploy Stryker equipment, aviation assets, and forces from multifunctional brigades in Washington or Hawaii. Then equipment moves afloat along a "pathway" through Asia that intersects with security cooperation exercise locations. Soldiers and headquarters fly in, link with the equipment, and execute missions in support of the TSCP or in response to operational or humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) requirements.⁵³ At the operational level, I Corps establishes command relationships, sets conditions for the exercise, and manages the potential for continuous response to exigencies. During exercises, the 25ID headquarters assumes TACON of Pathway elements and operates as exercise director while performing ARFOR tasks. Upon completion of the proof of principle, USARPAC plans to expand the concept to more Pacific Pathway rotations each year.⁵⁴

Pacific Pathways derives the most advantage from its approach, effect, and engagement benefits. Pre-positioning the equipment afloat exercises and confirms the ability for U.S. access in the region, as well as enhances responsiveness. The long-term relationships and cultural understanding developed through habitual and repetitive train-ups, planning, coordination, and execution addresses PACOM and partner countries' requirements. Security cooperation increases capacity and support of America's partners in the region, producing better global security with less U.S. presence over time. The strategic communication effect is that U.S. actions confirm U.S. commitment to partners without the cost and risk of permanent overseas basing.

DOTMLPF Analysis

Across DOTMLPF, issues and opportunities exist by using RAF corps and division headquarters as JTFs for exercise and operations in support of GCC. Commanders shaping their regions to deter in steady state and defeat aggression through building partner capacity create an increase in demand for RAF units and headquarters, especially with the potential for more units available due to the expected end of OEF.⁵⁵ Regional focus with long-term aligned headquarters builds relationships and reduces risk through understanding. Corps and division headquarters must balance their Title 10 responsibilities, AR 220-1 training requirements, and home-station responsibilities with the preparation to certify as joint headquarters or sustain JTF capable HQ status. While DOTMLPF is an Army construct, the nature of this topic affects the joint community. The Joint

Staff and Army must adjust policies, mitigate weaknesses, and seize opportunities to support divisions and corps becoming joint task forces through the below recommendations.

Doctrine provides the military with a codified way to operate and fight. Under the RAF concept, all divisions and corps provide one joint capable headquarters to operate as joint task forces in support of the GCCs.⁵⁶ As the RAF concept is Army specific, the impacts of this concept have not manifested in joint doctrine. The recently published FM 3-92 *Corps Operations* addresses the challenges and requirements to operate as a joint task force by focusing Chapter 5 on “Corps Headquarters Transition to a joint task force Headquarters.”⁵⁷ The Army is focusing corps and division doctrine toward operations as a joint task force with the upcoming publishing of ADP 3-94 *Division, Corps, and Theater Army Operations* which will supersede the FM 3-91 *Division Operations* published in 1996. ADP 3-94 (final draft) plans to include RAF concepts. If RAF is to be an enduring concept, then its effect must be embedded in the doctrine for corps and division.⁵⁸

One of the primary risks to the RAF concept at the corps and division headquarters level is the loss of capacity based on cuts to headquarters force structure. In August 2013, SECDEF McHugh directed twenty-five percent cuts to two-star headquarters and above.⁵⁹ In addition to the twenty-five percent reduction, active-duty manning efficiencies may result in a number of slots coded as Reserve Component (RC) positions. Currently, DA recommendations select most of the positions to code as RC in human intelligence, fire support, liaison officers and airspace coordination cells, all in the main command post.⁶⁰

Degradation in manning negatively affects the building of certified teams and employing tailored portions of the headquarters. Forming a JTF will still require augmentation through a JMD. The more often divisions and corps operate as JTF headquarters or train as a JTF-capable headquarters, the better the fidelity of their JMEELs and JMDs. If the JMEEL and JMD requirements are consistent across aligned division and corps for all GCCs, then those requirements and constructs might shape joint organizational formations and Army force structure, similarly to the former SJTFHQ-CE or current JECC.

The joint staff should expand the number of JECC teams to allow depth for operational employment, incorporation in exercises, and retention of capacity for the GRF. The joint staff should review the manning mix of the Joint Planning Support Element based on the reduction in table of organization and equipment (TOE) of the division and corps headquarters to include accounting for those positions moved to the reserve component. This review provides the HQs experienced joint capacity best tailored to the task requirements of the JTF headquarters.

There is little depth in the number of corps and division headquarters for geographic regions and strategic application, even after the withdrawal of forces from OEF. Three corps headquarters and ten active duty division headquarters divide against six GCCs, the GRF mission, and the defense of Korea.⁶¹ The 1AD employment in Jordan now commits a significant portion of that headquarters against that mission until complete or transitioned to a standing JTF. Division HQs rotations in support of OEF also reduce capacity based on the time for train-up and reset. Divisions must also conduct TSCP exercises. The Joint Staff requirement to manage established standing joint task forces or require GCC to sustain the deployment of the RAF JTF increases in importance. The flexibility required for divisions as a resource underscores the necessity of the long-term SRCA relationship to provide focus and DIRLAUTH for the GCC, while allowing global flexibility for the Joint Staff and the Army.

Three important issues for corps and division training under RAF are the certification as a joint task force, the incompatibility of the ARFORGEN process based on a lack of depth in numbers of corps and division headquarters, and language training. The Army needs to manage individual and collective education, training, and certification toward joint requirements while also meeting Army requirements.

The Army needs to strive to leverage as many exercises as possible to sustain JTF capable HQs capacity. ASCCs and FORSCOM need to encourage the Joint Staff to expand the joint exercise program to include exercises that are currently Army specific. Corps' decisive action METL now includes JTF certification and the division decisive action METL now includes a JTF capable, intermediate tactical HQ requirement.⁶² Training requirements for decisive action METLs can complement joint headquarters and regional exercises. Corps and division staffs must understand the joint training program requirements and the joint exercise program in addition to the Army readiness and training requirements. U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (USTRADOC) needs to coordinate with the Joint Staff and FORSCOM to make efforts to embed efficiencies in managing the dual, but complimentary systems.

The RAF concept uses the ARFORGEN template and approach to manage resources to generate unit readiness. Using ARFORGEN for BCTs creates less friction in establishing the RAF concept than creating another process. The model of reset, train, and employ does not work if a GCC is one deep with most corps and division headquarters, with the exception of CENTCOM and PACOM, which reflects rebalance to the Pacific and focus on OEF and the Middle-East. Corps and divisions must be managed as low density high demand organizations in the mission force pool requiring continuous availability periods.⁶³ Long term SRCA alignment provides GCC depth, corps and division efficiencies, and FORSCOM flexibility.

Alignment of units assists in efficiencies in CREL training, but achieving measurable language proficiency levels is unrealistic for most personnel and may not match career assignments. The Army should expand the Olmsted and other scholarship programs for regional/language expertise for post-key developmental (KD) field-grade positions. These initiatives imbue more regional expertise, language training, and joint training earlier in careers. In addition, the Army should revisit the dual track program for foreign area officers, who develop expertise in language that would give advantages in operational positions on coalition headquarters staffs. These initiatives require analysis by branch proponents and human resource commands to prevent unattended consequences. Furthermore, talent management and habitual alignment increases returns on investment in exercises, deployments, and language training.⁶⁴

Command and control (C2) systems' requirements will increase given the growth in exercises, operations, and transitions to JTFs across the GCC's TSCPs. Maintaining portions of the HQs at home-station increases requirements. There are limited resources in the JCSE for immediate employment. Corps and divisions need to recapitalize OEF Regional Command and CJTF command and control equipment to establish home-station mission command suites. This mission command capacity could assist brigade and below elements deployed in the region and provide reach-back when JTF-HQs are employed for exercises and operations. Headquarters should prepare to operate more austere than they have the last 10 years of OIF and OEF. Habitual regional alignment permits headquarters to better anticipate C2 challenges better through mission analysis and repetition to forecast equipment, certification, and training requirements.

The RAF concept complements mission command as described in General Martin Dempsey's 3 April 2012 White Paper, "Mission Command." Regional alignment facilitates building the key attributes of understanding the environment; communicating vision and intent; and establishing trust early between Army corps and divisions and the ASCC and GCC. The TSCPs and long-term regional focus provide the ability to build teams and networks before crisis. RAF facilitates headquarters leadership achieving competitive tempo, "operating at the speed of the problem," and effectively dealing with complexity and ambiguity.⁶⁵

Corps and division rank structure allows for three- and two-star commander engagement by an operational headquarters with regional and strategic JIIM partners. Under the RAF concept, these commanders drive the operational process, develop teams, and inform and influence internal and external audiences across services, agencies, and countries.⁶⁶ Having general officers as JTF deputy commanders creates flexibility in non-

contiguous operations, especially for span of control challenges. Corps headquarters, by design, command subordinate organizations led by general officers and have a higher rank structure and experience level in deputies and functional staff. As only three corps headquarters remain in the Army, division headquarters are more readily available and regionally focused in every GCC. Division leadership must develop the capacity to lead coalitions, to include units led by multinational general officers; meet home-station requirements; and meet ASCC, JTF, and ARFOR requirements.

Three personnel issues are salient for the RAF concept: coding for joint professional military education (JPME) II, individual regional alignment, and joint augmentation. There are opportunities to enable headquarters and the RAF concept; The Joint Staff and TRADOC, through JPME, must provide better joint preparation for corps and division staff officers. Providing more JPME II school slots are a coding, officer time, and school capacity issue. The corps and division TOE needs more 3H – Joint Planner positions for their staffs, especially in the TAC. The Army should consider mandatory JPME II certification as an elective at the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) course for majors projected to certain corps and division staff positions. Students in the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) should attend the JPME II course between ILE and SAMS, as all graduates will serve on corps, division, or higher staff and therefore need certification to operate in JTFs.

To get the most out of the RAF concept, the Army must transform its personnel management system to optimize talent use.⁶⁷ Enhanced talent management would assign an identifier for regional alignment at the field-grade level for officers to indicate specific regional experience. This identifier, like other skills, would be a descriptive criteria when determining future assignments, as an army skill identifier (ASI) or a secondary MOS code like the foreign area officer letter designation after the '48' denoting regional focus. The assignment process could also consider regional experience in command and key-billet slating guidance, fellowship applications, and broadening assignments. Coding the duty positions creates too much complexity on the TOE and assignment process. Managing individual alignment at the field-grade level allows development of breadth in experience, allows cross pollination of ideas between regions, and prevents "being stuck" at one location or region based on one's first assignment. However, the needs of the Army, other skills or experience, and officer choice would still be criteria. General Allyn, the FORSCOM commander, states "ideally, units and Soldiers that have gained valuable experience through regional alignment will build upon their experiences as they rotate to other assignments."⁶⁸ Currently there is no way to manage regional experience data for talent management across the Army.

CJCS Dempsey is promoting regional depth through career management with the Pacific Hands programs. The program aligns an officer's operational, broadening, and staff assignments, CREL training, and education to a geographic region.⁶⁹ Considering thirteen years of war focused on the CENTCOM region and the rebalance to Asia, beginning a Hands program with PACOM's AOR is a valid start. Currently, assignments do not deliberately develop depth in a region, but under RAF expansion, a Hands program in all regions is essential.

If corps and division headquarters under RAF train and employ as joint headquarters capable staffs, then manning policies should resemble joint staffs in coding, duration and training. Currently only one position in these staffs is a 3H – joint planner coded billet. More positions, especially in the TAC, need to be coded as such. Officers filling 3H – joint planner billets must remain in the headquarters for longer tours, three years as the joint standard. Lieutenant colonel key positions on the division staff should occur post-battalion command for two years and allow for a Senior Service College waiver. The Army needs to incentivize lieutenant colonel positions on the division staff in a similar fashion as positions like Combined Training Center senior trainers and division G3s positions to draw and reward talent.

Corps and division home-station posts need mission command facilities and joint connectivity capacity with theater to track ongoing operations and train JTFs prior to employment. Some headquarters currently have these facilities. The Army can recapitalize hardware resources available through the drawdown of the Army and redeployment of equipment from theater. This equipment provides reach-back capacity for the division across staff functions when deployed, subordinate unit teams, or other JTFs in the region, reducing the required footprint forward. There are existing and historic examples to make valid assumptions for the facilities, JMDs, and JMEELs to increase the corps and division capacity to sustain readiness as a JTF-capable HQs.

The Army plans to reduce to 450,000 active-duty personnel and must balance priorities due to the effects of a smaller budget and potential sequestration. If the Army does not have the funds to train, equip, and deploy, then maintaining regional expertise, relationships, readiness, access, and relevance becomes problematic.⁷⁰ In testimony to Congress in September 2013 on planning for sequestration, General Raymond Odierno established five priorities to “ensure that we align resources to set ourselves on course to realize this Army.”⁷¹ The top three relate directly to the RAF concept and are “to develop adaptive Army leaders for a complex world, to build a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army; and to provide a scalable and ready, modern force.”⁷² The effects of the budget occur regardless of RAF. In the words of General Odierno, “Regional alignment does not create new, unfunded requirements for training, equipping, or employing the Army Force, nor does it create new programs for overseas employment. It better organizes and prepares the Army to fulfill existing, funded requirements.”⁷³

Commanders and resource managers must become more adaptable and disciplined in resourcing regional alignment. Corps and division leadership and planners need an increase in travel funds; logistic and sustainment for small, distributed teams; training and education resources; communications solutions for globally distributed operations; and interpreter funding to build relationships, manage operations tempo, and develop regional expertise. Different environments will require off-the-shelf or rapid equipping force solutions.⁷⁴ Such fiscal flexibility requires disciplined management to prevent abuse, but cannot be restrictive to relationship building or effective operations. Organizations executing RAF for GCCs can leverage funding sources such as Title 22 (DoS authorities and funding), joint exercises, etc. Funding requires a balance, but the current fiscal environment has the propensity to cause commands to default to a restrictive posture.

One risk to the nation is a loss in ability to maneuver at brigade and higher echelons due to focusing on other tasks and echelons. Another risk is that America only engages in conflicts it can afford, leading to a decline of international influence from limited national military power or national will to deter threats. The opportunity in the RAF concept is that a smaller military forces America to partner and help build capacity for its allies and rely more on the economic, informational, and diplomatic elements of national power. Regional alignment facilitates those relationships and approaches.

Conclusion

The RAF concept is the way ahead and habitually aligned divisions are the key to success. The FORSCOM commander, General Allyn, stated best, “The stability for regional alignment comes from the Army corps and division headquarters that continue to maintain a focus on the same region year after year.”⁷⁵ The Army must commit to long-term SRCA of headquarters to GCCs, increase efforts to align enablers and BCTs to corps and divisions, and expand the Hands program to regionally align individuals to all regions in order to realize advantages in mission command and maximize returns on investment for regional expertise.

The joint community and Army must better enable corps and division headquarters to be the core elements of JTF headquarters before crisis to benefit from regional alignment in achieving national interests

for geographic combatant commanders. The joint staff must expand the JECC and work with the Army to integrate Army and joint requirements for training, manning and equipping. The Army must establish mission command capacity at home-station to facilitate building and training JTF-capable HQs and to provide reach-back for HQs, BCTs, and enablers in the aligned region. Finally, the Army must build depth in joint certification through coding more corps and division positions as joint planners, thus requiring JPME II for majors and lieutenant colonels on the staff.

Many challenges would exist with or without RAF, but the initiative reduces “cold starts,” builds teams, develops individual and unit depth in regional expertise, and establishes shared vision and trust earlier during steady state activities. The RAF concept, Defense Strategic Guidance, Joint Vision 2020, and the Army Vision all require long-term commitment to shape regions and build partner capacity with less forces that are regionally focused, but predominately CONUS-based. The priority effort for RAF must be enabling division headquarters’ operational mission command as a JTF-capable HQ to link the tactical success to the GCC strategic plan in order to prevent, shape, and win.

Notes

¹ Raymond Odierno, “Waypoint 2: Follow up to CSA’s Marching Orders,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, January 2014 <http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/329319.pdf>, accessed on March 1, 2014.

² John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *Army Posture Statement 2013, Fiscal Year 2013*, Posture Statement presented to the 113th Cong., 1st sess. <http://www.army.mil/info/institution/posturestatement/> (accessed January 10, 2014), p. 4-5.

³ Rob McIlvaine, “Odierno: Regional Alignments to Begin Next Year,” May 16, 2012, linked from the United States Army Home Page, <http://www.army.mil/article/79919/> (accessed March 10, 2014).

⁴ Robert W. Cone, “Regional Alignment of Forces”, DA G3/5/7 briefing slides with scripted commentary, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 16, 2013, p. 4.

⁵ There are six geographic combatant commanders: Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), Africa Command (AFRICOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM) and three Functional Combatant Commanders: Strategic Command (STRATCOM), Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

⁶ Vincent H. Demma, ed. by Susan Carroll, *Department of the Army Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1989*, Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 1998, <http://www.history.army.mil/books/DAHSUM/1989/CH5.htm>, accessed on March 1, 2014, pp. 64-65.

⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *FMI 3-0.1 Field Manual-Interim Headquarters No. 3-0.1*, Field Manual Interim 3-0.1, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, January 28, 2008, <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-0-1.pdf>, accessed on February 15, 2014, pp. vii to 1-2.

⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *FMI 3-0.1*, pp. 1-9 to 1-11.

⁹ John M. McHugh, George W. Casey, Jr., A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2010, Addendum F Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) The Army’s Core Process, 2nd Sess., 111th Cong., February 2010, [https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposture_statement/2010/addenda/Addendum_F-Army%20Force%20Generation%20\(ARFORGEN\).asp](https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposture_statement/2010/addenda/Addendum_F-Army%20Force%20Generation%20(ARFORGEN).asp), accessed on March 10, 2014.

¹⁰ Jim Garamone, “Joint Forces Command Cases its Colors,” Washington: *American Forces Press Service*, Aug. 4, 2011 <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64927>, accessed on February 27, 2014.

¹¹ Patrick C. Sweeney, *A Primer for Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)*, The United States Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, December 10, 2013, pp. 5-7.

¹² Jim Garamone, “Joint Forces Command Cases its Colors.”

¹³ Martin E. Dempsey, “*Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*,” September 10, 2012, pp. 2-4.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ (FOUO) Raymond Odierno, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, “FRAGO 1 to HQDA Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) EXORD,” Washington, DC, Headquarters, Department of Army, October 17, 2013, 1.C.2.D. [This information is drawn from a FOUO document, but the portion of the information cited is unlimited unclassified.]

¹⁷ (FOUO) Raymond Odierno, "FRAGO 1 to HQDA Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) EXORD," 1.C.2.B. [This information is drawn from a FOUO document, but the portion of the information cited is unlimited unclassified.]

¹⁸ John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *Army Posture Statement 2013, Fiscal Year 2013*.

¹⁹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 145.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 144.

²¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning 5.0*, Joint Publication 5.0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), pp. 3-41 to 3-44.

²² Ibid.

²³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Corps Operations*, FM 3-92 (FM 100-15), Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, November 26, 2010, pp. 5-1 to 5-3.

²⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Joint Task Force Headquarters 3-33*, p. 2-1.

²⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, *Corps Operations*, FM 3-92 (FM 100-15), pp. 1-2.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 22.

²⁷ (FOUO) Raymond Odierno, "FRAGO 1 to HQDA Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) EXORD," 1.C.5.C.2. [This information is drawn from a FOUO document, but the portion of the information cited is unlimited unclassified.]

²⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Joint Task Force Headquarters 3-33*, Appendix B-3.

²⁹ Patrick C. Sweeney, *A Primer for Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)*, pp. 5-7.

³⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Joint Task Force Headquarters 3-33*, pp. 2-3 to 2-6.

³¹ M. Matthews, "Protection Workshop," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Leonardwood, MO, U.S. Army, January 27, 2007.

³² Ibid.

³³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Joint Task Force Headquarters 3-33*, Appendix B 1- 6.

³⁴ Ibid., Appendix B 1-8.

³⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Military Personnel Exchange Program with Military Services of other Nations*, Army Regulation 614-10, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, July 14, 2011.

³⁶ Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland, "Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual," *Parameters* 43, no.3, Autumn 2013, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn_2013/5_Field.pdf, accessed on February 16, 2014, p. 60.

³⁷ Global Security's website, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) web page, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usarpac.htm>, accessed on March 22, 2014.

Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., Patrick Matlock, Christopher R. Norrie, Karen Radka, "Mission Command in the Regionally Aligned Division Headquarters," *Military Review*, November-December 2013, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20131231_art004.pdf, accessed on January 20, 2014.

³⁸ International Security Assistance Force Webpage regional command south and east pages, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/>, accessed on March 20, 2014.

³⁹ Thom Shanker, "After Years at War, the Army Adapts to Garrison Life," *New York Times*, January 18, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/us/after-years-at-war-the-army-adapts-to-garrison-life.html>, accessed on March 20, 2014.

⁴⁰ The National Guard divisions also have requirements for homeland security and homeland defense and are impacted by a longer availability and readiness cycle.

⁴¹ Email to author from COL James J. Learmont (UK), March 11, 2014.

⁴² Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., Patrick Matlock, Christopher R. Norrie, Karen Radka, "Mission Command in the Regionally Aligned Division Headquarters."

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Karen Radka, 1AD Division Staff Officer, "Training for a Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) Division Headquarters," Information Paper, Fort Bliss, TX, October 10, 2013.

⁴⁵ Barbara Starr, "U.S. Military to Step up Presence in Jordan in Light of Syria Civil War," *CNN Pentagon Correspondent*, April 19, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/17/world/us-jordan-troops-order/>, accessed on February 10, 2014.

⁴⁶ Karen Parrish, "Dempsey Visits U.S. Troops Serving in Jordan," *American Forces Press Service*, Amman, Jordan, August 15, 2013, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120629>, accessed on March 1, 2014.

⁴⁷ Interview with COL Mark Haseman, U.S. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 11, 2014.

⁴⁸ Karen Parrish, "Dempsey Visits U.S. Troops Serving in Jordan."

⁴⁹ U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Readiness of the Committee on Armed Services, *The Readiness Posture of the U.S. Army*, 113th cong., 1st sess., April 16, 2013, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg80758/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg80758.pdf>, accessed on March 12, 2014, p. 25.

⁵⁰ Vincent K. Brooks, "U.S. Army Pacific and the Pacific Rebalance," *Army Magazine*, Greenbook, October 2013, http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2013/10/Documents/Brooks_Greenbook2013.pdf, accessed on February 20, 2014, p. 122. 7ID is not an MTOE division, but provides title 10 functions for 6 brigades (3 of which are Stryker BCTs) at Fort Lewis. 25ID contains two Stryker BCTs, one Infantry BCT and one Airborne BCT.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁵² USARPAC Homepage exercise link, <http://www.usarpac.army.mil/exercises.asp>, accessed on February 20, 2014.

⁵³ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Army's 'Pacific Pathways' initiative sets up turf battle with Marines," *The Washington Post*, December 29, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/armys-pacific-pathways-initiative-sets-up-turf-battle-with-marines/2013/12/29/11c948c8-69b1-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html, accessed on February 20, 2014.

⁵⁴ USARPAC G3, "Pathways FY14 USARPAC G3 Synch Conference", briefing slides staff assessment, I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington, January 14, 2014.

⁵⁵ Barack Obama, *Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, *Defense Strategic Guidance 2012*, Washington, DC: The White House, January 3, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf, accessed on March 1, 2014, p. 4.

⁵⁶ (FOUO) John F. Campbell, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, "Execution Order 052-13 (ISO Regionally Aligned Forces)," Washington, DC, Headquarters, Department of Army, December 12, 2012. Para 3.a. (2) (c). [This information is drawn from a FOUO document, but the portion of the information cited is unlimited unclassified.]

⁵⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-92 Corps Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, November 2010, p. 5-1 to 5-15.

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *FM (Draft) 3-94 Division, Corps, and Theater Army Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, draft as of March 2014. Previous Division field manual, FM 71-100 Division Operations, is dated 1996. The author chose to reference a draft for relevancy.

⁵⁹ Brendan McGarry, "Army Races to Cut Headquarters Staff by 25 Percent," *Military.com News*, August 20, 2013 <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/08/20/army-races-to-cut-headquarters-staff-by-25-percent.html>, accessed on March 1, 2014.

⁶⁰ Mission Command Center of Excellence, "Division & Corps Headquarters Requirements Determination", briefing slides, February 18, 2014.

⁶¹ Robert W. Cone, "Regional Alignment of Forces", DA G3/5/7 briefing slides with scripted commentary, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 16, 2013, p. 5.

⁶² U.S. Army FORSCOM, "Preparing Regionally Aligned Forces to Meet CCMD Requirements," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, November 18, 2013, slide 12.

⁶³ (FOUO) Raymond Odierno, "FRAGO 1 to HQDA Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) EXORD," 1.C.5.B.1. [This information is drawn from a FOUO document, but the portion of the information cited is unlimited unclassified.]

⁶⁴ Lance M. Bacon, "Regional Alignment May Boost Soldiers' Career Stability," *The Army Times*, December 10, 2013, <http://www.armytimes.com/article/20131210/CAREERS/312100016/Regional-alignment-may-boost-Soldiers-career-stability>, accessed on March 10, 2014.

⁶⁵ Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Mission Command White Paper", 3 April 2012, [http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/misioncommandwhite paper 2012.pdf](http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/misioncommandwhite%20paper%2012.pdf), accessed on February 20, 2014. U.S. Department of the Army, *Mission Command*, ADP 6-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 17, 2012, p. 1-5.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁶⁷ Raven Bukowski, John Childress, Michael J. Colarusso, David S. Lyle, "Creating an Effective Regional Alignment Strategy for the U.S. Army," Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, November 2014, p.5.

⁶⁸ Michelle Tan, "FORSCOM Chief: Demand Grows for Regionally Aligned Forces," quote from General Daniel B. Allyn, FORSCOM Commander, *Defense News*, October 20, 2013, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131020/SHOWSCOUT04/310200014/AFRICOM-Regionally-Aligned-Forces-Find-Their-Anti-terror-Mission>, accessed on March 20, 2014.

⁶⁹ Martin E. Dempsey, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Asian-Pacific Hands Program," memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Services, Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Washington, DC, December 5, 2013.

⁷⁰ Chuck Hagel, *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 4, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf, accessed on March 10, 2012, pp. xiii to xiv.

David Vergun, "Regionally Aligned Forces Continue to Organize Despite Budget Uncertainties", *Army News Service*, October 23, 2013, http://www.army.mil/article/113660/Regionally_aligned_forces_continue_to_organize_despite_budget_uncertainties/, accessed on March 10, 2014.

⁷¹ Raymond T. Odierno, U.S. House of Representatives, *Planning for Sequestration in Fiscal Year 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review*, Committee on Armed Services, 113th cong., 1st sess., September 18, 2013, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg82963/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg82963.pdf>, accessed on March 28, 2014, p. 67.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Raymond T. Odierno, U.S. House of Representatives, *Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, Committee on Armed Services, 113th cong., 1st sess., April 25, 2013 <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg80767/html/CHRG-113hhrg80767.htm>, accessed on March 20, 2014.

⁷⁴ Kara Ewell, "Army Confirms Rapid Equipping Force as 'Enduring'", *Army News Service*, January 31, 2014, http://www.army.mil/article/119292/Army_confirms_Rapid_Equipping_Force_as_enduring/, accessed on March 13, 2014.

⁷⁵ Michelle Tan, "FORSCOM Chief: Demand Grows for Regionally Aligned Forces," *Defense News*, October 20, 2013 http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131020/SHOWSCOUT_04/31_0200014 (accessed March 22, 2014).

RAF and Authorities

Colonel Robert J. DeSousa and Colonel Scott J. Bertinetti

The method and manner in which the Army executes Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF) is evolving. The Army is changing and adapting the concept as it promulgates the idea across the force. Regional Alignment of Forces does not come with a Congressional mandate or specific statutory authority, and the utilization of forces in any circumstance requires clear authorities. Therefore, how RAF is implemented and under what legal authorizations are exceptionally important considerations.

History

The Army originally began the process by designating Regionally Aligned Brigades, primarily to assist combatant commanders (CCDR) with building partner capacity (BPC) and theater security cooperation (TSC) requirements.¹ With the end of hostilities in Iraq and the anticipated removal of combat troops from Afghanistan, the President of the United States (POTUS) emphasized his desire to share theater security responsibility with other nations.² By May 2012, General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) had expanded the concept of Regionally Aligned Brigades to include functional and multi-functional brigades, divisions, and corps. With this expansion, he introduced the term Regionally Aligned Forces into the Army lexicon.³

Since September 2012, RAF has been understood by Army planners to be a concept rather than a change in doctrine. Its main purpose is to align Total Army (TA) forces to a combatant command (CCMD), whether assigned, allocated, or service retained CCMD aligned (SRCA). All Army units will be regionally aligned with the exception of special operations forces (SOF) and the global response forces (GRF). The goal is to meet CCMD requirements that exceed the capability of assigned or allocated forces.⁴ The definition of RAF used to analyze issues of authorities, as approved by the CSA on October 25, 2012, states:

Regionally Aligned Forces provide the Combatant Commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army *units assigned* to combatant commands, *allocated* to a combatant command, and those *capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army* for combatant command regional missions. Includes Army total force organizations and capabilities, which are forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including providing reach-back; prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Regional Missions are driven by combatant command requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.⁵

While the first use of a RAF unit, the Second Armored brigade combat team, First Infantry Division (2/1 ABCT) was deemed a success, its deployment to the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) AOR was not without challenges.⁶ Working with the authorities and limitations set by Congress, the Department of State (DoS) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) highlighted the difficulties in providing security cooperation activities in the AFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR). The operations began on March 15, 2013

and continued until June 15, 2014. The 2/1 ABCT commander's intent was to build long lasting relationships, which promote specific U.S. interests, while the partnered African land forces military capabilities of self-defense and regional stability were developing and progressing.⁷ Nevertheless, sixty percent of all 2/1 ABCT planned RAF missions at the time of its first interim after action report (AAR) were canceled due to lack of funding.⁸

The RAF concept introduces new terms such as "aligned" without new funds. The introduction of new terms and their application to the TA, combined with a myriad of possible existing authorities that could apply to RAF, warrant further discussion. The Total Army starts with the Active Component including the GRF, the operating force (OF), and SOF. It also includes the Reserve Components (RC), which consists of the Army Reserve (AR) and the National Guard (NG). Army civilians may also be included.⁹ Each force component may deal in different ways with various general and specific authorizations.

Title 10 of *United States Code* provides the legal basis for the roles, missions, and organization of each armed service. Title 32 of *United States Code* relates to the National Guard. Title 22 of *United States Code* outlines the role for foreign relations and engagement. Title 22 also references the manner in which the DoS may work with DoD, including the Army, to advance national interests. Title 50 of *United States Code*, War and National Defense, is of particular use to SOF. Title 50 authorities are beyond the RAF TSC and BPC goals; however, its applicability is addressed later in this report. Other potential authorities impacting RAF can be found in miscellaneous statutes and various yearly National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA). "The NDAA is the key mechanism to provide necessary authorities and funding for America's military."¹⁰ Some authorities may apply only to certain components or specific places. This report provides a point of initiation in identifying and understanding the legalities involved with the RAF concept.

RAF Terms

Each component of the TA will fall into one of the categories utilized for planning. The Army divides its force structure into the OF and the Generating Force (GF).¹¹ The OF includes units that are organized, trained and equipped to deploy and conduct joint operations in support of a combatant commander's objectives, whereas GF under RAF may simply be aligned.¹² The GF in the aligned stage is not fully equipped, ready to deploy, nor assigned to a combatant commander. If aligned, a RAF unit in the GF can initiate a relationship with the combatant commander, but is not tasked by this command. Separately, the GRF has a worldwide focus on specific missions and must be prepared to deploy within 18 hours. It is a service-retained unit that maintains high readiness and increased global responsiveness.¹³ In contrast, "RAF focuses on a specific theater for habitual planning, training, exercises, and response."¹⁴ The key is that RAF units are drawn from the total force and will be either assigned, allocated, apportioned, or SRCA.¹⁵

The first category of RAF is those units assigned to or allocated to a CCMD.¹⁶ Assigned forces are those forces, and resources, which have been placed under combatant command (COCOM) of a unified commander at the direction of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Assignments of forces are found in the Secretary's "Forces for" Unified Commands Memorandum and in Section II of the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) pursuant to the Unified Command Plan (UCP).¹⁷ This relationship is established by law. It is favored by CCDRs due to their ability to influence specific organizations and, importantly, it incorporates a clear chain of command. Closely related are allocated forces. The POTUS or the SECDEF provides allocated forces to a combatant commander for the execution of a specific assigned mission.¹⁸ Missions may include current operations and theater campaign plans within the parameters established by the SECDEF. Generally, only those Army forces allocated or assigned pursuant to the GFMIG

may be deployed in support of the CCDRs requirements.¹⁹ Apportionment guidance of forces for planning are described in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

The second category of RAF is those forces that are aligned, but service-retained.²⁰ Service retained forces may be aligned to a combatant command, but trained by the Army in culture, language, and customs for a specific mission or to a region or sub-region of a CCDR's AOR.²¹ Alignment is a developing term that the DoD has not defined. As envisioned, aligned RAF will understand the population of the region with which they are aligned, thereby enhancing ability to influence the human domain in the operational environment.²² Aligned forces are by law in the GF as "unassigned forces." While in the GF, they can still be OF. They are, however, neither assigned nor allocated to a unified combatant commander under the provisions of Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 162 and the UCP. As such, they remain under Army administrative control (ADCON) in order to execute functions assigned by the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY).²³ By being aligned, the forces establish a planning association with a specific CCMD. The planning association begins with a mission alignment order (MAO) during the unit's available period. Units are the primary sourcing option for SECDEF directed force allocations. During this time, direct liaison is authorized (DIRLAUTH) from the CCMD to the unit, but no command relationship exists. During the SRCA period, the unit may only execute those tasks specially outlined in law.²⁴ While there are clear limits on specific missions an aligned unit can perform during this period, creative and well-researched planning can mitigate the restrictions. The SECARMY has the authority to conduct the Title 10 recruit, train, and equip responsibilities that provide the limits of use to the CCMD during this period. Responsibilities are not restricted to the Continental United States (CONUS) and they could, if properly authorized, be done in the CCDR's AOR. When Army forces are regionally aligned within the geographic responsibility of the CCDR, they will normally be under operational control (OPCON) of the CCDR and ADCON to the Army Service Component Command (ASCC).²⁵

Statutory Authorities in General

RAF units will be assigned, allocated, or aligned to the geographic commandant commands (GCC) under established authorities and roles.²⁶ RAF units deployed to a GCC's AOR, especially overseas, will have contact with and very often work alongside other government agencies (OGA) in a whole of government approach. Ideally, RAF is not about solely using the military to accomplish policy objectives, but rather through relationship building to also contribute to diplomatic and informational initiatives. OGAs may include the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, as well as those involving law and drug enforcement. The authorities impacting deployed RAF units are critical since they both determine the tactical limits and resource the funding. There is no easier way for any commander to violate the law (often inadvertently) than to fail to understand funding related authorities. Using the wrong color of money is a serious matter as only Congress can specify how funds are to be used. Funding provides opportunities, but carries significant restrictions.

As a concept, RAF continues to grow and broaden. Regionally Aligned Forces will predominantly help in steady state shaping operations. The recent Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander, General Robert Cone, broadly described Phase Zero or shaping operations in the operational environment (OE) as, "...those operations, occurring at any echelon, that create or preserve conditions for success of the decisive operation. Thus engagement by Regionally Aligned Forces positively shapes the environment in which the Army operates thought the range of military operations."²⁷ GEN Cone described the RAF broadly and TSC expansively as "other actions that the units or even small groups of individual Soldiers can take"²⁸ He described the TSC mission of RAF as "running the gamut from division-sized assets to an individual soldier."²⁹ To that end, a look at general statutory authorities must be equally broad since there are no specific or new

RAF authorities.³⁰ The key for planners is to be creative in looking for authorities, which if implemented properly, enable mission execution. At the same time, planners must be careful to comply with requirements of Congressional mandates.³¹ Funding for RAF activities may be provided from the DoD budget as both operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for the Army in a CCMD-specific appropriation or in a special appropriation for a specific use.³² Any funding stream, of course, is always subject to or influenced by budget limitations.

The DoS budget, despite being considerably smaller than the DoD budget, may be a source of funding beyond what it typically provides to fund military-type missions. If the Regionally Aligned Forces are able to support a mission not usually handled by a military component, the DoS may consider funding it. Specifically, the DoS may consider the use of RAF assets if using the Army is more cost beneficial than other means for completing DoS missions. DoS partnership programs, many of which are used by the National Guard in the State Partnership Program (SPP), are also important. DoS funds have clear statutory requirements, however, and commanders and planners at all echelons must ensure funds are used appropriately directed.

Title 10 Authorities Overview

The starting place for authorities in support of geographic combatant commanders, is Chapter Six of Title 10, *United States Code*. Under that Chapter in Section 166, Congress provides funding for broad categories of assignments. Moreover, under Section 166a (a), Congress created the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF). Section 166a (b), authorizes the “CJCS to provide funds to the CCDRs for combined exercises and for foreign country participation.”³³ The authorization, although statutorily prioritized, is broad. Army Regionally Aligned Forces participating in CCMD activities may come under this authorization, but only if assigned or allocated as opposed to aligned. The use of this authority is dependent, however, upon the amount funded in apportions each year. Annual funding can make planning difficult, but this is a reality of Congressional budgets.³⁴

Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 168, Military-to-Military Contacts and Comparable Activities, covers “activities that are designed to encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries.”³⁵ This section includes “exchanges of military personnel between units of the armed forces and units of foreign Armed Forces.”³⁶ This law may be of particular use if the Army can show why its RAF personnel, as opposed to those of other services, are best suited due to their understanding of a region’s culture, languages, and customs to be exchanged with personnel of the region under consideration.

For RAF units oriented toward the Western Hemisphere, Congress established the Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance under United States Pacific Command (PACOM). This organization is the principal agency for promoting disaster preparedness and societal resiliency in the Asia-Pacific region for United States Government (USG) agencies.³⁷ This 1994 Act, codified in Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 182, “authorizes education, training, and research in civil-military operations, particularly operations that require international disaster management and humanitarian assistance and operations.”³⁸ The Center for Excellence works with Active and Reserve Components to develop domestic, foreign, and international capability and capacity.³⁹ The Center also offers customized education and training packages designed to meet the specific training objectives of the requesting organization. The requesting organization, such as an Army Regionally Aligned Force, helps select the curriculum and develop a draft agenda based on the training objectives and target audience.⁴⁰

The Center’s staff provides the training, facilitation, and case study management in support of the requested training. The curriculum is based on existing products or may be specifically developed to meet emerging mission-focused requirements from the requesting organization.⁴¹ The Center has many partners

among NGOs, IGOs and private enterprise. The 1994 statute states that training may be paid for through donations from these partners.⁴² Donations could be an avenue for resourceful RAF units to seek funding in support of training, especially in resource-constrained years.⁴³ A unit aligned with a particular Asian country with specific needs could, for example, request an estimate of what training would cost from the Center for Excellence. The unit could, with the Center's assistance, identify a partner interested in funding training through the Center at which both the RAF unit and the foreign country could attend.

Other possible funding sources may be specific to humanitarian aid situations and would be of special relevance to RAF units, such as medical or engineer detachments. Title 10, *United States Code*, Sections 401, 402, 404, 2557, and 2561 address humanitarian aid. Section 401 specifically authorizes "civic assistance expenditures in conjunction with military operations."⁴⁴ Section 401(e)(1) allows "medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care to be provided in areas of a foreign country that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals."⁴⁵ Section 401 further authorizes "education, training, and technical assistance"⁴⁶ to meet human and animal health needs. This statutory section also allows for the "construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems, well drilling, the construction of basic sanitation systems, and basic construction and repair of public facilities."⁴⁷

Additionally, the expenditure of Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) funds for unit O&M expenditures incurred pursuant to humanitarian assistance operations may be authorized and provided under several other specific statutes. Relevant statutes include Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 401(7), Humanitarian Demining Assistance, and Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 402, Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries (Denton Program). Other humanitarian statutes include Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 404, Foreign Disaster Assistance, and Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2561, which covers Humanitarian Assistance in general.⁴⁸ The DoD, under Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2557, can donate "excess nonlethal supplies for humanitarian purposes."⁴⁹ All provide potential opportunities for RAF units to shape the environment in Phase Zero.⁵⁰

The authorities noted apply to assigned and allocated RAF units, but some aligned units may have elements that could be deployed to humanitarian missions including education related tasks. A unique statutory authority exists for assigned and allocated units as well as service retained CCMD aligned forces for cost effective shaping opportunities in Phase Zero. This unique authority, Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 184, Regional Centers for Security Studies, allows small elements or individuals to participate in various programs. This section authorizes activities for "multilateral or bilateral research, communication, and the exchange of ideas for civilian and military personnel."⁵¹

Three research centers, the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies are in Washington, DC.⁵² The location of these centers makes it cost efficient for a CONUS-based RAF unit to send personnel for training and interaction with regional partners. Research centers located outside of CONUS, although beneficial for their geographic proximity, can be more expensive due to travel costs.

The George Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany is ideal for the U.S. forces remaining in Europe and European partners. The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii enables a central regional location for forces located in the PACOM AOR. Importantly, for relationship building, if a RAF unit is able to access funding to send its personnel to a center for a related program, participation from foreign Soldiers in the AOR aligned with the RAF unit "may be paid by foreign governments, other USG agencies, domestic or foreign foundations, or charitable organizations."⁵³ If the RAF unit has an aligned relationship with a CCMD, the funding from partners could be sought at that level. If there is no aligned relationship, funding would likely have to be sought from either their respective divisions or at the ASCC level.⁵⁴

This opens opportunities for the RAF unit to be creative, flexible, and adaptive. To a lesser degree, because of the nature of their programs, RAF personnel oriented to the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) could look to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), formerly known as the U.S. Army School of the Americas. WHINSEC was created under Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2166 and it authorizes “education and training to eligible military, law enforcement, and civilian personnel of Western Hemisphere nations.”⁵⁵

Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 374 addresses counter-narcotics activities. Under the current NDAA, it “authorizes DoD to provide counter-narcotics assistance and training for foreign security forces”⁵⁶ through FY 2014. Funding under Section 374 has been consistently extended in various NDAA's. Section 374 provides for major anti-narcotic programs focused primarily in SOUTHCOM's AOR that includes Total Army assets. RAF organizations with counter narcotic capabilities aligned to SOUTHCOM may be funded under this authority.

Title 10, *United States Code*, Sections 1050, and 1050a, authorize cooperation between the United States and Latin American countries and the United States and African countries.⁵⁷ These will be of particular interest to RAF units in the SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM areas of responsibility. These statutes provide a potential authority for military officers from those Latin American and African regions to travel to the CONUS and collaborate with RAF units. The SECDEF must approve the participating countries. For an approved country, the statutes authorize “travel, subsistence and special compensations and other expenses.”⁵⁸ In addition, Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 1051 allows the SECDEF to approve funding for bilateral or regional cooperation programs, including “defense personnel of developing countries” in conjunction with attending meetings “in the national security interests of the United States.”⁵⁹ These bilateral or regional cooperation programs have potential for a RAF unit to send Soldiers to a training program in which foreign Soldiers from their aligned region are attending.

Recently enacted Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 1051c allows for the “temporary assignment of a member of a foreign military to any DoD organization to train and improve that foreign Soldier's ability to understand and respond to information security threats.”⁶⁰ Unit information officers could explore the possibility of inviting a member of a foreign military from their aligned area to the training of the RAF units' own personnel, keeping security concerns in mind.⁶¹ If a RAF unit in CONUS were to be able to invite a foreign Soldier to participate in training, that Soldier could also be asked to assist with instructing other Soldiers in the RAF unit on the culture from the foreign Soldier's region. Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 1051c contemplates only a small number of foreign Soldiers training in the United States through temporary assignment. The effect, however, would enable greater cultural awareness for the RAF unit conducting the information security training.

Partner nations from the “developing world, participating in combined exercises, if approved by the SECDEF, in coordination with DoS,” may under Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2010 have their military's “incremental expenses” paid.⁶² Those expenses “include rations, fuel, training ammunition, and transportation, but not pay and allowances.”⁶³ Under this statute, a RAF unit training in its overseas-aligned region may be able to have foreign units participate in its training with minimal cost to the foreign nation.

SOF, civil affairs and military information support operations (MISO) units may, if authorized by a CCMD to which they are assigned or allocated, find a source of funding under Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2011. Section 2011 allows friendly foreign nations to train with U.S. SOF if the “primary purpose of an exercise is to train U.S. personnel.”⁶⁴ Another potential avenue for conducting partner training falls under the “Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP).”⁶⁵ This program is pursuant to Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2249c, Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program and authorizes appropriated

funds for costs associated with education and training of foreign officials. This section allows for “the education and training of foreign military officers and civilians from defense and security ministries of foreign countries to combat terrorism.”⁶⁶

RAF units participating in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations must comply with the rules and authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty. While the authorities associated with NATO are beyond the scope of this report, some sections of Title 10, *United States Code*, relating to NATO are worth mentioning.⁶⁷ For example, under Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2350a, NATO, allied, and friendly foreign countries may provide opportunities for building the kind of relationships for which the RAF concept is intended. More specifically, Section 2350a “authorizes the SECDEF to establish formal agreements with partner countries or organizations to conduct cooperative research and development projects on defense equipment and munitions. Such projects must contribute to the common conventional defense capabilities of the U.S. and the partner country or organization.”⁶⁸ The State Partnership Program of the National Guard will be explored under the “Title 32” section of this report. However, NATO related funding for authorized support to nations participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program falls under Title 10, *United States Code*, Sections 168, 1051, 2010.⁶⁹ PFP programs build trust and capacity the cornerstones of RAF. PFP programs involve the TA not just the NG.

Other Title 10 authorities, which could be used to enable RAF units to participate with regional partners on a small scale, include Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2557, Excess Non-Lethal Supplies. This Section enables “the SECDEF to provide excess non-lethal DoD supplies to the State Department for humanitarian relief distribution.”⁷⁰ RAF units may be employed in the distribution of these supplies. Another statute, Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2561, Humanitarian Assistance, authorizes “funds to be appropriated to DoD to provide transportation of humanitarian relief supplies and resources and for other humanitarian purposes.”⁷¹ Under this Section, a RAF unit may be employed to transport supplies for responding to events that pose serious environmental harm.

Title 22 Authorities Overview

The United States Government (USG) agency responsible for interacting with foreign governments is the DoS. All RAF activities are coordinated through the GCC and the U.S. Ambassadors’ country teams. Title 22, *United States Code*, Section 2311 is the general authority that “authorizes the President to furnish foreign military assistance. This includes the assigning or detailing of members of the DoD to include civilian personnel, to perform noncombatant duties and assist friendly foreign countries or international organizations to purchase defense articles or services.”⁷² Title 22, *United States Code*, Section 2347 covers International Military Education and Training (IMET). It authorizes the President to furnish “military education and training, on a reimbursable basis, to foreign military personnel.”⁷³ Education and training may be supported with either partner nation funds or American grant assistance. The statute not only covers schools but, critically for RAF (in either the assigned, allocated or the aligned stages), also allows for “observation and orientation visits to military facilities and related activities in the United States and abroad.”⁷⁴

Peacekeeping operations (PKO) are authorized in Title 22, *United States Code*, Section 2348. As addressed regarding NATO Peacekeeping, these operations are beyond BPC and TSC. Similar to combat operations, peacekeeping missions are separately funded. The statute “authorizes assistance to friendly countries and international organizations by terms and conditions as the President may determine for peacekeeping operations carried out in furtherance of the interests of the United States.”⁷⁵ It is also the law under which the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is authorized. GPOI is a major BPC and TSC mission for AFRICOM. The statute permits training and equipment for up to 75,000 military troops for

peacekeeping operations, focused on the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.⁷⁶ GPOI was launched in fiscal years (FY) 2005-2009 and is funded through FY 2014. GPOI, in the current budgeted phase emphasizes assisting partner country efforts to build sustainable, national peacekeeping training capacity.⁷⁷ RAF Participation in GPOI has already been successful:

Recent events in Mali significantly increased Africa Command's requirements for Army support to the Department of State Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)-funded training for partner nation security forces. Army Regionally Aligned Forces from 1-18 IN deployed a 22-person multifunctional training team to Oullam, Niger, on 27 May 2013 to help mentor and train a Nigerian Defense Force for deployment to Mali as part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali missions. Through interagency collaboration with the Chief of Mission and the Department of State, U.S. Army personnel were accompanied by seven PAE contractors to execute the training mission.⁷⁸

In a much more limited way, Army personnel might be involved in training foreign forces under Title 22, *United States Code*, Sections 2761-2762, Foreign Military Sales (FMS). FMS authorizes government-to-government sales of military materials, supplies, or equipment from DoD stocks or through new procurement. RAF personnel could also be involved, in small numbers, pursuant to Title 22, *United States Code*, Section 2769, Foreign Military Construction Sales, which authorizes "design and construction services to any eligible foreign country or international organization if such country or international organization agrees to pay for the services."⁷⁹

Title 32: National Guard, Army Reserve Issues and Individual State Laws

Members of the Army National Guard (ARNG) perform duty under three separate legal provisions.⁸⁰ When called up as the National Guard (NG) of the United States under Title 10, the provisions apply as they would for an Active Component or Army Reserve Soldier.⁸¹ Normally, when not on active duty, they function as the NG of individual states and territories, i.e., they act with federal funding, but under state control.⁸² Finally, the National Guard may be called to State Active Duty (SAD), where the state is in control and pays for the activity.⁸³ Consequently, training missions under Title 32 and some missions under various state laws and authorities may be potential funding sources for RAF CONUS-based National Guard missions.

The Regional Alignment of Forces incorporates what the National Guard has been doing for the last two decades in the SPP and expands it significantly.⁸⁴ SPP played a major part in the first successful RAF missions to AFRICOM.⁸⁵ "We in Africa Command rely on members of the Army and Air National Guard every day to accomplish our mission," said AFRICOM Commander General Carter Ham.⁸⁶ The benefits and use of the Guard as a Regionally Aligned Force have been detailed by others.⁸⁷ Under Titles 10 and 32, nine programs fund SPP activities and these programs were described in a 2011 report to Congress.⁸⁸ The authorities that can be used for SPP have been well documented.⁸⁹ SPP will remain a critical aspect of RAF and may be expanded. Several considerations are in order, however. Specifically, it is important to understand the various duty statuses between traditional and full time RC members. These cautions may apply equally in the case of Title 10 to the Reserve Component in various statuses. Both traditional NG and full-time NG technicians may perform missions under Title 32, *United States Code*, Section 502(f), even if on a federal mission.⁹⁰ Annual NG appropriations have received fiscal authority for specific operational activities, but the authority must be reviewed by planners and judge advocates each time they deviate from convention.⁹¹ Additionally, Full Time National Guard (FTNG) personnel may be under additional restrictions.

FTNG technicians operating under Title 32, *United States Code*, 709(a)(1) have a responsibility for the "organizing, administering or training of the NG, and the maintenance and repair of NG supplies."⁹²

Technicians may be given additional RAF-focused duties such as supporting federal training missions and instruction if a particular assignment does not interfere with their primary duties.⁹³ However, if the NG technician's unit, pursuant to request of the POTUS or SECDEF, is performing an authorized mission, the Title 32 NG technician may perform primary duties in support of that mission. Similar restrictions are placed on the use of FTNG Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Soldiers.⁹⁴ AGR Soldiers, similar to technicians, have a primary duty of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, and training the reserve component.⁹⁵ As long as it does not interfere with these duties, AGRs can perform additional duties to support unit operations if it is at the request of the POTUS or the SECDEF. Moreover, AGRs may support training operations and missions assigned to the AGR member's unit. The AR also has AGR Soldiers and technicians. Issues of how to use AGR and technicians in the AR parallels their use in the NG, with the exception that the AR is under Title 10.

National Guard units, like all RC units, may be given a RAF mission under Title 10. If they are, the authorities charged with review as to status and purpose of the mission will be similar to the authorities described in the "Title 10" section of this report. The review is especially important if the RAF mission is an annual training exercise. NG members under Title 32 with missions in the states and territories may have opportunities to participate with foreign regional partners in CONUS or locally. However, Title 32 authority does not apply overseas.⁹⁶

Both the AR and the NG are based on a platform of monthly training exercises known as drill weekends and 15 days of annual training (AT).⁹⁷ The SECARMY may order any unit and individual members not assigned to a unit, but in an active status in the reserve component, to AT.⁹⁸ The primary purpose of AT is to provide unit-based mission essential task list (METL) training. Operational support may also occur as a consequence of performing AT. This means that AT requirements may support RAF purposes overseas, so long as the primary, and larger component of training, is for U.S. forces. All AT must be within budgeted fiscal training constraints. In other words, foreign forces can participate with U.S. forces during AT if the main purpose is training U.S. forces. Thus, a well-planned training program with full judge advocate review may accomplish both the RAF and the METL requirements. Moreover, the SECARMY may order individual Soldiers to active duty or to remain on active duty beyond the 15 days for training or for operational support.⁹⁹ Thus, both RCs can use AT to support RAF. Additionally, SECARMY can mobilize the NG or AR for periods of no more than a year to augment the active forces for preplanned missions in support of a GCC.¹⁰⁰ In order for Reserve Component capabilities and assets to be utilized under this authority, the CCMD would have to describe the requirements and costs in detail for the SECDEF to submit the same to Congress. Currently, the 48th brigade combat team (BCT) from the Georgia ARNG is aligned with SOUTHCOM. The BCT's 3,900 Soldiers are scheduled to conduct 260 activities in 18 countries in 2014-2015.¹⁰¹ Mobilized RAF RC units will be assigned to a GCC. Non-mobilized Reserve Components, which are Army SRCA, could conduct their Annual Training in a GCC's AOR, thus supporting the RAF concept while in an aligned mode. Conversely, outside of AT as described above, alignment alone may prompt some authority issues since aligned forces may not be tasked, deployed or employed in support of CCMD requirements except for service functional support coordinated with the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC).¹⁰² In short, aligned forces within a CCMDs AOR remain under the control of the assigned ASCC and all service functional support executed within a CCMDs AOR is to be coordinated through the ASCC.¹⁰³

While the bulk of shaping opportunities for Army Guardsmen to perform under regional alignment will be in a Title 10 or Title 32 status, there is the potential that under SAD, opportunities could arise on small or individual levels. As General Cone pointed out, regional alignment of forces, as a method of shaping the operational environment, may not only be at the unit level. "A single act of kindness to a foreign student in an Army school who later rises to high levels in his or her nations' armed forces" counts as RAF shaping."¹⁰⁴

However, once ARNG units are aligned to an area, opportunities will arise. For example, the Adjutant Generals (TAGs) in many states have a mixed civil-military role. Their roles are similar to a service secretary or the Secretary of Veterans' Affairs within their respective states. TAGs can serve as an emergency management director and may deal with training individuals from foreign countries in various aspects of emergency management. TAGs may be invited in their secretarial status, (i.e., not in uniform), in a state role, for sponsored trade missions to an aligned country. Often a TAG seeks an expansive military-civilian approach with their assigned foreign states.¹⁰⁵ Individual National Guardsmen may have opportunities to interact with foreign military officials where their civilian jobs provide the basis for the interactions.¹⁰⁶ Such conduct has the potential to enhance the RAF mission, although such interaction could entail issues related to conflicts of interest.

Special Operations Forces

Since Regional Alignment of Forces generally applies to the Total Army, a brief mention of SOF is in order because the RAF goals of BPC and TSC are not new. The basic concept behind RAF has already "been used with great success by U.S. Army Special Forces and to a lesser extent by the U.S. Marines for many years," noted Professor Dan G. Cox.¹⁰⁷ In 1991, Congress clarified Title 10 to allow U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to use operations and maintenance funds to train foreign forces.¹⁰⁸ These Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs are designed to provide training opportunities for American Special Forces by conducting training operations in countries within which these forces may have to operate. They also provide training opportunities for the armed forces of the host countries. Typically, each JCET program involves 10–40 American SOF personnel. In 2011, Army SOF supported the Ugandan forces in their war against the Lord's Resistance Army, a terrorist group. The SOF operated in an advise and assist mission consistent with the RAF concept.¹⁰⁹ A more recent example of SOF in an advise and assist role occurred in Hungary. The embassy stated that the JCET activities were well aligned with that country's DoS Missions.¹¹⁰ JCET missions can support the BPC and TSC purposes of RAF. Regardless of the intent of military-to-military operations, emphasis must be placed on improving SOF and U.S. Army coordination with the DoS.¹¹¹ Review of JCET AARs and training materials may be of use to GPF units conducting missions in the regions with which they are aligned. What must be very clear, however, is that SOF, acting clandestinely under the special authorities of Title 50, do not fall within the parameters of the RAF concept.

Other Authorities and the FY 2014 NDAA

Other laws that may help enable the RAF concept include Public Law 110-293, Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) in support of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). This law authorizes activities to protect and prevent foreign nation armed forces from HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.¹¹² In another example, under Public Law 104-201 Section 1082, Agreements for Exchange of Defense Personnel between the United States and Foreign Countries, "the SECDEF may enter into agreements to exchange military and civilian personnel of DoD with similar personnel of a foreign defense ministry. Exchanged personnel could fill positions as instructors."¹¹³ Additionally, DoD personnel may be assigned to positions in private industry that support a foreign defense ministry.¹¹⁴ Moreover, under Public Law 109-163, Section 1206, Authority to Build Capacity of Foreign Military Forces, "POTUS may direct the SECDEF to conduct or support BPC of a foreign country's national military forces in order for that country to conduct counter-terrorist operations or participate in or support military and stability operations in which U.S. Forces are a participant."¹¹⁵ The program may include providing equipment, supplies, and training. This is an example of a joint DoD and DoS program.¹¹⁶ Finally, Public Law 111-84, Section 1207, Authority for Non-Reciprocal Exchanges of Defense Personnel between the United States and Foreign Countries, allows "the SECDEF to

enter into agreements with the governments of allied or friendly foreign countries for the exchange of military and civilian personnel of the foreign defense ministry.”¹¹⁷

Since RAF is a policy and therefore lacks direct funding or specific authority for implementation, the FY 14 NDAA must be reviewed to ascertain if it contains sections which might support the RAF concept.¹¹⁸ First, Section 1071 of the FY 14 NDAA, which amends Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 426, creates a “Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC).”¹¹⁹ This center (located at National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC) is an example of a pan-government collaboration.¹²⁰ It allows “collaboration within the broad national security communities both domestic and international.”¹²¹ This law enables DoD to receive services, personnel, and funds from other agencies as well as to “receive gifts and donations to defray costs or enhancing the operation of the CRRC.”¹²² Section 426 is broadly written and could provide opportunities to pair individual Soldiers from a RAF unit with Soldiers or academics from the RAF’s aligned country to collaborate on “research, conferences, seminars, and other information exchanges.”¹²³ Second, Section 1086 of the FY 14 NDAA requires the “SECDEF to review SOF including the requirements of GCCs.”¹²⁴ This review assesses “force structure, capabilities, authorities” and how they can be better “aligned with conventional force structures as well as any other matters the Comptroller General determines to be relevant.”¹²⁵ Although RAF directly targets GPF rather than SOF, this study provides an opportunity for the SECARMY and CSA to recommend a broadening of authorizations and funding to assist in the RAF mission. Third, and important for the foreign language portion of RAF, Section 1088 of the FY 14 NDAA requires “the SECDEF to complete a report on DoD’s management of foreign language programs.”¹²⁶ The SECARMY and CSA should provide input to this study as it relates to the RAF concept because culture and language are key aspects of this concept.

As noted, Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 1051c allows “the temporary assignment of a member of a foreign military to any DoD organization to train and improve that foreign Soldier’s ability to understand and respond to information security threats.”¹²⁷ The fourth relevant section of the FY 14 NDAA relates to the information security issue. Section 1096 calls for the “development of a DoD strategy for information operations through 2020.”¹²⁸ The Army could use this study to propose a more expansive use of regionally aligned foreign Soldiers in information security operations with their U.S. RAF counterparts. Fifth, Section 1203 authorizes, with SECDEF approval, “GPF to train with foreign forces if the SECDEF determines that the training is in the national interest of the United States.”¹²⁹ This broadly written section specifies funding to \$10,000,000 per fiscal year for this purpose.¹³⁰ In a time of diminishing resources, well planned and SECDEF approved overseas training with RAF units can leverage this authority. Sixth, Section 1205(d) recognizes the success of the SPP by clarifying its authority and outlining the specific funds that may be spent on foreign militaries.¹³¹ It calls for a full review of the SPP, which is an opportunity for the Army to make recommendations to further the SPP, thus enhancing the RAF concept.¹³²

Several other FY2014 NDAA Sections, which modify or extend current authorities, are noteworthy. Section 1201 is the “modification and extension of authorities relating to BPC programs with foreign military forces.”¹³³ Section 1202 creates a “Global Security Contingency Fund.”¹³⁴ Section 1204 grants “authority to conduct activities to enhance the capability of foreign countries to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”¹³⁵ Congress, cognizant of increasing U.S. presence in Africa, addressed the “United States security and assistance strategies in Africa” within the FY 14 NDAA at Section 1206.”¹³⁶ The FY 14 NDAA Section 1207, authorizes “assistance to the Government of Jordan for border security operations.”¹³⁷ The involvement of U.S. forces in support of actions against the African terrorist organization the Lord’s Resistance Army, is discussed in FY 14 NDAA, Section 1208.¹³⁸ This law delineates the Department of Defense’s ability to support forces against the Lord’s Resistance Army operating in and around Uganda.

Recommendations

RAF is a dynamic response to the need to be able to act in an agile, cost effective fashion, while building partner capacity and shaping the theater environment. The RAF concept has potential because the Army is responsible for landpower and works in the human domain where culture matters. Through RAF, the Army has the greatest opportunity and need to understand culture, language, and particularities of a region and the people who reside there. RAF as a concept continues to be refined as details are explored and solidified. RAF missions come with no separate funding and under no special statutory authority. Other authorities and statutes must be applied and, therefore, constantly reviewed by planners and judge advocates to ensure that RAF policy aligns with extant authorizations.

In order to deliver high value at low cost, the Army must continue to ensure units are able to perform their assigned tasks. This does not mean those units in the aligned stage cannot take advantage of relatively low cost methods such as cultural orientation, basic language study, and regional skills training.¹³⁹ Doing so requires no new authorities. RAF include more than corps, division, BCT, or company level deployments. Planners and judge advocates must look for novel and well-analyzed ways under existing statutes to deploy Soldiers, including individual augmentations, to the region where the unit is aligned. Educational opportunities for and with aligned foreign militaries should continue and be augmented when possible. Finally, military leaders must consult with judge advocates regarding the potential opportunities to accomplish or enhance training in support of a combatant commander's theater strategy. As the RAF concept continues to develop and evolve, commanders and judge advocates must assess and understand the authorities that rule unit and individual participation. The U.S. Army must reinforce the importance of understanding authorities in its RAF discussions at the Judge Advocate General's school and the Army's Pre-Command Course for selected officers. Gaining a firm understanding of the authorities which control training opportunities will benefit the U.S. Army and the interests of the United States, while adhering to fiscal responsibilities as established by law.

Notes

¹ James E. Rexford, "Regionally Aligned Forces" briefing slides with scripted commentary, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, November 19, 2013.

² U.S. Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," Washington, DC, January 2012, available from www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf, accessed on November 5, 2013.

³ Kristian Matthew Marks, *Enabling Theater Security Cooperation Through Regionally Aligned Forces*, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2013, pp. 8-12.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ U.S. Department of the Army G3/5/7, "Regional Alignment of Forces 27 JUN 13," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, October 19, 2013.

⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., p. 8

⁹ This paper addresses authorities related to the use of uniformed Army personnel for RAF. Army Civilian personnel are a critical part of the Total Army. Many authorities discussed here apply to them, however because of the complexity of civilian employment issues, union matters, civil service issues, merit protections and other Human Resources matters Army Civilian employee usage for RAF Missions will not be separately discussed in this article. See U.S. Army Civilian Personnel, <http://cpol.army.mil/>, accessed on December 29, 2013.

¹⁰ House Armed Services Committee, "Fact Sheet: FY14 NDAA Summary," Washington, DC, December 2013, available from http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=127E1D4B-DD70-4B69-80DC-A036DA7B3519, accessed on January 9, 2014.

¹¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Generating Force Support for Operations*, Army Field Manual 1-01, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, April 2, 2008, p. 1-1. This document can now be found at: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/doctrine/CDG/cdg_resources/manuals/fm/fm1_01.pdf

¹² Ibid., pp.1-1 to 1-2.

¹³ Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland, "US Landpower in Regional Focus, Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual," *Parameters* 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2013), p. 56.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of the Army G3/5/7, "Regional Alignment of Forces 27 JUN 13," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, October 19, 2013, p. 3.

¹⁵ Total Force within this context encompasses the Total Army as previously defined.

¹⁶ Field, "U.S. Landpower in Regional Focus," p. 56.

¹⁷ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 162(a)(1).

¹⁸ Ibid., Section 162(a)(3).

¹⁹ Ibid., Section 162.

²⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0, Washington, DC, Department of Defense, August 11, 2001. Appendix H.

²¹ Field, "U.S. Landpower in Regional Focus," p. 56.

²² Charles L. Cleveland and Stewart T. Farris, "Toward Strategic Landpower," *Army Magazine*, July 2013, pp. 21-22.

²³ Title 10, *United States Code*, Sections 162 and 3013.

²⁴ Ibid., Sections 162 and 3013(b) & (c).

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, DoDD 5100.01, Washington, DC, Department of Defense, December 21, 2010, available from www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510001p.pdf accessed on December 24, 2013.

²⁷ Robert W. Cone and Jon D. Mohundro, "Capstone, Strategic Landpower for the Company Commander: Leading the U.S. Army into the 21st Century," *ARMY*, January 2014, p. 39.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ This report addresses broad authorities that may be used by RAF units during in shaping. It does not discuss wartime or contingency operations funding or specific peacekeeping or stability missions.

³¹ For an excellent overview of issues and authorities for a member of a GCC's team see Harry A. Tomlin, "United States European Command, Theater Strategic Level Interagency Planning Handbook 2012," Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2012. See also, *The Management of Security Assistance*, 27th ed., Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, October 2007.

³² Ibid., pp. B-4, B-5.

³³ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 166a(b).

³⁴ Regrettably, there seems to be little that currently will solve the issue of a lack of a long-term budget.

³⁵ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 166a(b).

³⁶ Ibid., Section 168(c)(4).

³⁷ "The CFE-DMHA Strategy," *Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance*, available from <http://www.cfe-dmha.org/about-cfe-dmha/cfe-dmha-strategy.html>, accessed on December 26, 2013.

³⁸ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 182 (b) (1).

³⁹ The Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, available from www.cdmha.org, accessed on December 27, 2013.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ The Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Activities Page, available from <http://www.cdmha.org/activities.htm>, accessed on December 26, 2013.

⁴² Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 182 (d)(1).

⁴³ The Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Resources Page, available from www.cdmha.org/Resources.htm, accessed on December 26, 2013. See also 10 USC Sec 182 (d).

⁴⁴ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 401(a)(1).

⁴⁵ Ibid., Section 401(e)(1).

⁴⁶ Ibid. For an example see, “Realigning Regional Forces Aimed at Preventing Future Wars”, *ARMY, The Magazine of the Associating of the United States Army*, January 2013, available from www.ansa.org/publications/ausanews/archives/2013/01/Pages/Realigningregionalforcesaimedatpreventingfuturewars.aspx, accessed on November 19, 2013.

⁴⁷ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 401(e)(2)(3)(4).

⁴⁸ Tomlin, “United States European Command,” p. B3.

⁴⁹ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2557(a)(1).

⁵⁰ Phase Zero activities per U.S. Joint Doctrine address normal and routine military activities potentially conducted by military forces and interagency departments to dissuade potential adversaries while reassuring and building relationships with partners and allies. See Joint Pub 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, August 2011.

⁵¹ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 184(a).

⁵² Ibid., Section 184(b)(2).

⁵³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Security Cooperation Handbook*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, March 5, 2013), p. 68.

⁵⁴ The challenge is to identify how far out this training should occur especially regarding funding timelines. This is part of the synchronization efforts that staffs are going to have to work out in order to ensure the appropriate individuals or staffs are attending training especially in regards to future training opportunities.

⁵⁵ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2166(c). See also, *The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation Homepage*, available from www.benning.army.mil/tenant/WHINSEC/index.html, accessed on December 24, 2013.

⁵⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Security Cooperation Handbook*, p. 69.

⁵⁷ See Title 10, *United States Code*, Sections 1050 and 1050(a).

⁵⁸ Ibid., Section 1050.

⁵⁹ Ibid., Section 1051(a).

⁶⁰ Ibid., Section 1051c(a).

⁶¹ Ibid., Section 1051c(c).

⁶² Ibid., Section 2010(a).

⁶³ Ibid., Section 2010(d).

⁶⁴ United States Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (DoD FMR)*, DoD 7000.14R (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 2012), 15-3.

⁶⁵ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2249(c).

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Brian H. Brady, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Legal Advisor: A Primer,” *The Army Lawyer* (October 2013) 4. See also Tomlin, “United States European Command.”

⁶⁸ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2350(a).

⁶⁹ NATO, The Partnership for Peace Programme, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm, accessed on December 27, 2013.

⁷⁰ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2557(a)(1).

⁷¹ Ibid., Section 2561(a)(1).

⁷² Ibid., Section 2311(a).

⁷³ Ibid., Section 2347c(a).

⁷⁴ Ibid., Section 2347(3).

⁷⁵ Ibid., Section 2348.

⁷⁶ United States Department of State, Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), available from www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/, accessed on December 24, 2013.

⁷⁷ United States Department of State, Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) "Phase II" (Fiscal Years 2010-2014), available from <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/c47009.htm>, accessed on December 24, 2013.

⁷⁸ Field, “U.S. Landpower in Regional Focus,” pp. 61-62.

⁷⁹ Title 22, *United States Code*, Section 2769.

⁸⁰ Ibid., Sections 326-27.

⁸¹ Ibid., Section 101(5), and Section 802.

⁸² Ibid., See also Title 32, *United States Code*, Section 502.

⁸³ See generally, National Guard Fact Sheet Army National Guard (FY2005), available from www.army.mil/ SiteCollectionDocuments/ Publications/ News%20Media%20Factsheets/ ARNG_Factsheet_May_06%20ARNG%20fact%20Sheet.pdf, accessed on December 28, 2013.

⁸⁴ Joshua Parrish, "The Value of Regional Alignment," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 39, no.1., January - March 2013, p. 44.

⁸⁵ Field, "U.S. Landpower in Regional Focus," p. 61-62. See also MG Charles Hooper, "Going Farther by Going Together: Building Partner Capacity in Africa," *Joint Force Quarterly* 67, (4th Quarter 2012).

⁸⁶ Jim Greenhill, "Ham: National Guard essential to Africa Command," *National Guard News*, September 12, 2012, available from www.nationalguard.mil/ news/ archives/ 2012/ 09/ 091112-Ham.aspx, accessed on December 28, 2013.

⁸⁷ Edward S. Smith, Army National Guard: Regionally Aligned Brigade Force of First Choice, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 15, 2012).

⁸⁸ Lawrence Kapp and Nina Serafina, *The National Guard State Partnership Program: Background Issues, and Options for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 15, 2011). pp. 6-11

⁸⁹ Ibid., Appendix B.

⁹⁰ National Guard technicians were created under "The Technician Act of 1968", Public Law 90-486 codified at Title 32, *United States Code*, Section 709. They are civilian federal employees, who as a condition of their federal technical job must be a member of the Reserve Component. When at work they wear their uniform. They drill with a National Guard unit, which may or may not be the same unit they work in as a technician.

⁹¹ See Public Law 112-74.

⁹² Title 32, *United States Code*, Section 709(a)(1)(2).

⁹³ Ibid., Section 709(a)(3).

⁹⁴ Active Guard Reserve (AGR), is a program that places Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers on federal active duty status under Title 10 U.S.C. or full-time National Guard duty under Title 32 U.S.C. 502(f).

⁹⁵ Title 32, *United States Code*, Section 328.

⁹⁶ Ibid., Section 502(f)(1) and (2).

⁹⁷ The Dick Act, also known as The Militia Act of 1903, (32 Stat. 775), first provided federal funds to the National Guard to pay for equipment and training, including annual summer encampments. It created the one weekend a month two weeks a year program, which was also incorporated into the Army Reserves when it was formed in 1908.

⁹⁸ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 12301(b).

⁹⁹ Ibid., Section 12301(d)(2). The authority of the SECARMY to direct Army forces to conduct operational-domain training within the AOR of a GCC is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SECDEF as well as to Title 10 USC § 162.

¹⁰⁰ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 12304(b).

¹⁰¹ Lance M. Bacon, "Regional Alignment may Boost Soldiers' Career Stability," *Military Times*, December 10, 2013.

¹⁰² Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 162. See also OPOD 13-067, Army Reserve Regional Aligned Forces, Annex B, Draft V7.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Cone, "Capstone, Strategic Landpower for the Company Commander," p. 39.

¹⁰⁵ See for example, Pennsylvania-Lithuania Partnership: Background, Accomplishments and Relevance, White Paper, Fort Indiantown Gap, PA, November 2013, p. 2. "The unique civil-military nature of the PANG enables it to interact with Lithuanian active and reserve forces as well as civilian and governmental agencies."

¹⁰⁶ The author as a civilian employee of the United States Senate has traveled overseas and met with foreign military personal pursuant to Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, Title 22, *United States Code*, Section 2451.

¹⁰⁷ Dan Cox, "An Enhanced plan for Regionally Aligning Brigades Using Human Terrain Systems," *Small Wars Journal*, June 2012, available from smallwarsjournal.com/ jrn/ art/ an-enhanced-plan-for-regionally-aligning-brigades-using-human-terrain-systems, accessed on December 28, 2013.

¹⁰⁸ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 2011.

¹⁰⁹ Carlo Munoz, "Army Builds First of New Brigades to Train Foreign Militaries" *Breaking Defense*, (October 17, 2011) available from breakingdefense.com/ 2011/ 10/ army-builds-first-of-new-brigades-to-train-foreign-militaries/, accessed on December 28, 2013.

¹¹⁰ Embassy of the United States, Budapest Hungary, "Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) for Special Operations Forces (SOF)," August 7 2013, available from hungary.usembassy.gov/ event_08072013.html, accessed on December 23, 2013.

¹¹¹ Jim Thomas and Chris Dougherty, "Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces," *Center for Strategic Budget Assessments*, 2013, p. 96.

¹¹² Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, available from www.med.navy.mil/ sites/ nhrc/ dhapp/ Pages/ default.aspx, accessed on December 28, 2013.

¹¹³ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997*, Public Law 104-201, 104th Cong. (September 23, 1996), 2673.

¹¹⁴ Kapp and Serafina, *The National Guard State Partnership Program*, Appendix B.

¹¹⁵ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006*, Public Law 109-163, 109th Cong. (January 6, 2006), 3456-3457.

¹¹⁶ Kapp and Serafina, *The National Guard State Partnership Program*, Appendix B.

¹¹⁷ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010*, Public Law 111-84, 111th Cong. (October 28, 2009), 2514-2515.

¹¹⁸ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, Public Law 113-66, 113th Cong. (December 26, 2013), p. 867.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ *Conflict Records Research Center*, “About CRRC,” available from crrc.dodlive.mil/, accessed on December 30, 2013.

¹²¹ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 427(b)(4). See also, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, Public Law 113-66, 113th Cong. (December 26, 2013), p. 867.

¹²² Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 427(e). See also, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, Public Law 113-66, 113th Cong. (December 26, 2013), p. 868.

¹²³ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, Public Law 113-66, 113th Cong. (December 26, 2013), p. 867.

¹²⁴ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, Public Law 113-66, 113th Cong. (December 26, 2013), p. 873.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, Section 1086.

¹²⁶ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, Public Law 113-66, 113th Cong. (December 26, 2013), 874.

¹²⁷ Title 10, *United States Code*, Section 1051c(a).

¹²⁸ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, Public Law 113-66, 113th Cong. (December 26, 2013), p. 880.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 894.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 898.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, Public Law 113-66, 113th Cong. (December 26, 2013), p. 891.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 893.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 896.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 899.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 902.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 903.

¹³⁹ Daniel Stoutamire, “Dagger University prepares Soldiers for missions to Africa,” available from www.army.mil/article/103815/Dagger_University_prepares_Soldiers_for_missions_to_Africa/, accessed on December 29, 2013. See also Benton, “2/1 ABCT Regionally Aligned Force Interim Lessons Report.”

The United States Army War College

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving national security objectives.

	The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national security and strategic research and analysis to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between military and academia.
	The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development contributes to the education of world class senior leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national security community.
	The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute provides subject matter expertise, technical review, and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability operations concepts and doctrines.
	The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program supports the United States Army War College’s lines of effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being education and support by developing self-awareness through leader feedback and leader resiliency.
	The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, resource management, and responsible command.
	The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use to support the U.S. Army, educate an international audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

